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ABSTRACT 
 
‘DISCIPLINING’ TURKISH PEOPLE THROUGH THE PEOPLE’S HOUSES: A 
DISCURSIVE READING OF THE ÜLKÜ MAGAZINE (1933-1950) 
 
Kılınç, Volkan. 
MA, Department of Modern Turkish Studies 
Thesis Supervisor: Prof. Mesut Yeğen 
March 2017, 193 pages 
 
This study examines the Ülkü (the Ideal) magazine, which was the main publicat ion 
of the People's Houses (1932-1951) in Turkey, by conducting a discourse analysis 
through a Foucauldian perspective. By drawing on his concepts of 'disciplinary power', 
'biopower', and 'governmentality', the study argues that, the People's Houses were 
designed by the republican policy makers not only to spread the Kemalist ideology, 
but also to increase the state's control over the population through disciplinary and 
regulatory policies and techniques. First, I summarize the historical process and 
developments leading to the establishment of the People's Houses in some detail. Then, 
I conduct an extended literature review by discussing the shortcomings of the 
mainstream approach and underlying the important contributions of the critical studies 
on these institutions. Third, I introduce my research hypothesis in light of the three 
theoretical concepts above. I argue that the activities of the People's Houses were 
designed by the policy makers to improve physical capabilities of individuals, to 
render the population healthier and to accelerate its growth; to increase its economic 
productivity; and to transform ordinary people into modern republican citizens that the 
new regime envisaged by shaping their lifestyles, habits, beliefs, and aesthetic tastes 
through 'conduct of conduct'. Lastly, I concentrate on numerous writings and speeches 
by prominent republican intellectuals and policy makers that were published in the 
Ülkü magazine, the main publication of the People's Houses. By zeroing in on the 
ideas and policy designs of the republican policy makers and intellectuals about 
physical education, the issue of population, political economy, and folk education; I 
intend to demonstrate that modern governmental rationality was an integral part of 
their mindset, and that the ultimate objective of the People's Houses project extended 
well beyond mere 'ideological indoctrination' or 'control over minds'. 
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ÖZ 
 
HALKEVLERİ ARACILIĞIYLA TÜRKİYE’DE NÜFUSUN ‘TERBİYESİ’: 
ÜLKÜ DERGİSİNİN SÖYLEMSEL BİR ANALİZİ (1933-1950) 
 
Kılınç, Volkan. 
MA, Modern Türkiye Çalışmaları Bölümü 
Tez Danışmanı: Prof. Dr. Mesut Yeğen 
Mart 2017, 193 Sayfa 
 
Bu çalışma Türkiye'de Halkevleri'nin (1932-1951) ana yayın organı olan Ülkü 
dergisini bir söylem analizi yaparak incelemektedir. Çalışma Michel Foucault'nun 
'disiplinci iktidar', 'bio-iktidar'' ve 'yönetimsellik' kavramlarına dayanarak 
Halkevleri’nin cumhuriyet yöneticileri tarafından sadece Kemalist ideolojiyi yaymak 
amacıyla kurulmadığını, buna ek olarak disiplinci ve düzenleyici politikalar ve 
teknikler aracılığıyla devletin nüfus üzerindeki kontrolünü arttırma amacına da hizmet 
etmek için kurulmuş olduklarını iddia etmektedir. Çalışmada ilk önce Halkevleri’nin 
kuruluşuna yol açan tarihsel süreç ve gelişmeler özetlenmektedir. Daha sonra ise geniş 
bir literatür taraması ile Halkevleri üzerine yapılmış ana akım çalışmaların eksik 
yönleri tartışılmakta ve öte yandan eleştirel çalışmaların yaptığı önemli katkılar 
vurgulanmaktadır. Üçüncü olarak, yukarıda bahsi gecen teorik kavramlar ışığında bu 
çalışmanın ana tezi olan Halkevleri’nin faaliyetlerinin cumhuriyet yöneticile r i 
tarafından bireylerin bedensel yeteneklerini arttırma, nüfus artistini hızlandırma ve 
nüfusu daha sağlıklı kılma, nüfusun üretkenliğini arttırma ve yönetimsellik  (conduct 
of conduct) aracılığıyla bireylerin yasam tarzları, alışkanlıkları, inançları ve bedii 
zevklerini şekillendirerek onları yeni rejimin tahayyül ettiği cumhuriyetçi vatandaşlara 
dönüştürme amaçlarıyla tasarlanmış oldukları iddiası sunulmaktadır. Çalışmanın son 
bölümünde ise bu iddiayı desteklemek amacıyla önde gelen cumhuriyet yöneticiler inin 
ve entelektüellerinin beden terbiyesi, nüfus meselesi, ekonomi-politik ve halk eğitimi 
gibi konular hakkında Halkevleri’nin ana yayın organı olan Ülkü dergisinde 
yayınlanmış olan yazıları ve demeçleri detaylı bir şekilde incelenmektedir. Bu 
incelemeyle amaçlanan modern yönetim zihniyetinin cumhuriyet yöneticilerinin zihin 
dünyasının ayrılmaz bir öğesi olduğunu ve Halkevi projesinin nihai hedeflerinin dar 
vii 
anlamıyla 'ideolojik endoktrinasyon' veya 'zihinler üzerinde kontrol kurma' amacının 
çok ötesine geçmiş olduğunu gösterebilmektir. 
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Ülkü Dergisi, Halkevleri, modernleşme, disiplinci iktidar, bio-
iktidar, yönetimsellik. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The decision to establish Halkevleri (People’s Houses) around Turkey was taken 
during the third congress of the CHP (Republican People’s Party) in May 1931. After 
this decision a delegated party committee immediately started to prepare for the 
inauguration of the People’s Houses. Nine months later preparations were complete d, 
and on February 19th 1932 People’s Houses were simultaneously opened in 14 cities1 
with an inauguration speech by the CHP Secretary General Recep Peker broadcasted 
live on the Ankara radio. In his speech Peker defined the goal of the Houses as: “… to 
organize the [Turkish] nation as a group of conscious people who understand and love 
each other, and who are committed to the ideal [of the Turkish Republic].”2 In the 
following years the number of the People’s Houses steadily increased, reaching to a 
total of 478 by 1950. Moreover, in 1939 the government also started to establish 
People’s Rooms in villages around Turkey. The People’s Rooms were designed as 
smaller versions of the Houses, and the party intended to expand the activities of these 
institutions to villages in which population was not sufficient to open People’s Houses. 
By 1950 the number of People’s Rooms had reached to 4322. Taken together, the 
overall number of the People’s Houses and the Rooms can be seen as an indication of 
the willingness, and perhaps also the desperation, of the new regime to spread the 
reforms and its ideology to ordinary people.  
 
In simple terms, the People’s Houses were established in 1932 in order to accelerate 
the modernization process in Turkey which was initiated by the founders of the 
republic almost a decade earlier. Therefore, these institutions should be construed as 
an integral element of a greater and ambitious modernization and nation-build ing 
project. Alberto Martinelli simply defines modernization as “...the combination of 
social, economic, political, and cultural largescale changes that have characterized the 
past 200 years and that are by now taking over the entire world.”3 Although 
‘modernity’ originated in Western Europe, the concept of modernization does not 
                                                                 
1 These cities include Adana, Afyon, Ankara, Aydın, Bursa, Çanakkale, Denizli, Diyarbakır, Eskişehir, 
İstanbul, İzmir, Konya, Samsun, and Van. 
2 Recep Peker, “Halkevleri Açılma Nutku” p.6, in Ülkü, February 1933, Volume: 1. 
3 Alberto Martinelli, Global Modernization: Rethinking the Project of Modernity , p.9, Sage 
Publications: London, 2005. 
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necessarily exclude the experience of other countries that are located outside of the 
‘West’. In the 20th century, as a result of the fall of empires after the WWI and later 
the decolonization process, multiple new nation states were formed; and as Erne st 
Gellner underlines, nationalist elites in these newly formed nation states strived for 
modernization and nation-building.4 For such nationalist elites education of ordinary 
people through formal or semi-formal education was an indispensable part of nation-
building. 
 
In this respect, the Turkish case seems to be largely in line with the ‘global trends’. As 
the founders of a newly established nation state, the republican elite wished to rapidly 
transform the society into a modern nation. For this purpose, education of ordinary 
people, the majority of whom continued to live in villages and were illiterate, was seen 
by the republican elite as a ‘panacea’ to Turkey’s problems. Yet, formal education 
alone seemed incapable of introducing such a transformation in a short time period. 
The republican elite, however, desired to see rapid results as they aimed to catch up 
with the Western civilization by closing ‘a gap of centuries in a few decades’, even 
shorter if possible. Much to their despair, despite the rapid introduction of various 
political, legal, economic, and social reforms throughout the 1920s and early 1930s, 
the majority of ordinary people in Turkey remained reluctant, and occasionally became 
resistant, to endorse the reforms and the values of the new regime. A series of events, 
such as the short-lived Liberal Party experiment in 1930, and the Menemen incident 
in the following months, along with the negative effects of the Great Depression; 
revealed a growing discontent and resentment among ordinary people towards the 
single party rule of the CHP. In other words, in the early 1930s it became clear that the 
reforms had not taken root in society, and that the regime stood on shaky ground. 
 
The People’s Houses were established in such a historical context to entrench the 
republican regime by spreading its ideology and core values among ordinary people; 
to transform their pre-republic and heterogeneous identities into a uniform Turkish 
identity; and in this way to complement the modernization and national integrat ion 
process in Turkey. In this quest for modernization the People’s Houses operated along 
with other institutions, such as the ministry of education and the Village Institutes that 
                                                                 
4 Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, Basil Blackwell: London, 1983. 
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shared the same goals. As the main institution of education in the country, the most 
pressing priority of the ministry was to promote primary education in Turkey by 
opening new schools in the remote corners of Anatolia, and training sufficient numbers 
of teachers. However, the government lacked the necessary financial resources to build 
a primary school in every village, and the dispersed nature of Anatolian villages made 
this task even more difficult. Moreover, it became clear in the 1930s that teachers of 
urban origin could not easily adapt to village life, and thus they did not show the 
enthusiastic performance that the government expected of them. This lack of 
adaptability and enthusiasm on the part of village teachers of urban origin hindered the 
success of the republican education campaign.  
 
Therefore, leading republican educators, such as Hasan Ali Yücel and İsmail Hakkı 
Tonguç, with the influence of the peasantist ideology of the time, came up with the 
idea of ‘peasant teachers’ who, upon receiving a training in institutions that were 
specifically designed for them, would return to their villages and build village schools 
with the assistance of their fellow peasants to educate and enlighten them. After a pilot 
study for three years, the Village Institutes were established in 1940 to eradicate 
poverty and ignorance among peasants, to transform social relations in villages, to 
increase agricultural productivity, to create peasant intellectuals, and to help spread 
the Kemalist ideology in the countryside.5 The institutes were designed to give 
prospective peasant teachers a vocational and practical education so that they, in turn, 
could teach peasants modern methods of agriculture, and other crafts to increase 
economic production. In sum, the ministry of education, the People’s Houses, and the 
Village Institutes shared the same goals, and together they constituted three 
educational pillars of the republican modernization project. 
 
According to the bylaw of the People’s Houses, a fully operational House would 
consist of the following nine branches: Language, Literature, and History; Fine Arts, 
Theatre, Sports, Social Assistance, Educational Courses, Library and Publicat ion, 
Village Studies, and Museum and Exhibition branches. The bylaw defines activit ies 
and responsibilities of each branch in detail. Collectively, the responsibilities of the 
branches included: Promoting Turkish language, literature, and history among local 
                                                                 
5 M. Asım Karaömerlioglu, “The Village Institute Experience in Turkey”, p.47, British Journal of 
Middle Eastern Studies, Volume 25, Issue 1 (May 1998), pp.47-73. 
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people; encouraging them to perform fine arts such as painting and sculpture, and 
theatre; promoting sports activities and physical education, providing poor people and 
the sick with financial assistance and healthcare; conducting ethnographic research on 
nearby villages and their inhabitants, and publishing such research; educating and 
enlightening peasants; and collecting and preserving historical artifacts in museums. 
All Houses had to send the center a detailed quarterly activity report and their 
membership records. All citizens were encouraged to become members of the Houses 
and participate in their activities; but management positions were reserved only for 
party members. Overall, the Houses operated as the cultural branches of the CHP 
without having their own legal personality. The party exercised great control over the 
Houses, and closely inspected their activities. In the long run, this close affilia t ion 
with, and dependence on the CHP precipitated the closure of the People’s Houses by 
the Democrat Party in 1951. 
 
The vast literature on the People’s Houses can be roughly divided into two groups. 
First, the mainstream approach constitutes the bulk of the existing literature, and it 
heavily relies on the official historiography and the ‘public transcript’ of the early 
republican period. Usually, studies in this group uncritically celebrate the People’s 
Houses as a successful experiment that accelerated the modernization process in 
Turkey. For example, as the leading figure of the mainstream approach, Anıl Çeçen 
argues that the People’s Houses were established to awaken ordinary people from a 
medieval sleep, and to modernize Turkey according to the principles of Atatürk.6 The 
main deficiency of the mainstream studies derives from their over reliance on the 
official historical narrative of the early republican period, and their failure to notice 
the ideological and assimilative functions of the People’s Houses. The critical studies, 
on the other hand, examine the People’s Houses from a variety of perspectives, and 
shed light on the ideological and assimilative functions of these institutions. These 
studies usually underline the authoritarian and top-down nature of the republican 
modernization project, and maintain that the People’s Houses were established to 
spread the revolutions, and to indoctrinate and assimilate ordinary people in line with 
the republican principles. For instance, Sefa Şimşek argues that the Houses were 
established to transform traditional, religious, and illiterate people, who constituted the 
                                                                 
6 Anıl Çeçen, Halkevleri, p.15, Gündoğan Yayınları: Ankara, 1990. 
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majority and remained loyal to the Sultanate and Caliphate, into republican, 
nationalist, secular, populist, etatist, and revolutionary citizens.7 
 
In this study I intend to contribute to the critical literature on the People’s Houses by 
analyzing these institutions through a Foucauldian perspective. While acknowledging 
the ideological and assimilative functions of these institutions, I argue that the  
objectives of the People’s Houses project extended beyond mere ideologica l 
indoctrination. By drawing on Michel Foucault’s concepts of ‘disciplinary power’, 
‘biopower’, and ‘governmentality’, I shall argue that in addition to spreading the 
Kemalist ideology, these institutions were also designed to render the population 
physically stronger and healthier, and economically more productive; and also to 
transform individuals into modern subjects through ‘conduct of conduct’. In other 
words, I contend that activities of the Houses were also designed to enhance the 
government’s control over the population, and its ability to implement various social 
policies to make the population healthier and more productive.  
 
To give one example, the sports branches of the Houses were responsible for 
promoting physical education (beden terbiyesi), and encouraging local people to 
exercise regularly. These activities intended to make individuals physically stronger 
and robust both for national defense and economic productivity. At the same time, 
sports activities of the Houses would improve the health of the population as a whole. 
Second, the Houses were responsible for educating ordinary people about hygiene and 
sanitation. In addition, the Village Studies branches would have sick peasants 
examined by doctors, and distribute medicine during village incursions. I argue that 
these activities of the People’s Houses can be construed as local implementation of 
disciplinary power and biopower aiming to make individuals physically stronger and 
docile, and a population healthier. 
 
Third, the educational courses branch and the Village Studies branch would organize 
courses on various subjects, such as reading, natural sciences, history, accounting, 
foreign languages, painting, music, photography, needlecraft, floriculture, beekeeping, 
agriculture etc. These courses were designed to integrate ordinary people into the 
                                                                 
7 Sefa Şimşek, Bir İdeolojik Seferberlik Deneyimi: Halkevleri (1932-1951), p.69, Boğaziçi Üniversitesi 
Yayınevi: İstanbul, 2002. 
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newly emerging national economy by equipping them with the necessary skills, and to 
increase their efficiency and productivity. Moreover, activities of the Language, 
Literature, and History; Fine Arts, Theatre, Library and Publication, Village Studies, 
and Museum and Exhibition branches intended to instill in people certain new 
behavior, manners, and habits, and cultivate modern aesthetic tastes. I will claim that 
such activities can be analyzed in terms of their relation to the concept of 
governmentality.  
 
This thesis is organized in four chapters. In the first chapter I will focus on the 
historical developments prior to the establishment of the People’s Houses. More 
specifically, I will discuss the political, social, and economic developments in Turkey 
between 1923 and 1931 in their relation to the establishment of the People’s Houses. 
First, I will describe the process leading to the consolidation of the single party rule of 
the CHP by 1925. The main developments of this period include the formation of the 
Progressive Republican Party (PRP) in November 1924, the Sheikh Said rebellion that 
started in February 1925, declaration of the martial law called ‘Takrir-i Sükun’, and 
the suppression of any form of opposition to the government with the banning of the 
PRP and some Istanbul newspapers that were previously critical of the government. 
With this suppression of all forms of opposition, the CHP remained as the only 
organized political actor in Turkey, and its single party rule began to consolidate. With 
no organized opposition group left to challenge its dominant position, the CHP 
initiated a rapid and top-down reform process to modernize and secularize the state 
and the society. Through a series of revolutions in the 1920s and early 1930s, the 
government abolished the institutions of the ancient regime, and established new ones. 
However, during this period the traditional gap between the political center and 
ordinary people living in the countryside continued to widen. By the early 1930s, it 
became evident that as the ruling single party, the CHP was isolated from ordinary 
people, and it lacked popular support. I will link these developments and the 
dissolution of the Turkish Hearths in 1931, to the establishment of the People’s 
Houses. In the remainder of the first chapter first I am going to describe the 
organizational structure of the People’s Houses, and the duties and responsibilities of 
each branch as defined by the bylaw of the Houses. Then, in the last part of the first 
chapter I will briefly discuss the closure of the People’s Houses in 1951 by the new 
ruling Democrat Party. 
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In the second chapter I am going to concentrate on the literature on the People’s Houses 
by dividing it into two main categories. First, I shall examine the works of the 
prominent representatives of the mainstream approach in great detail, and discuss the 
fundamental assumptions underlying their studies. I will argue that, despite the rich 
historical details they provide about the operations of specific People’s Houses, their 
uncritical adherence to the official historiography of the early republican period limits 
the explanatory power of the mainstream studies.  Then, I will present the critical 
studies, and underline their contributions. These studies enhance our understanding of 
the People’s Houses by analyzing them from novel perspectives. 
 
In the third chapter I am going to introduce the theoretical framework of this study, 
and explain my research hypothesis. In the first part I will discuss and elaborate the 
concepts of ‘disciplinary power’, ‘biopower’, and ‘governmentality’. In the second 
part I will relate these three concepts to my research hypothesis, and argue that the 
People’s Houses were designed by the republican elite to perform disciplinary and 
regulatory functions on the Turkish population. In other words, in the ideal plan of the 
republican elites the People’s Houses would serve as a socio-cultural space where 
disciplinary power, biopower, and governmentality operate at the local level to enable 
the government to manage the population more effectively. 
 
In the long fourth chapter I will set to support my research hypothesis by focusing on 
numerous writings of some prominent republican intellectuals and policy makers that 
were published in the Ülkü (the Ideal) magazine. In this way, I intend to demonstrate 
the elements of disciplinary reasoning, bio-political reasoning, and governmenta lity 
that were inherent in the mindset of the republican elite. More specifically, I will 
analyze 68 articles from the Ülkü magazine by dividing them into four themes that I 
will develop in relation to the concepts of disciplinary power, biopower, and 
governmentality.  
 
The names of these four themes are as follows: ‘Physical Education’, ‘The Issue of 
Population’, ‘Economic Productivity’, and ‘The Village Question and Folk 
Education’. In the physical education theme I will look at the ideas of republican 
intellectuals and policy makers about sports and physical education. Second, the issue 
of population theme will focus on their plans, and social policy designs to grow the 
8 
Turkish population and to make it healthier. In the economic productivity theme I will 
deal with their ideas about political economy, industrialization, and their various 
policy suggestions to increase the economic productivity of the population. Finally, in 
the last part of the fourth chapter I will concentrate on their ideas and plans about the 
village question and folk education. In sum, through this extensive examination of the 
writings of the leading republican intellectuals and policy makers I intend to 
demonstrate that the republican elite adopted the modern governmental rationality, and 
they wished to apply various social, economic, and cultural policies on the population 
to make it healthier and more productive. Institutions such as the People’s Houses, the 
Village Institutes, or the ministry of education implemented these policies with varying 
degrees of success. 
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CHAPTER I 
THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
 
Before examining the historical process leading to the establishment of the People’s 
Houses in February 1932, I should first briefly discuss the mainstream historica l 
narrative on the establishment of these institutions. This narrative is largely based on 
the modernization discourse of Kemalism that was articulated during the 1930s and 
1940s, and it seems to have been influential on the great majority of the recent studies 
on the People’s Houses as well. According to this approach, after the War of 
Independence Turkey was totally devastated and the country lay in ruins. The Kemalist 
elite, having secured the political independence of Turkey under very harsh conditions 
in 1923, immediately set out to modernize the country by launching an extensive 
reform program. The People’s Houses, it is argued, were the main cultural institut ions 
that assisted reformers in achieving their goal. For instance, Adem Kara argues that 
the War of Independence was won under very difficult conditions and with very 
limited resources. After a long period of warfare since 1913 Turkey was economica lly 
devastated, and socially and culturally backward. Majority of the people lived in 
villages in poverty, and most of them were illiterate. Kara maintains that under these 
circumstances the founders of the republic needed an institution to spread the reforms 
to the people rapidly and efficiently. Therefore, People’s Houses functioned as a 
‘bridge’ between ordinary people and the elite, leading to harmony and cooperation 
between these two groups so that they can work together in order to modernize Turkey 
rapidly.8 In other words, the republican elite were to provide guidance and leadership 
to the Turkish people, whom in return would voluntarily work hard to achieve the goals 
of modernization and development set forth for them by the republican elite. In this 
context, the People’s Houses are believed to have provided a suitable and nurturing 
environment in which people could learn and work together. 
 
Obviously the problem with this narrative has nothing to do with the historical facts it 
provides regarding the conditions of Turkey after the War of Independence. It is 
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beyond dispute that after the war Turkey did not have favorable economic and social 
conditions. The problem with this narrative lies somewhere else: It intends to create 
an appearance of harmony and cooperation between the republican elite and ordinary 
people by largely overlooking the fact that majority of the reforms introduced by the 
republican elite in the course of 1920s and early 1930s did not reach to people living 
in rural areas at all. This narrative also overlooks the growing discontent among 
ordinary people towards the new regime as a result of the reforms, and political and 
economic developments of the period. 
 
The mainstream narrative on the People’s Houses presents the establishment of these 
institutions as a continuation of a modernization project that was characterized by a 
harmonious and voluntary division of labor between the elite and ordinary people. In 
my opinion, we can categorize this mainstream narrative on the People’s Houses as a 
part and extension of the ‘public transcript’ of the republican elite, to use James Scott’s 
concept. In analyzing relations between dominant elites and subordinate groups in 
various historical settings, Scott makes a distinction between a ‘public transcript’ and 
a ‘hidden transcript’. Basically, he defines a public transcript as “the open interaction 
between subordinates and those who dominate.”9 In public settings and in the presence 
of the powerful, subordinate groups such as slaves, untouchables, and serfs are 
required to perform certain acts of subordination to the former. Subordinate groups 
may perform such acts, which are usually humiliating and degrading, “out of prudence, 
fear, and the desire to curry favor…”10 having to conceal the resentment, anger, and 
contempt they feel towards the dominant. In other words, in their public transcript 
subordinate groups have to appeal to the expectations of the powerful. Their hidden 
transcript, on the other hand, refers to their ‘offstage’ discourse and performances 
when they are not seen or heard by the powerful. In the absence of direct surveillance, 
subordinate groups usually express their real feelings that they cannot express in the 
face of power, criticizing the dominant group. 
 
On the other hand, dominant groups also have their own public and hidden transcripts. 
Their public transcript, however, does not derive from an outright fear. In public 
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settings dominant groups need to pay lip service to the values and principles their own 
ideology promotes. As Scott puts it: “A divine king must act like a god, a warrior king 
like a brave general; an elected head of a republic must appear to respect the citizenry 
and their opinions; a judge must seem to venerate the law. Actions by elites that 
publicly contradict the basis of a claim to power are threatening.”11 For instance, in a 
relation of domination such as slavery where the powerful publicly claim that slaves, 
as long as they obey the rules, are not treated badly, and that their basic needs are 
guaranteed; the powerful cannot publicly disregard those promises. Even though they 
treat their slaves harshly, and do not honor their promises ‘offstage’, publicly they 
must still maintain an appearance of justice and fairness. Scott gives a more concrete 
example of this elite behavior: In socialist-communist societies where the ruling party 
claims to rule the country on behalf of the working class, party elites need to conceal 
the special shops and hospitals exclusively designed for them.12 Otherwise, their claim 
to power would become questionable in public. When they are not in public, however, 
elites also have a hidden transcript that usually contradicts their public performance. 
 
In sum, dominant groups must publicly maintain an appearance of order and obedience 
by the subordinates. With their performances and discourse in public they need to 
prove that the system functions as their ideology claims. Therefore, any sign of 
disorder and malfunction, or expression of disobedience by subordinates in public is a 
threat to the powerful. In light of this argument, I believe the concept of ‘public 
transcript’ may help us understand the official discourse of the Kemalist elite on the 
People’s Houses, and the mainstream narrative on these institutions in the literature. 
This discourse aims to create an appearance of harmony between the republican elite 
and ordinary people, because their claim to power, as the ruling single party, relied on 
this appearance of the Turkish society as a ‘classless and harmonious nation’. The 
mainstream narrative, on the other hand, strictly adheres to the public transcript of the 
republican elite, and thus presents the People’s Houses as the main cultural institut ion 
that strengthened this harmony for the goal of modernization. In my opinion, however, 
a more critical look at the developments of the early republican period would cast 
doubt on the discourse of ‘a harmonious relationship between the republican elite and 
the ordinary people’. 
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This chapter is organized into four parts. In the first part I am going to examine the 
political and economic developments, and the reforms prior to the establishment of the 
People’s Houses; and argue that that the mainstream narrative is not capable of fully 
explaining the establishment of these institutions. In the second part, I will discuss and 
relate the closure of the Turkish Hearths to the establishment of the Houses. The third 
part briefly describes the organizational structure of the Houses as defined by their 
bylaw. At the end of the chapter I will also discuss the closure of the People’s Houses 
in 1951. 
 
1.1. Behind the Official Story: Political and Economic Developments (1923-1931) 
After the elections of 1923 the second term of the Grand National Assembly began in 
August of that year. During its first term the War of Independence was won, the 
Sultanate was abolished, and the Lausanne Treaty was signed.  As Ahmet Demirel 
demonstrates in his analysis, there was a fierce opposition during the first term of the 
Assembly, and Mustafa Kemal was not content with the opposition of the second 
group.13 Thus, before the elections of 1923 he guaranteed, by publicly advocating for 
the election of members of the first group, that neither the members of the second 
group nor the members of the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) would enter 
the parliament.14 In this way he intended to create a more docile and manageable 
assembly to work with. From the beginning of its second term, however, the assembly 
was not devoid of opposition, an opposition that slowly grew and eventually 
crystallized into the Terrakiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası (TpCF) (Progressive 
Republican Party) – PRP from now on- in November 1924. As a result of growing 
disputes and disagreements within the party, several parliamentarians such as Rauf 
Orbay, Kazım Karabekir, and Ali Fuat Cebesoy resigned from the CHP and formed 
the PRP. As Mete Tunçay observes, the program of the new party advocated politica l 
and economic liberalism.15 
 
Clearly the new party was not welcomed by the government, and there were three main 
accusations brought against the PRP. First, it was asserted that the PRP did not have a 
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real alternative program to the CHP program, and that the party was created because 
of personal resentments and envy of its leaders. For instance, in an interview given to 
the London Times Mustafa Kemal argued that the program of the PRP did not have 
any important principles or ideas that were different from the principles of the CHP.16 
Second, members of the PRP were accused of being covert monarchists who were still 
loyal to former Caliph and against the republican regime, secretly aiming to restore the 
Ottoman monarchy.17 For example, in his famous Nutuk Mustafa Kemal says that on 
one occasion Rauf Orbay told him he was loyal to the Ottoman dynasty and to the 
caliphate.18 Third, members of the PRP were charged with encouraging religious 
reactionism. A clause in the program of the PRP that advocates being respectful 
towards religious beliefs was seen as a sign of ‘the reactionary inclinations’ of the 
party. Another and clearer evidence that the government disliked the new party was 
the proposal by the Prime Minister İsmet İnönü to declare martial law in the country 
just three days after the formation of the PRP.19 When this proposal was rejected 
during a CHP group meeting, İnönü resigned and the new government was formed by 
Fethi Okyar. The accusations against the PRP, and the proposal to declare martial law 
right after the formation of the party were early indications of the intolerance of the 
government towards any form of opposition in the country.  
 
The Sheikh Said Rebellion, which started in February 1925 in Bingöl and quickly 
spread to other cities such as Mardin and Diyarbakır, and the ensuing martial law 
called Takrir-i Sükun to suppress the rebellion and restore government authority in the 
region, provided the government with a pretext and means to crush any form of 
opposition against itself. One week after the beginning of the rebellion the government 
introduced martial law in eastern cities, and in early March the parliament passed the 
Takrir-i Sükûn Law which authorized the government to abolish any form of 
association and ban all publications that may disturb the public order. The government 
immediately put this clause into force by creating two Independence Tribunals, a 
central one in Ankara, and a mobile one to prosecute rebels in eastern cities. In the 
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meantime, the Istanbul press20 that had earlier opposed the government policies, such 
as the abolishment of the Caliphate, were banned. Moreover, some journalists were 
arrested by the eastern Independence Tribunal with the accusation of provoking the 
rebellion indirectly. The journalists were only able to escape prosecution by pledging 
their allegiance of loyalty to Mustafa Kemal and asking for a pardon.  21 
 
The eastern Independence Tribunal maintained that some members of the Progressive 
Republican Party were involved in the Sheikh Said rebellion, and thus closed down all 
offices of the party in the rebellion region. In general, the party was accused of 
instrumentalizing religion in politics and provoking the rebellion. The clause in the 
program of the PRP regarding religious liberties was interpreted, by the government 
and the Independence Tribunal, as a sign of sympathy and support towards counter -
revolutionaries. As a result, the government banned the PRP in June 1925, and some 
members of the party were sentenced by the Independence Tribunals.  
 
In June 1926 a plot to assassinate Mustafa Kemal in İzmir was discovered, and the 
Ankara Independence Tribunal immediately started an investigation to punish the 
perpetrators. Upon a preliminary investigation, the tribunal came to the conclusion that 
this assassination plot was the first step of a greater political conspiracy to overthrow 
the government. It was claimed that some members of the CUP, having failed to revive 
their party, had initially become parliamentarians as members of the CHP, and later 
they joined the PRP. After the banning of the PRP by the government, the tribuna l 
maintained, those Unionists conspired to assassinate Mustafa Kemal and eventually to 
overthrow the government.22 Therefore the tribunal arrested several people around the 
country including the assassins, former CUP notables, some members of the first group 
in the first term of the assembly, and former leaders of the banned PRP, such as Kazım 
Karabekir, Ali Fuat Cebesoy, and Refet Bele, who were believed to be involved in the 
conspiracy. After the trial fifteen people, among whom six active parliamentar ians 
who were former members of the PRP, were sentenced to death; and thirteen of them 
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were immediately executed. On the other hand, Kazım Karabekir, Ali Fuat Cebesoy, 
Refet Bele, and Cafer Tayyar were acquitted upon a personal request from Mustafa 
Kemal. 
 
With the Takrir-i Sükûn law, suppression of the Sheikh Said rebellion, criminaliza t ion 
and banning of the PRP, silencing of the Istanbul press, and the execution of forme r 
prominent CUP members as a result of the Izmir assassination trials, the government 
suppressed all forms of opposition in the country. Therefore, with these developments 
the single party period in Turkey started to become consolidated from 1925 onwards. 
Thereafter any form of autonomous organization or association, such as Türk Ocakları 
(Turkish Hearths), that might possibly be a source of opposition to the government and 
its policies were either banned or forced to abolish themselves and join the CHP. In 
such an environment without any serious and organized opposition, the ruling elite 
accelerated a reform process which they started earlier. These reforms comprised a 
wide range of areas such as politics, economy, law, education, social life, and culture. 
The ruling elite intended to modernize and secularize the Turkish society by 
introducing reforms in these areas in a top-down manner. Here I am only going to 
mention and summarize the most important reforms of the early republican era. 
 
The political and legal systems were secularized by the abolishment of the Sultanate 
in 1922, proclamation of the republic in 1923, the abolishment of the caliphate in 1924, 
removal from the constitution the clause: “The religion of the Turkish Republic is 
Islam” in 1928, and later the inclusion of laicism in the constitution as a principle in 
1937. This secularization, however, did not necessarily mean a separation of the state 
and religion as it did in Western European countries. On the contrary, the Turkish state 
sought to keep religion under its control and surveillance by replacing the Şeriye ve 
Evkaf Vekâleti (Ministry of Sharia and Charity Foundations23) with the Diyanet İşleri 
Başkanlığı (Presidency of Religious Affairs) in 1924. In other words, rather than 
separating the state and religion, the republican elite on the one hand tried to keep 
Sunni Islam under control as ‘the religion of the state’ through the Presidency of 
Religious Affairs, and on the other hand they sought to make religion and its 
expressions less visible in public life. Moreover, the legal system was modernized and 
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secularized through translations and adoption of laws from European countries such 
as Switzerland, Germany and Italy. Religious courts were abolished in 1924, and 
modern and secular courts were established in their stead under the control of the 
Ministry of Justice. 
 
The education system was also secularized and modernized. With the Law of Tevhid-
i Tedrisat (Unification of Education) passed in 1924, religious schools such as 
madrassas were abolished, and the Ministry of Education took control of all schools in 
Turkey. In 1928 the Arabic alphabet was replaced with the Latin alphabet. In order to 
teach people the new alphabet and increase the literacy rate, temporary education 
centers (Millet Mektepleri) were opened all around the country. Another important 
step in education was the opening of new schools to train teachers. As Mete Tunçay 
observes, however, the education reforms in the early republican period were not as 
successful as they were expected, and the schooling rate by the end of the single party 
period was less than 50 per cent.24 
 
As mentioned above, after the War of Independence Turkey was demographically and 
economically devastated. The economy was still heavily based on agriculture, and 
efforts to industrialize the country had largely failed during the late Ottoman period. 
Moreover, with the loss of the Balkan regions, which were economically more 
developed, the Empire was left with a depopulated and poor Anatolia.25 In the 
Lausanne Treaty the foreign debt of the Ottoman Empire was distributed among the 
states that were formerly parts of the empire, and Turkey agreed to pay the majority of 
this debt. The payment of this foreign debt was another heavy burden on the Turkish 
economy. The founders of the republic were aware that political independence would 
not mean much without economic development and independence. During the first 
economy congress in Izmir in 1923, there was a debate on the future economic 
program of Turkey. Instead of making a difficult choice between economic liberalism 
and protectionism, the policy makers decided to adopt a hybrid economic policy. It 
was argued that Turkey should both encourage foreign investment without bestowing 
foreign investors with privileges, and at the same time protect its own infant industr ies 
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and help them develop.26 Thus the state heavily invested in railroads and nationalized 
certain sectors such as tobacco, alcohol, sugar etc. and established new banks to 
provide cheap credit to the newly emerging Turkish industries. 
 
The Great Depression of 1929 severely damaged the Turkish economy as it did other 
economies around the world. The decline in food prices, in the demand for agricultura l 
products, and hence in international trade worsened the economic conditions in Turkey 
as the economy was still largely based on agriculture. The purchasing power of people 
also started to decline. In this conjuncture the government decided to apply more 
protectionist and interventionist economic policies because Turkey needed to be 
economically more self-sufficient and less depended on the harmful effects of 
international markets. With the influence, encouragement, and assistance of the USSR, 
Turkey adopted her first ‘five years development plan’ in 1933.27 In line with this plan, 
big state-owned enterprises were established, and subsidized by the state. The state 
also raised the tariffs on imports to protect the already weak Turkish industries. Turkey 
relied on this import substitution policy until the 1980s. 
 
Reforms in social life and culture were introduced to transform Turkish society into a 
modern and Western society by erasing the traces of the Ottoman and Islamic past in 
everyday life.  In order to achieve this goal, religious orders, sects, and titles were 
outlawed in 1925. Religious symbols such as fez, and clothes were also outlawed, and 
with the ‘Hat Law’ of 1925 wearing a fedora in public became compulsory for civil 
servants. Mete Tunçay states that in Anatolia there were several reactions and protests 
to the outlawing of religious orders and sects, and to the clothing reforms of the 
government. The protestors were immediately prosecuted and punished by the mobile 
Independence Tribunal.28 While traditional and religious clothing and symbols were 
being marginalized, the republican elite also encouraged people to adopt Western style 
clothing and symbols. In 1926 Turkey abandoned the Islamic calendar, and adopted 
Western calendar and the international 24 hour clock. Similarly, traditiona l 
measurements were replaced with the international measurements in 1931. In addition, 
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Friday as the traditional Ottoman weekend holiday was abandoned, and Sunday was 
adopted as the new weekend holiday in 1935. 
 
Adoption of international time and measurement standards served the policy of 
Westernization and modernization in two ways: First, these changes enabled the new 
regime to break with the traditional Ottoman system and its understanding of time, and 
from that time onward social and public life in Turkey were to be organized, at least 
in urban settings, in accordance with the Western standards and understanding of time. 
Second, these reforms gradually led to a synchronization of the Turkish economy and 
society with its Western counterparts. To put it in a nutshell, in order for Turkey to be 
a ‘contemporary’ of ‘the West’, she needed to reorganize her economic, social, and 
public life according to Western standards. 
 
In such an era of rapid reforms Turkish language was subject to reform as well. As 
mentioned above, the Arabic alphabet was replaced with the Latin script in 1928. In 
the course of 1930s there were several attempts to purify and simplify Turkish. It was 
argued that the foreign words in Turkish from Arabic and Persian, by which the 
Ottoman Turkish was heavily influenced, prevented Turkish language to truly 
represent the Turkish culture. It was also claimed that this foreign vocabulary made it 
difficult to read and write. Therefore, those foreign words needed to be replaced by 
their purer Turkish synonyms. For this purpose, the Turkish Language Association 
was formed in 1932, and three language congresses were organized in 1932, 1934, and 
1936. This institution and congresses devoted their energy to purification and 
simplification of Turkish, and created new words as Turkish synonyms to the Arabic 
and Persian words in the language. This effort was a part of the policy of erasing the 
traces of the Ottoman past, and creating a new ‘Turkish identity’. In fact, this effort 
went to such absurd extents that during the third language congress in 1936, the ‘Sun 
Language Theory’ was endorsed. According to this infamous theory, Turkish 
language, with its origins going back to thousands years ago in Central Asia, was the 
mother of all extant languages.29 Similarly, the Turkish History Association developed 
the ‘Turkish History Thesis’ in 1932. This thesis underlines the important role played 
by Turks throughout the history by arguing that Turks created several earliest and 
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greatest civilizations such as Sumerians and Hittites. These curious theories can be 
seen as a part of an uneasy nation building process in which the republican elite needed 
both to distance themselves from the Ottoman past, and to create a solid national 
identity reliant more on an imagined distant past than the recent past. 
 
As a whole, the Kemalist reforms were introduced in a top-down manner in a relative ly 
short period of time, in a political environment where there was hardly any opposition 
to the ruling party, with the goal of rapid modernization. This top-down, monolithic, 
and authoritarian modernization program of the republican elite was, in fact, a 
continuation of the Ottoman reform movements in the nineteenth century. 30 
Throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the main concern of the 
Ottoman reformers was always to save the empire from disintegration, and they 
initiated several reform programs in a top-down manner. The republican elite, having 
witnessed the downfall of the empire as a result of a long period of warfare and military 
defeats, also inherited this concern, as well as the authoritarian tendency. In other 
words, the idea of ‘the survival of the state’ preceded, for both earlier Ottoman 
reformists and the republican elite, any other ideas such as freedom of speech and 
democracy. For this reason, the general tendency of the state elites, both in the late 
Ottoman period and the republican era, has been to suppress any form of opposition to 
their own rule or their policies. For instance, the relatively pluralist and democratic 
period between 1908 and 1913 was interrupted by the monolithic and authorita r ian 
rule of the CUP until 1918. Similarly, the period between 1918 and 1925 can be 
characterized as a relatively democratic period because there was a strong opposition 
during the first and second terms of the Grand National Assembly. As we have seen, 
this period was also followed by an authoritarian single party rule that continued until 
1946. This time, however, authoritarianism and centralism were even stronger than 
earlier periods. 
 
Having summarized the general characteristics of the Kemalist reforms, now I will 
return to the political developments of 1930, because developments of that year played 
a major role in the establishment of the People’s Houses. As stated above, after 1925 
there were not any serious opposition to the government left, and the single party rule 
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was in the process of consolidation. This, however, does not necessarily mean that 
there were not any grievances and resentments towards the regime. On the contrary, 
there was a growing dissatisfaction among ordinary people due to the economic 
depression and radical reforms of the government. Since the establishment of the 
republic the economy did not develop as it was initially expected, and the Great 
Depression made the economic situation even worse31; and the reforms were embraced 
only by urban people whom constituted only a small section of the population. In rural 
areas, rather than being endorsed and supported, the reforms created resentment among 
people. Religious people were not happy with the radical, top-down, and secular 
reforms of the regime that sought to minimize the role of Islam in social and public 
life. There were not, however, any alternative political channels to express these 
feelings. As the single ruling party, the CHP dominated the political scene, but it did 
not actually represent choices of the people because almost all candidates for 
parliamentary elections were predetermined by Mustafa Kemal himself. People were 
only expected to vote for and approve those candidates in elections. As a result, there 
was not any meaningful opposition within either the CHP or the parliament. In fact, 
Mete Tunçay calls this system a ‘unanimous democracy’ (oybirlikli demokrasi) 
because from the 1930s onwards the great majority of the laws were passed 
unanimously.32 
 
It appears that Mustafa Kemal was, to a certain degree, aware of the discontent among 
people; but he certainly did not know its extent. He thought that a docile and loyal 
opposition party would first create a channel for the expression of resentment, and 
would help the government to appease it. Second, an opposition party would also 
motivate the CHP to work harder by criticizing government policies. He believed that 
as the single party, the CHP had become too lazy and comfortable. A mild opposition 
to its policies would make the CHP more passionate and hardworking. Third, Mustafa 
Kemal feared of being perceived as a dictator by the Western countries.33 Unlike the 
PRP, a small and manageable opposition party in the parliament would positive ly 
change such perceptions. However, the new party should never become an alternative 
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to the CHP. It was only expected to provide a mild and constructive criticism of the 
government policies without competing with the CHP for power.  
 
For this purpose, Mustafa Kemal needed a leader for the new opposition party in whom 
he could trust. Fethi Okyar seemed to be a good candidate, and Mustafa Kemal 
convinced him to undertake this mission in August 1930. Mustafa Kemal agreed to 
Okyar’s condition that as the president of the republic he would remain impartial, and 
treat both parties equally. Upon this agreement, they negotiated the number of seats 
the new party would get in the parliament. The new party was named ‘Serbest 
Cumhuriyet Fırkası’ (Liberal Republican Party), and its members were also 
determined through negotiations between Mustafa Kemal, İsmet Inönü and Fethi 
Okyar. Consequently, fifteen parliamentarians resigned from the CHP and joined the 
Liberal Party.34 Obviously, the new party did not come into existence with efforts of 
an independent opposition movement. On the contrary, it was designed by Mustafa 
Kemal as a docile opposition party. Therefore, it was not expected to become a threat 
to the single party rule. 
 
Contrary to the expectations of both Mustafa Kemal and the CHP rulers, the Liberal 
Party did become a ‘threat’ to the CHP in a short period of time. People who were 
discontented with the CHP and its policies perceived the new party as an alternative. 
As a result, the Liberal Party received more support from people than expected. In 
September 1930, the Liberal Party organized a rally in Izmir, and forty thousand 
people enthusiastically participated.35 Upon this unexpected support to the Liberal 
Party, local CHP rulers also decided to organize a counter rally one day after the rally 
of the Liberal Party; but people did not wish to participate in the CHP rally. When 
local CHP rulers eventually organized the rally by forcing certain groups of people to 
join it, the Aegean campaign of the Liberal Party was overshadowed with violence. 
The Liberal Party supporters were quite agitated by the recent CHP propaganda in the 
city, and they attacked the CHP headquarters and official buildings. In the ensuing 
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clashes between the Liberal Party supporters and the police, a fourteen year old boy 
was shot dead, and fifteen protesters were injured.36 
 
Cem Emrence maintains that the sudden support the Liberal Party gained in the 
Aegean region was related to the dissatisfaction of people in this region towards the 
economic policies of the government. This region was economically more developed 
compared to other parts of Turkey, and it was commercially connected to internationa l 
markets. The Great Depression, and the protectionist policies of the government 
severely damaged the economy of this region. Therefore, people in this region were 
generally quite angry with the CHP, and they perceived the new party as a ‘liberator’. 
In fact, the discourse of the Liberal Party was based on a critique of the economic 
policies of the government37, and this discourse quickly became attractive to people. 
In addition, there is also the view that the Liberal Party was supported by muhajirs 
living in the Aegean region who were discontented with the economic policies of the 
government, as well as with the inhospitality of locals towards them.38 
 
In general, the Liberal Party received a great support from people throughout its 
campaigns. This unexpected and sudden support the party gained from people 
obviously shocked and frightened the CHP rulers. An opposition party, which was 
their own creation, was perceived as an alternative to the CHP within two months. 
Moreover, the CHP was not only unable to mobilize people in İzmir, but it was also 
attacked by them. To make matters worse, the Liberal Party received a great deal of 
support in the local elections of 1930, which was misconducted and rigged39 by the 
pro-CHP bureaucracy. Despite the misconduct by the pro-CHP bureaucrats and 
security forces, the Liberal Party was able to win 40 municipalities around Turkey. 40 
The Aegean campaign of the Liberal Party had already engendered a hatred within the 
CHP toward the opposition party. The following success of the Liberal Party in the 
local elections was intolerable for the CHP rulers because they realized that the 
opposition party they created was becoming a threat to their own power.  Thus the 
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government started to exert a great pressure on the Liberal Party by arguing that it was 
a ‘reactionary party’. Under pressure from some CHP rulers to side with them, Mustafa 
Kemal himself abandoned his initial neutral stance as the president, and openly 
positioned himself against the Liberal Party.41 In such a high pressure environment, 
Fethi Okyar did not want to challenge the persona of Mustafa Kemal, and he dissolved 
the Liberal Party in November 1930. The party could only survive for four months. 
 
In December 1930, another violent incident taking place in Menemen (a district of 
Manisa) exacerbated the fears of the government of losing control. Six people in 
Menemen announced that they did not recognize the secular republican regime and 
they would reintroduce the Sharia, killing one military officer (Mustafa Fehmi 
Kubilay) and two watchmen who tried to stop them.42 It appears that some local people 
also expressed sympathy to this uprising. The government suspected that the uprising 
may have been performed by a secret reactionary organization that aimed to overthrow 
the regime, and that the former political opponents of Mustafa Kemal may be involved. 
The government introduced martial law in Manisa and Balıkesir for one month, and 
the uprising was suppressed quite violently. After the trials 35 people were sentenced 
to death and they were immediately executed. In addition, 41 people were sentenced 
to prison.43  
 
In my opinion, the political, economic, and social developments between 1923 and 
1930, which I have summarized above, cast doubt on the mainstream account of the 
establishment of People’s Houses. This approach usually looks at the early republican 
history through ‘rose-colored glasses’, and tends to ignore those ‘unpleasant’ events.  
However, it appears that these developments and the conjuncture of the early 1930s 
played an essential role in the establishment of the People’s Houses. In other words, I 
argue that People’s Houses were not created to increase cooperation and harmony 
among the republican elites and ordinary people for the common goal of moderniza t ion 
that both groups supposedly shared. On the contrary, the primary reason of the 
establishment of the Houses was the lack of any cooperation and harmony between the 
elites and ordinary people. By 1930 the regime had introduced several reforms in a top 
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down manner in a short period of time; but these reforms were not endorsed by the 
majority of people. Conservative people living in Anatolia were opposed to the secular 
reforms of the regime, and the government usually accused these people of reactionism 
and suppressed them with violent means if necessary. Moreover, the economy did not 
grow as fast as the elite initially expected, and the Great Depression, combined with 
government policies, severely damaged economic conditions of people. In other 
words, by 1930 the regime was already quite disconnected from ordinary people, and 
its rule over people certainly was not based on consent.44 
 
In his book Hasan Rıza Soyak provides some evidence to support this argument. Soyak 
quotes Mustafa Kemal during his 1930 nationwide tour saying: “I feel depressed son, 
I feel depressed by a great misery! As you see, wherever we go we always listen to 
problems and complaints…We are surrounded with a deep poverty, a material and 
moral misery… We rarely see anything refreshing, unfortunate ly this is the real 
condition of our country!”45 It appears that the Liberal Republican Party experiment 
and the unexpected expression of popular discontent towards the CHP, the Menemen 
incident, and his experience during his journey around the country most likely led 
Mustafa Kemal to the realization that the regime had largely failed to incorporate 
ordinary people, and the reforms did not take root in the society.  
 
1.2. The Dissolution of the Turkish Hearths and the Establishment of the People’s 
Houses 
In the meantime, there were two related developments that paved the way for the 
establishment of the People’s Houses. The first one was the dissolution of the Turkish 
Hearths46 in 1931. As mentioned earlier, after 1925 all autonomous organizations, 
associations, and clubs were either banned or forced by the government to abolish 
themselves and join the CHP, and eventually the Turkish Hearths were not an 
exception. These institutions were established in 1912 by nationalist Turkish students 
with the goal of improving the social, cultural, and economic conditions of Turkish 
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people, and their language. As a promoter of Turkish nationalism these institut ions 
organized conferences, course on Turkish and foreign languages, concerts, theater 
plays and shows, and provided some social assistance and healthcare services. In this 
respect, the Turkish Hearths can be considered as the predecessor of the People’s 
Houses. After the First World War and the occupation of Istanbul by the British, 
leaders of the Turkish Hearths left Istanbul for Anatolia to join the nationalist 
movement for independence. In 1923, the Hearths were reactivated in Ankara.  
 
After the establishment of the republic, the Hearths continued to play an active role in 
spreading Turkish nationalism. They were seen as the bearers of the Turkish culture, 
expected to promote Turkish language and to work for the creation of a national 
consciousness among people.47 Another mission of the Hearths was to assist the 
Turkish modernization project. In other words, the founders of the republic considered 
the Turkish Hearths as the cultural branch of their national modernization project, and 
thus they provided these institutions with assistance and financial support. Under the 
patronage of the ruling elite, activities of the Hearths expanded, their overall number 
exceeded 250, and they had more than thirty thousand members by 1930.48 
 
However, the relationship between the Hearths and the CHP was not as smooth as it 
first appeared. The CHP’s desire to control all social, political, and cultural entities in 
the country created tensions between the two organizations. Despite their close and 
organic relations with the CHP, the leaders of the Hearths wished to maintain their 
autonomy from the party and the government. In contrast, the CHP cadres considered 
the Hearths as the cultural branch of the party, and they demanded the Hearths be 
governed by CHP members. In fact, from 1925 onwards the party took certain steps to 
bring the Hearths under its control. In 1927 a new clause, stating that the Hearths would 
work with the CHP for implementing state policies, was added to the bylaw of the 
Hearths. Similarly, the Hearths were defined as an institution under the CHP 
supervision by the CHP congress of 1927.49 Moreover, some party members were 
actively involved in the administrative body of the Hearths.  
 
                                                                 
47 Mesut Yeğen, p.176. 
48 Füsun Üstel, p.358. 
49 Ibid., pp.402-403. 
26 
According to its bylaw, the Hearths and its members were not allowed to engage in 
any political activities. However, not only some prominent members of the Hearths, 
such as Ahmet Ağaoğlu, Mehmet Emin Yurdakul, and Reşit Galip, became members 
of the Liberal Republican Party- as a result of the agreement between Mustafa Kemal 
and Fethi Okyar, but also the Hearths developed generally close relations with the new 
party.50 The involvement of some members of the Hearths in politics, also not in the 
CHP but in an opposition party, certainly altered the positive perception of the Turkish 
Hearths among the CHP rulers. Suddenly the Hearths became a place for politica l 
struggle and propaganda. Members of the Liberal Party began to criticize the CHP and 
the government during the meetings of the Turkish Hearths, and there were heated 
debates between the Liberal Party supporters and the CHP advocates. Moreover, the 
Hearths had, thanks to their activities, stronger ties with people at the local level. This 
was seen as a threat by the CHP because the Liberal Party could possibly take 
advantage of the local power the Hearths possessed. 
 
As a result, the CHP started to exert pressure on the Turkish Hearths by emphasizing 
that these institutions were the cultural branch of the party. Therefore, it was 
announced that members of another political party could not be members of the 
Hearths, and only CHP members and people who were not members of any politica l 
party were welcome to the Hearths. Similarly, the pro-government media began to 
criticize the Hearths even more aggressively, by arguing that these institutions had 
become obsolete over years: during the late Ottoman period these institutions had 
played important roles, but after the establishment of the republic the Hearths failed to 
adopt themselves to the new conditions, and they could not perform their functions 
properly anymore. Second, the Hearths were accused of promoting Pan-Turkist ideas 
and policies that might deteriorate relations with the Soviet Union. In fact the Soviet 
ambassador in Ankara did warn Turkish officials about the Hearths and their 
expansionist ideas about the Soviet territories populated by Turks. The nationalism 
adopted by the Hearths was still in line with the Pan-Turkist ambitions of the CUP; 
but the republican regime had long abandoned such ambitions, and it now favored a 
more Anatolian-based Turkish nationalism. Thus, the nationalism promoted by the 
Hearths was seen as archaic and dangerous for Turkey. Third, it was also argued that 
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both the CHP and the Turkish Hearths shared the same ideals and objectives. 
Therefore, their abolishment and incorporation to the CHP would be more appropriate. 
Lastly, there were allegations of misconduct against the rulers of the Hearths. For 
instance, it was claimed by the pro-government media that certain officers of the 
Ankara Turkish Hearth received too high salaries.51 
 
All these arguments, accusations, and propaganda against the Turkish Hearths 
eventually proved effective. In March 1931 the Turkish Hearths decided to have an 
extraordinary congress in the following month, and Mustafa Kemal informed the 
leaders of the Hearths that he wished to see the Turkish Hearths united with the CHP. 
He argued both institutions worked for the same goals, and their combined strength 
and resources would be more efficient and productive. All the organizations, and 
spiritual and material forces working for the national goals needed to be united under 
one banner.52 Upon such a request from Mustafa Kemal, the dissolution of the Hearths 
was inevitable. In the extraordinary congress of April 1931 the general assembly of 
the Turkish Hearths decided to dissolve themselves and join the CHP. All resources 
and properties of the Hearths were transferred to the party. With the forced dissolut ion 
of the Turkish Hearths, another semi-autonomous actor was absorbed by the CHP.      
 
In the meantime, there were efforts of young Kemalist intellectuals, who were sent to 
Europe for education by the government, to create a new institution for folk education. 
They carefully examined several institutions established in European countries for this 
purpose, and presented their reports and presentations to the related government 
authorities. For instance, Vildan Aşir Savaşır paid special attention to the Sokol 
organizations in Czechoslovakia, and examined these institutions in great detail.53 He 
presented his reports during a conference at the Ankara Turkish Hearth’s building. 
Later his speech was broadcasted live on the Ankara radio. During his speech he 
suggested that Sokols may serve as an example, and Turkey should create similar 
institutions for folk education. After his speech on the radio, Savaşır received a phone 
call and encouragement from Mustafa Kemal. Savaşır was told that he should be 
prepared for further tasks.  
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The minister of education Reşit Galip was order by Mustafa Kemal to organize a 
meeting with young intellectuals in order to prepare for the creation of the People’s 
Houses. The meeting was held at the Ankara Turkish Hearth, and Reşit Galip informed 
the participant intellectuals that they were assigned to work for the creation of the 
Houses. A commission was formed and it was assigned to write the bylaw of the new 
institutions. The commission members included Ziya Cevher Etili as the president, 
Şevket Süreyya Aydemir, Sadi Irmak, Tahsin Banguoğlu, Hamit Zübeyir Koşay, 
Hüseyin Namık Orkun, Kerim Ömer Çağlar, Namık Katoğlu, and Vildan Aşir 
Savaşır.54 This commission prepared a bylaw in two months and it was examined and 
discussed during the CHP meetings. During the third congress of the CHP in May 1931 
the party ratified the final version of the bylaw, and formally took a decision to 
establish the People’s Houses around Turkey.55 The preparations were completed by 
1932, and on February 19th Houses were opened in 14 cities.   
 
1.3. The Organizational Structure of the People’s Houses  
As stated earlier, the bylaw of the People’s Houses was penned by a delegated 
commission, and ratified by the CHP. Unlike the Turkish Hearths, the Houses did not 
have any autonomy, and the CHP strictly monitored and supervised their activities. All 
Houses had to send the center a detailed quarterly activity report.  Also, the bylaw 
meticulously defines the duties and responsibilities of each branch. According to the 
bylaw, the People’s Houses were institutions working in accordance with the six 
principles of the CHP: republicanism, nationalism, populism, laicism, statism, and 
revolutionism. All citizens, whether they be party members or not, were welcome to 
participate in activities of the Houses. Yet, in order for a person to become a part of 
the administrative body, he or she had to be a member of the CHP. Each branch should 
carefully keep membership records56, and branches that had ten to fifty members 
would form a management committee of three members. Branches that had more than 
fifty members would form a management committee of five members. Each branch 
would elect a representative to the administrative body of the House.57 
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There were certain preconditions for establishment of a People’s House in a region. 
First, there needed to be a proper location and a building that had adequate space for 
all activities of a House. Buildings and budgets of the Houses were financed by the 
CHP. Second, a People’s House had to have at least three active branches with 
sufficient number of members. A fully active House would consist of nine branches: 
Language, Literature, and History; Fine Arts, Theatre, Sports, Social Assistance, 
Educational Courses, Library and Publication, Village Studies, and Museum and 
Exhibition branches. Each branch had its own management committee and worked 
independently from other branches; but they should also cooperate with each other 
when necessary. Now, I will briefly describe the duties, responsibilities, and activit ies 
of each branch as defined by the bylaw of the People’s Houses.  
 
1.3.1. Language, Literature, and History Branch 
This branch was responsible for organizing conferences58, studying Turkish language 
and national traditions, publication of books and magazines, and discovering and 
encouraging people talented at literature. The branch organizes conferences about 
various subjects to educate people, to teach them the principles of the republic and the 
revolutions, patriotism, civic duties, and know-how for economic activities and 
everyday life. Second, it collects and records local dialects, proverbs, idioms, tales, 
and cultural traditions of the local people. Third, the branch publishes magazines 
consisting of educative articles, poems, and stories on the principles of republic, the 
revolutions, national values etc. Fourth, it helps young people who are talented at 
literature to improve their skills.59 
 
1.3.2. Fine Arts Branch 
First, this branch discovers and assists talented artists and amateurs to improve their 
skills in music, painting, sculpture, and architecture. Second, it organizes exhibit ions 
and concerts at night for local people. Third, the branch intends to fuse traditiona l 
Turkish music with modern music. Fourth, it seeks to increase the number of people 
interested in fine arts, to improve aesthetic senses and tastes of local people by opening 
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courses where available. Lastly, the branch teaches people how to sing national 
anthems and songs, and collects and records lyrics and notes of local folk songs.60 
 
1.3.3. Theatre Branch 
Theatre branches consist of local people who are interested in and talented at theatre . 
The theatre group performs plays that were deemed appropriate and listed by the CHP. 
Other plays outside of the list must first be examined and approved by the party before 
being performed.61 
 
1.3.4. Sports Branch 
The bylaw states that sports are an indispensable part of education/discipline (terbiye) 
of the youth and the nation. Therefore, these branches should arouse interest among 
the Turkish youth and people for sports. Second, according to the bylaw sports 
branches should always take into consideration the fact that realization of the national 
ideals requires all sports and physical activities to be in line with the scientific laws 
and methods. Thus, they should assist national and local sports clubs to observe these 
methods. They should also encourage young people to join these clubs. Sports 
activities strengthen the body, improve people’s mental health, and helps them build 
self-control. Therefore, sports branches should encourage involvement of local people 
in sports such as gymnastics, cycling, swimming, wrestling, boxing, hunting, fishing, 
and horseback riding. They should also organize hiking tours and journeys around the 
country, and conferences about sports.62 
 
1.3.5. Social Assistance Branch 
The main mission of these branch is to raise funds to help destitute and helpless women 
and children, disabled people, the sick, and the elderly in the locality. For this purpose, 
social assistance branch cooperates with other charity organizations in the country, 
supports hospitals, nursing homes, kindergartens, and other health organizations in 
their efforts, provides for orphans, helps unemployed people to find jobs. In order to 
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be able to undertake these missions the branch seeks to arouse humanitarian feelings 
among the local population, and organizes kermises and shows for charity.63 
 
1.3.6. Educational Courses Branch 
This branch aims to educate local people in various subjects such as history, natural 
sciences, foreign languages, accounting, and handcrafts etc. It also organizes courses 
to teach illiterate people how to read and write. This branch coordinates with other 
educational institutions and courses offered by municipalities.64 
 
1.3.7. Library and Publication Branch 
The bylaw states that libraries play a crucial role in broadening knowledge and skills 
of ordinary people. Therefore, all People’s Houses have to have a library and a study 
room. This branch should enrich the collection of their library by encouraging people 
to donate books, archiving daily newspapers, buying and renting books, and 
exchanging extra copies of books for required books. It should also regularly organize 
reading parties in remote villages to encourage people to read books.65 
 
1.3.8. Village Studies Branch 
According to the bylaw of the People’s Houses, the primary mission of the Village 
Studies branch is to improve the health condition of villages, cultivate civic manners 
and aesthetic capacity in peasants, to foster mutual understanding and cooperation 
between urban people and peasants. It often invites peasants to participate in various 
activities of the Houses, and organizes trips to villages to integrate both groups. 
Moreover, this branch cooperates with Educational Courses branch to increase the 
literary rate in villages. It also assists peasants with their contacts with state institut ions 
and deals with the paperwork. Finally, the branch takes care of orphans, wounded 
veterans, and families of martyrs in villages.66 
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1.3.9. Museum and Exhibition Branch 
This branch consists of two groups. The Museum group seeks to preserve artifacts in 
its region, and informs authorities about them. Second, it tries to enrich the existing 
museums in the region, and establish new ones. If possible, it collects national artifacts 
either through donations or purchase. The Exhibition group, on the other hand, 
organizes exhibitions in which talented painters, sculptors, architects, calligraphers, 
and other artists in the locality can easily exhibit their creations. It also tries to cultivate 
a sensibility of aesthetics and a love of art in local people.67 
 
1.4. The Closure of the People’s Houses  
After the establishment of the first 14 Houses in 1932, the number of the People’s 
Houses rapidly increased, and they continued their activities until 1951. However, the 
transition to multiparty politics in 1946 signaled the beginning of a difficult period for 
the People’s Houses which resulted in their closure by the Democrat Party (DP) in 
1951. During the single party period the Houses had operated as the cultural branches 
of the CHP under the party’s strict control without having their own legal personality, 
and they were funded by the party from the state budget. In the multiparty era funding 
of the People’s Houses from the state budget became a point of contention between 
the CHP and the DP. The main argument of the DP against the People’s Houses was 
that despite being the cultural and propaganda branch of the CHP, the Houses had been 
illegally funded from the state budget, and that these institutions should adopt a 
nonpartisan attitude and allow all parties to utilize their facilities equally. In response 
to these arguments, the CHP deputies claimed that the Houses were established as non-
political cultural institutions to spread the revolutions and the national culture to the 
people, and that their funding from the state budget was justified by the fact that their 
doors were open to all citizens who wished to use its facilities. 
 
This dispute over the status of the People’s Houses continued until and after the 
accession of the DP to power in 1950. Anıl Çeçen claims that while still in power the 
CHP actually aimed to transform the People’s Houses to independent cultura l 
foundations able to meet the requirements of the new multiparty era. Yet, due to 
slowness and bureaucratic-mindedness of its top management, the CHP could not 
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achieve this transformation.68 On the other hand, according to Sefa Şimşek the CHP 
had deliberately not given the Houses a legal personality in order to exclude them from 
the scope of the law of associations which prohibited associations from engaging in 
political and propaganda activities. Şimşek also argues that the People’s Houses were 
not transformed because the CHP wished to maintain its control over them.69 In either 
case, the Houses remained untransformed until the end of the CHP rule. 
 
Once in power, the DP assigned inspectors to examine the budget of the People’s 
Houses, and drafted bills to transfer their property into the treasury. Now in opposition, 
the CHP realized that the Houses should be transformed into independent public 
foundations; and established a party commission for this purpose. As a result of the 
negotiations between the CHP representative Faik Ahmet Barutçu and the Prime 
Minister Adnan Menderes, the two parties initially agreed to preserve the People’s 
Houses as a memory of Atatürk, and to transform them into public facilitie s. 70 
However, this conciliation did not last long, and the two parties could not agree on the 
details of the draft. After fruitless negotiations for months, the DP drafted and passed 
a bill that confiscated the property of the People’s Houses, and the law was 
immediately enforced. Consequently, the People’s Houses were closed down on 
August 8, 1951.  
 
Anıl Çeçen argues that the Houses could have continued to serve as independent 
cultural institutions in the multiparty period; but the reactionary elements of the DP 
base, who disliked and wished to revert the republican revolutions, exerted pressure 
on the DP government and eventually had the Houses closed down.71 Sefa Şimşek, 
however, maintains that the Houses were designed for a single party political system, 
and in the multiparty period they had already started to degenerate and decay. He 
points out that in the 1940s activities of the Houses, such as theater, started to lose 
their ideological character. Moreover, in the multiparty era most people had already 
stopped attending the People’s Houses because of the possibility of a government 
changeover. For these reasons, according to Şimşek, the closure of the People’s 
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Houses in 1951 only made their already ongoing decline official.72 In my opinion, from 
the very beginning the overwhelming control of the CHP over the People’s Houses, 
and its over-monitoring of their activities eventually paved the way for their closure in 
1951. The overdependence of the Houses on the CHP, and the close affiliation between 
the two hindered a possible adaptation of the Houses to the multiparty period; and the 
Houses continued to be viewed, both by the DP and the wider public, as the cultura l 
and propaganda branches of the CHP. As a result, this politicized image of the People’s 
Houses precipitated their closure. 
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CHAPTER II 
THE LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
In the previous chapter I discussed the historical background of the establishment of 
the People’s Houses, and described their activities as they were defined by the bylaw. 
In this chapter I am going to focus on the vast literature on the People’s Houses. 
Despite the large number of studies and different perspectives it contains, I believe 
that it would be appropriate, for analytical purposes, to classify the literature on the 
People’s Houses into two main categories. The first category constitutes the bulk of 
the existing literature, and it heavily relies on the modernization discourse of 
Kemalism that was articulated in the early republican period. Studies in the second 
category, on the other hand, take a more critical position and analyze ideological and 
assimilative functions of the People’s Houses. Studies in this group give a critical 
account of the indoctrination of people in these institutions from a variety of 
perspectives. In the next part I am going to present and critically examine the 
fundamental tenets and assumptions of the mainstream approach with several 
examples from the literature. In the second part I will introduce the critical studies on 
the People’s Houses and underline the contributions they have made to our 
understanding of these institutions. 
 
2.1. The Mainstream Approach  
A typical mainstream study on the People’s Houses usually goes along these lines: It 
starts with a very brief summary of the Independence movement and the establishment 
of the republic under very harsh conditions under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal 
Atatürk; then it also mentions the ensuing urgent need to modernize the country after 
the War of Independence, and relates the establishment of People’s Houses to this very 
necessity. Then, the general organization and institutional structure of the People’s 
Houses is explained in some detail. After that, activities of a particular People’s House 
are listed in great detail, and the importance of that House for the local people and 
culture, and for development of the region is underlined. The activities of a particular 
House are usually listed according to the branches of the House. For instance, first 
activities of the Language, Literature, and History branch would be explained, then 
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activities of the Theatre and Fine Arts branches would follow, and so forth. Authors 
usually conclude their studies by emphasizing the achievements and the significance 
of the People’s Houses both for the local community and for Turkey as a whole in 
socio-economic and cultural development, and modernization. Now, I will examine 
this approach in more detail beginning with a constitutive example that summarizes its 
main tenets quite well. 
 
Perhaps the pioneer of the mainstream approach, Anıl Çeçen’s book Halkevleri 
presents a classic example. Çeçen is not only an academician studying the People’s 
Houses, but he also served as secretary general of the Ankara People’s House for long 
years in their second period. Therefore, his personal experience at this institution had 
an influence on his ideas about them. In the first chapter of the book Çeçen engages in 
a long discussion of the notions of ‘people’ and ‘populism’ within the context of 
Atatürk’s revolutions that were ‘directed towards the Turkish people’.  In the second 
chapter, he gives a historical account of the establishment of the People’s Houses. 
After the War of Independence the Kemalist movement undertook a major 
reorganization of the state and the society. Çeçen maintains that the new regime was a 
‘state of the people’, and thus the rulers sought to increase people’s participation in the 
government of the country through elected representatives in the parliament. Yet it 
was becoming clearer every day that the people could not understand what was being 
done for them. The ruling cadre came to the realization that the people could not keep 
pace with the revolutions and they were not able to endorse them quickly. Therefore, 
Çeçen argues, the rulers started to search for ways to close this gap.  73 
 
Çeçen also elaborates on the ‘question of the Turkish Hearths’. He points out that even 
though these institutions had done the country great services during the Ottoman 
period, they gradually became a venue for racist, pan-Turkist, and religious reactionary 
people. In other words, the Hearths began to oppose Atatürk’s reforms. From the very 
beginning, Çeçen notes, Atatürk did not have any negative opinions about the Hearths, 
and he in fact wished to transform them into republican cultural institutions; but the 
events unfolded in such a negative way that there was not much left to do about them. 
Çeçen speculates that had the Hearths not become unprogressive and a center for 
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reactionary ideas, they could have been the primary institutions through which the 
Kemalist revolutions were spread to the people.74 Yet, the Hearths were becoming 
engaged in politics and they were promoting reactionary and anti-Kemalist ideas as 
though they were an opposition party. Çeçen notes that the Hearths started to work as 
the branches of the new Liberal Republican party. Moreover, some leaders of the 
Hearths like Hamdullah Suphi were promoting expansionist and pan-Turkist ideas by 
suggesting that Turkey should also establish youth organizations, similar to the 
‘successful’ Fascist organizations in Italy, in order to save Turks living outside of 
Turkey. 
 
According to Çeçen the Liberal party experiment and the Menemen incident were the 
drop that spilled the cup. Çeçen argues that in order to save the regime Mustafa Kemal 
had to take a decision to close those institutions, which he initially supported, for they 
started to degenerate. Çeçen continues his analysis by discussing the establishment of 
the People’s Houses to replace the Hearths. He argues that two developments played 
an important role in the establishment of the Houses. First, the harmful impact of the 
Great Depression on the Turkish economy became visible from 1930 onwards. 
Second, the gap between the bureaucratic elite and ordinary people had widened due 
to the policies between 1923 and 1929 which restricted democratic rights and liberties, 
and by doing so these policies put the economic burden on ordinary people’s shoulders 
through high tax rates. In such a conjuncture, Çeçen argues, the Kemalist cadre had 
two options. They would either extend democratic rights and liberties to make the 
regime more democratic, or they would establish a more centralist and stricter regime 
through interventions that encompass every area of life. Given the conditions of the 
country and the limited experience of the Kemalist cadre, they were inclined to choose 
the latter. 75 
 
As a result, the regime became more authoritarian compared to its earlier years, and 
having failed to cope with the economic depression through economic interventions, 
the rulers prioritized an ideological solution. They feared that the economic depression 
would lead to new disputes and problems, and thus they wished to engender a new 
enthusiasm around the country by establishing the People’s Houses. Çeçen states that 
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these institutions were going to educate people politically and ideologically in 
accordance with the Atatürk’s revolutions. They served as the mass organization that 
spread the populist and nationalist ideology of the Kemalist cadre into Anatolia. 76 In 
the third chapter of his book Çeçen examines the activities of the People’s Houses in 
their first period. The fourth chapter deals with the second period of the People’s 
Houses between 1963 and 1980, but this period is beyond the scope of this study. 
Overall, Çeçen’s book is rich in historical details, and it has constituted a narrative that 
the majority of the mainstream studies have followed. Therefore, while presenting 
other representatives of the mainstream approach in the following pages I am not going 
to repeat their historical accounts of the establishment of the People’s Houses because 
their accounts largely rely on, and repeat Çeçen’s narrative. I will rather present some 
of the empirical data that other mainstream studies provide about specific Houses in 
Anatolian cities. In this way, I hope to enrich our understanding of activities of some 
local People’s Houses with the historical details that mainstream studies provide 
abundantly. 
 
Nurcan Toksoy presents the second example of the mainstream approach in her stud y 
on the cultural activities of the People’s Houses. She argues that these institut ions 
played a great role in the cultural development and enlightenment of the Turkish 
people in the early republican period, and that the primary goal of the Houses was to 
initiate and spread a cultural enlightenment into even the remotest corners of Turkey. 
Reaching the level of contemporary civilizations required education and 
enlightenment of the ordinary people. The peasants constituted the primary target of 
this cultural campaign. According to Toksoy, the republican intellectual class 
considered the enlightenment of the Turkish peasantry as their responsibility and 
mission for they were indebted to the peasantry a great deal. Toksoy also notes that 
the Houses did not belong to any particular class, group, or adherents of a certain 
political ideology; all citizens (young, old, men, women, peasants, city dwellers, 
educated, uneducated etc.) were welcome to participate in the activities of the Houses 
so that they could meet each other, and cooperate for the development of Turkey.77  
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In the second chapter, Toksoy focuses on the history studies of the People’s Houses, 
which were conducted in cooperation with the Language and Literature branch, 
Museum and Exhibition branch, and the Turkish Historical Society. She notes that the 
People’s Houses were responsible for raising the consciousness of ordinary people 
about the Turkish history by organizing conferences and lectures. The Houses also 
conducted research on local history and the Ottoman court records, and published their 
studies. In addition, they made contributions to the Turkish History Thesis. In the last 
part of the chapter Toksoy examines in detail the annual activities of the Language and 
History, and the Museum and Exhibition branches of the People’s Houses. 78 Similarly, 
in the third chapter the author focuses on the annual activities of the Houses on 
language and literature. Toksoy notes that the main responsibilities of the Language 
and Literature branch included collection, classification, archiving, and publication of 
folk sayings, stories, epic literature, and traditions. The branch was also responsible 
for organizing conferences on the Turkish language and literature in order to educate 
ordinary people and to raise a national consciousness among them. Toksoy concludes 
the chapter with a detailed examination of the annual activities of the Language and 
Literature branches.79 
 
In the fourth chapter, the author analyzes the publishing and library activities of the 
Houses by focusing on the magazines published by these institutions. At the end of the 
chapter, Toksoy similarly examines the annual activities of the Library and Publicat ion 
branches.80 In the last chapter of the book the author analyzes the education activitie s 
of the People’s Houses. Toksoy notes that these branches played an active role in their 
locality, and that local people enthusiastically attended the courses offered by the 
branches. In her conclusion, Toksoy argues that the People’s Houses played a crucia l 
role in modernization and sociocultural life of Turkey. These institutions increased the 
integration and cooperation between the intellectuals and ordinary people, enhanced 
national unity and cohesion, and facilitated the modernization process in Turkey.81 
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The third example of the mainstream approach was written by Murat Küçükuğurlu and 
Mehmet Okur. In their study the authors examine the influence of the People’s Houses 
in Erzurum upon the local life and culture. In the introduction, they argue that the 
People’s Houses were established to spread the republican revolutions and to make 
sure that ordinary people adopt the republican values. After a brief summary of the 
historical process leading to the establishment of the People’s Houses, and of their 
organizational structure, the authors continue with a description of the sociocultura l 
conditions in Erzurum prior to the establishment of the People’s Houses. Before the 
WWI Erzurum was an affluent city with a population of 80,000. Unfortunately, the 
city was devastated by the Great War, and its population shrank to 8000. The 
destruction of the war and the ensuing poverty made life difficult in Erzurum. Even 
though Erzurum was an important cultural center during the Ottoman period, the 
literacy rate had traditionally remained low due to the elitist understanding of 
education. Because of this traditional sociocultural backwardness of ordinary people 
and the devastation of the war, Erzurum was in a quite bad condition before the 
establishment of the central People’s House in 1934.82  
 
The first chapter of the book focuses on the central House and its activities in some 
detail. The authors list the names of the founding members of the central House, and 
it is evident that the bureaucrats and civil servants, along with a few rich landlords, 
dominated the cadres of the central House in Erzurum. Küçükuğurlu and Okur also 
point out that during its first few years the Erzurum House did not have a good 
performance, and it received warnings from the CHP headquarters. The authors argue 
that the unsatisfactory performance of the House during its initial years was related to 
the socioeconomic conditions of Erzurum at the time, migration of young and talented 
people to big cities for higher education or better employment opportunities in the 
bureaucracy, lack of electricity, lack of a proper building for the House, local people’s 
habit of spending the summer in plateaus; as well as the disinterestedness of the House 
managers.83 Moreover, the House initially did not have much financial resources 
either, and it only had a small library with few books. As a result of these drawbacks, 
the House was initially unable to meet the expectation of the CHP headquarters. In 
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1934, the House had 489 members, 461 male and 28 females. 84 However, the authors 
argue that from the end of the 1935 onward the House slowly became more effic ient 
and successful. Consequently, local people became more and more interested in the 
activities of the House, and started to attend the conferences and courses it organized.85 
 
In the remainder of the first chapter the authors examine in great detail the activit ies 
of the central House in Erzurum until its closure in 1950.  Even though it faced many 
problems and difficulties the House continued its activities. In November 1939, the 
new People’s House building became operational. In 1942 Murat Uraz became the 
president of the House, and a new era for the Erzurum House began. During his term, 
all branches became more active and the Erzurum House gained momentum, and 
experienced its golden age in the mid-1940s.86 Yet, in the multiparty era the House 
faced new problems and its activities started to slow down. Due to the criticism and 
opposition by the Democrat Party towards budget of the People’s Houses, the 
government had to cut the budget. As a result, all People’s Houses around Turkey 
experienced economic difficulties. Moreover, the political rivalry and accusations 
between the two parties also negatively affected the performance of the Houses in this 
period. The opposition accused the People’s Houses to be just a branch of the ruling 
CHP. In fact, the central Erzurum House actually supported the CHP in the 1950 
elections. As a result, when the Democrat Party came to power after the election, the 
managers of the Erzurum House, majority of whom were also public servants, had to 
resign from their positions at the House. Resignation of its managers led the Erzurum 
House into a period of inactivity. Eventually, the Erzurum House, along with all 
People’s Houses, was closed down by the Democrat Party on August 8, 1951.87 
 
In the second chapter of the book, the authors focus on the others People’s Houses and 
People’s Rooms that were located in districts of Erzurum, and examine their activit ies 
in some detail. Compared to the central House, the Houses in the districts had limited 
financial resources, and their performance was generally lower to the point that some 
party inspectors argued that these ineffective Houses needed to be closed down and 
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replaced with much cheaper People’s Rooms.88 Moreover, Küçükuğurlu and Okur 
note that personal rivalries and accusations between former presidents and their 
successors and their staff also hindered the activities of the Houses in districts.89 
 
In their conclusion, the authors maintain that the central People’s House in Erzurum 
played a crucial role in modernizing a war-torn and backward city. Yet, the same thing 
cannot be said about the Houses in the districts of Erzurum. They note that due to 
economic hardships and ineffective administration those Houses could not achieve 
their full potential. Even the performance of the central House varied from one period 
to another. Overall, Küçükuğurlu and Okur argue that, despite the various efforts of 
the central government and local managers to urge ordinary people to participate in 
the activities of the Houses, the success of the People’s Houses in Erzurum in attracting 
people’s attention remained limited due to the economic hardships ordinary people 
endured, especially during the WWII. Ironically, during this period the central House 
experienced its golden age, but the economic hardships and poverty made ordinary 
people less interested in the activities of the House. As a result, civil servants and local 
notables took a more active role in the activities of the Houses than ordinary people.90 
 
The fourth example of the mainstream approach was written by Mustafa Şanal. In his 
descriptive and highly extensive study Şanal examines the activities of the Kayseri 
House between 1932 and 1950. In the first chapter the author discusses the concepts 
of ‘people’ and ‘populism’ (halkçılık) with reference to Atatürk’s understanding of the 
two concepts. According to Şanal populism refers to a political movement that defends 
the interests of masses who live on their own labor. This movement seeks to establish 
national unity by overcoming class struggles.91 In order to achieve this goal, Şanal 
argues, Atatürk wished to spread folk education around Turkey. Folk education would 
both teach ordinary people how to read, and through various courses, teach them 
practical knowledge and skills that they would use in social and economic life. 
According to Şanal, the People’s Houses were designed to achieve these goals. In the 
second chapter Şanal discusses the historical context in which the People’s Houses 
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were built. Then, he also describes the organizational and administrative structure of 
the Houses, and the duties and role of each branch.92 In the third chapter Şanal briefly 
analyzes the establishment of the Kayseri House, its administrative structure and gives 
the names of its presidents and other managers. 
 
In the fourth chapter of the book Şanal engages in an exhaustive and highly detailed 
analysis of the annual activities of the House between 1932 and 1950 by drawing on 
the documents in the Prime Minister’s Republican Archives, the local newspaper 
‘Kayseri Vilayet Gazetesi’, and other news about the Kayseri House in its publicat ion 
‘Erciyes’ magazine and in the Ülkü.93 In the fifth chapter, the author focuses on the 
publications of the Kayseri House and gives information about 19 books and 
magazines that were published by the House. In his conclusion, Şanal summarizes the 
activities of each branch of the Kayseri House. These statistics may help us understand 
the scope of the activities of Houses in general. According to his analysis, the 
Language and Literature branch organized 397 conferences on various topics between 
1932 and 1950. The Fine Arts branch organized 133 concerts between 1932 and 1937, 
taught various music courses for young and talented youth who were interested in 
music; and organized semi-monthly movie screenings for women. The Theater branch 
performed 163 plays in total. The Sports branch helped local football clubs, and 
organized football games between them. It also organized climbing and skiing 
activities on the Erciyes Mountain. The Social Assistance branch gave 3585 liras to 
1500 people as charity between 1932 and 1937. It also had 2486 patients treated, and 
provided poor students with food, clothes, and books. The Educational Courses branch 
organized various courses on several subjects including foreign languages like 
English, French, and German. The Library and Publication branch created a library 
containing 6464 books and magazines. It also published 85 issues of its Erciyes 
magazine between 1938 and 1950. By 1950 it published 21 books and magazines. The 
Village Studies branch organized village trips, helped peasants with their offic ia l 
affairs, and organized practical courses, theater plays and movie screenings to educate  
the peasants. Finally, the History and Exhibition branch discovered and excavated 
various artifacts from the Seljuk period, and exhibited them at the Kayseri museum.94  
                                                                 
92 Ibid., pp.12-23. 
93 Ibid, pp.29-185. 
94 Ibid., pp.193-196. 
44 
Kenan Olgun presents another example of the mainstream approach in his study on the 
Adapazarı House. His study examines the influence of the Adapazarı House on the 
social and cultural development of the region. In the second chapter Olgun analyzes 
the period from the establishment of the Adapazarı House in 1934 until 1940. He notes 
that in general the management cadres of People Houses were dominated by civil 
servants, bureaucrats, and especially teachers. The Adapazarı House was not an 
exception, and most of its managers were teachers. In 1934 the House had 880 
members, and only two of them were females. The majority of members (593) were 
enrolled to the sports branch of the House. The least favorite branches among the 
members were the fine arts branch and the educational courses branch, each receiving 
only 18 members. 95  Olgun notes that in the first inspection report on the Adapazarı 
House the inspector expressed his disappointment with the performance of all 
branches, stating that branches had done almost nothing in their first year, and that 
branch managers lacked enthusiasm. The inspector also stated that most local people 
even did not know where the Adapazarı House was because the House, having no 
building of its own, was located in the CHP building without a signboard.96 In the 
remainder of the second chapter the author continues to analyze in detail the annual 
membership records and activities of the Adapazarı House until 1940. In the third 
chapter, he follows the same method, and examines the activities of the House fro m 
1940 until its closure in 1951. In his conclusion, Olgun argues that the Adapazarı 
House had several positive effects upon the sociocultural development of the region, 
and promoted theater, fine arts, and sports among the local people. Therefore, its 
closure in 1951 hindered this cultural development process which had started in 
1932.97 
 
Another example of the mainstream approach was written by Eminalp Malkoç on the 
Kadıköy House. In his introduction the author notes that after the establishment of the 
Turkish republic the success of the new regime depended on the adoption of the 
principles of the revolution by ordinary people through nationwide folk education. The 
People’s Houses were established to achieve this goal.98 In the first chapter of his book 
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Malkoç analyzes the establishment of the People’s Houses, their organizationa l 
structure, and duties of each branch.99 The second chapter extensively focuses on the 
Kadıköy House and its activities. The House was established in 1935, and initially it 
had 1042 members. The Fine Arts branch was the first to become operational, and in 
1935 it had 59 members: one lawyer, 13 teachers, 4 artists, and 41 civil servants. Over 
the years this number increased, and the branch taught various painting, sculpture, 
violin, piano, mandolin, and guitar courses; organized concerts and exhibitions, and 
encouraged many talented youths to pursue their careers in fine arts. The Social 
Assistance branch, on the other hand, provided poor people with financial assistance, 
food, clothes, coal, free healthcare, medicine, and vaccination. By 1943 the branch 
distributed over 74 tons of food, 16 tons of bread, 4000 kg milk, 700 kg dates, 55 kg 
medicine, 7863 kg fuel allowance, and 386 liras as financial aid.  
 
Similarly, the Educational Courses branch taught 3706 courses until 1942, and 39,816 
students attended these courses. Between 1935 and 1942 the Literature and Language 
branch organized 205 conferences that were attended by 48,901 people. The Library 
and Publication branch aimed to increase the number of books in the House library, 
and organized several conferences. By 1945 the library contained 4163 books, and in 
the first six months of the same year it was visited by 21,341 readers. Between 1935 
and 1943 the Theater branch performed 96 plays which were watched by 64,828 
people. The Sports branch, on the other hand, was one of the most active branches of 
the Kadıköy House, and it encouraged young people to engage in football, athletics, 
wrestling, aquatic sports, fencing, and tennis. The Village Studies branch organized 
trips to nearby villages such as İçerenköy, Bakkalköy, and Merdivenköy; as well as to 
the villages in Kartal and Pendik regions. In his conclusion Malkoç argues that the 
closure of the People’s Houses in 1951, as a result of the political rivalries of the time, 
dealt a major below to the cultural development, enlightenment, and democratiza t ion 
of Turkey. He suggests that the Houses could have easily been placed under the 
supervision of the Ministry of Education; and in this way they would have continued 
their activities in the multiparty era.100 
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Another study in this group was written by Mustafa Özsarı. In his study Özsarı 
analyzes the literature and cultural activities of the People’s Houses in the Aegean 
region by focusing on the magazines published by those Houses. In the first chapter 
Özsarı first gives some information about the People’s Houses in the Aegean region. 
There were 15 Houses in Aydın, 20 in Denizli, 22 in Izmir, 15 in Manisa, and 7 in 
Muğla. Focusing only on the major Houses that were influential in the cultural sphere, 
Özsarı points out that from its establishment in 1932 until its closure in 1951, the 
management cadres of the Izmir House were dominated by prominent bureaucrats, 
journalists, and educators in the city. The Izmir House was especially active in 
publishing, organizing conferences and performing theater plays. It published two 
periodicals, over 40 books, and many brochures. The House also organized several 
conferences that were lectured by famous intellectuals such as Ahmet Hamdi Tanpınar, 
M. Fuat Köprülü, Nurullah Ataç, Necip Fazıl Kısakürek, and many others. The House 
also cooperated with the British Council in order to promote friendly relations between 
the two countries, and some British scientists and artists visited the House and gave 
lectures. Lastly the House also performed 69 theater plays in 18 years.101  
 
After summarizing the activities of other culturally influential Houses in the region, 
Özsarı also analyzes in detail the major magazines published by those Houses. For 
example, the Izmir House published Fikirler and Güzel Günler; the Manisa House 
published Yeni Doğuş and Gediz; the Muğla House Muğla, the Milas House Yeni 
Milas, the Denizli House İnanç, the Urla House Ocak, and the Tire House published 
Küçük Menderes magazines.102 In the second and third chapters of the book the author 
engages in an in-depth analyses of the poems, stories, articles, essays, and other 
writings in those magazines with respect to their topics and themes which include 
patriotism, revolutions, and local heroes; social life, city life, and life in villages; 
nature, love, and loneliness; scientific and philosophical writings, law, economy, 
geography, history, health, sports, theater, music, painting etc.103 In his conclusion, 
Özsarı emphasizes the important role those Houses and their publications played in the 
cultural and intellectual life of the Aegean region in particular, and in Turkey in general 
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as they provided a platform where prominent intellectuals of the day could share their 
ideas and works.104 
 
The next two books in this category were penned by Selçuk Duman, one about the 
Sivas House, and the other about the Tokat House. In the former book Duman begins 
his analysis with a discussion of the concepts of ‘people’, ‘populism’, and ‘folk 
education’. He argues that the People’s Houses came into existence as a result of 
Atatürk’s adherence to the idea of populism, and his willingness to enlighten Turkish 
people through folk education.105 The second chapter of the book extensively focuses 
on the Sivas House that was established in 1933. Duman examines the administra t ive 
structure of the Sivas House, and lists the name of its presidents. In 1933 the House 
had 447 members, 399 males and 48 females, majority of whom were civil servants. 
The most popular branch of the House was sports branch with 151 members. On the 
other hand, the Museum and Exhibition branch initially had only 9 members. Duman 
notes that between 1933 and 1938 the Literature and Language branch organized 50 
conferences that were attended by 16,890 people. Initially, the House failed to attract 
ordinary people to the conferences, and thus they were mainly attended by civil 
servants. However, after 1938 the House managed to obtain a regular audience, and 
the conference hall hardly had enough room for the people. 
 
The sports branch was especially active in javelin throwing and skiing, and encouraged 
local people to engage in these sports. Also, Duman notes that the CHP supplied the 
Sivas House with various gymnastics equipment that the House could not afford on its 
own. The Social Assistance branch provided poor and sick people with free healthcare, 
and organized conferences for ordinary people on sanitation. The branch played a 
critical role in assisting the victims of the 1939 Erzincan earthquake. The educationa l 
courses branch organized literacy courses for the local people and prisoners whom 
received their certificates at the end of the course. The other courses offered by the 
branch included French, German, painting, violin, as well as physics, chemistry, math, 
and language courses for students who failed their exams.106 In the fourth chapter of 
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the book Duman gives information about the publications of the Sivas House. The 
House published two periodicals called Ortayayla and 4 Eylül, and the Kızılırmak 
newspaper. The House also published 14 books.107 In the conclusion, Duman argues 
that the Sivas House in particular, and the People’s Houses in general played a crucial 
role in preserving the Turkish culture and traditions against cultural erosion; and that 
nowadays Turkey needs such nationwide education institutions.108 
 
In his second book Duman follows the same organizational pattern. In the third chapter 
he examines the activities of the Tokat House in detail. For example, the Language 
and Literature branch of the Tokat House organized many conferences on various 
topics such as sanitation, sports, literature, and Turkish history. Similarly, the Theater 
branch performed 16 plays in 1935 that were watched by 8000 people. The Sports 
branch was active in football, hunting, biking, and horseback riding. The Social 
Assistance branch had 625 patients examined free of charge, and supplied 300 poor 
people with money for medicine. The Educational Courses branch organized literacy, 
French, and accounting courses. In 1939 the library of the Tokat House included 1293 
books and 1675 magazines. In 1933 the Village Studies branch visited 40 nearby 
villages, examined the sick, and provided them with medicine.109 The publications of 
the Tokat House included the Tokat newspaper, the Yeni Tokat magazine, the 
Yeşilırmak newspaper, and the Ülker magazine.  In his conclusion Duman 
reemphasizes the important role the People’s Houses played in promoting national 
unity and culture in Turkey.110 
 
Examples of the mainstream studies can be multiplied111, but the ones presented above 
should suffice to describe the general characteristics of this approach. As we have seen, 
mainstream studies usually examine a specific House, or all Houses in a city as a case 
study; and in this way they provide rich historical details by analyzing activity reports 
of different People’s Houses. In this respect, they enhance our understanding of the 
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People’s Houses by shedding light on the specific operations of local Houses as 
described in their activity reports. However, mainstream studies also have several 
drawbacks that limit their capacity to analyze the People’s Houses from a wider, and 
perhaps a more neutral perspective. To begin with, mainstream studies heavily rely on 
the official historiography of the early republican period. For instance, following the 
‘public transcript’ of the republican elite which publicly preaches ‘the people’, Anıl 
Çeçen maintains that the new regime was a ‘state of the people’ and it sought to 
increase the participation of the people in the government; but he does not take into 
consideration the authoritarian policies of the regime such as the Takrir-i Sükun law, 
the violent suppression of the Sheikh Said rebellion, criminalization and banning of 
the PRP, silencing of the Istanbul press, and oppression of all forms of opposition in 
the country in the same period. Even though Çeçen acknowledges that the policies 
between 1923 and 1929 restricted democratic rights and freedoms, and created 
economic problems for ordinary people; he does not seem to problematize further these 
policies, and he does not examine how authoritarian policies of the government may 
have hindered the ‘participation of the people in politics’. However, such authorita r ian 
policies of the government certainly cast doubt on the discourse of ‘a state of the 
people’ that Çeçen uncritically accepts.  
 
Similarly, other mainstream studies overlook the authoritarian policies of the 
government in this period by strictly adhering to the official historiography. These 
studies usually repeat the same historical narrative regarding the early republican 
period, and focus on a specific People’s House and its activities. There is, however, 
one exceptional study in the mainstream approach that gives a more balanced historica l 
account of the period. In his study, Şerafettin Zeyrek acknowledges that the violent 
suppression of the Sheikh Said rebellion, the banning of the PRP, the İzmir 
assassination trials, the purge of the former CUP members from politics, the burden of 
the Ottoman foreign debt, and the Great Depression created dissatisfaction among 
ordinary people and led to some ‘unpleasant events’.112 He also admits that the 
government had sometimes, but not always, been violent when it purged social and 
political opposition to itself.113 His uneasy acknowledgement of the authoritarian 
policies of the early republican period makes Zeyrek’s study an exception among other 
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mainstream studies. However, overall his study only focuses on the positive effects of 
the People’s Houses on Turkey’s modernization and development, without 
entertaining the possibility that there might have been some negative effects as well. 
In other words, his study generally shares other tenets of the mainstream approach. 
 
Second, the mainstream approach does not at all problematize the indoctrination of 
people in the People’s Houses. Several authors assert that the establishment of these 
institutions was necessary to educate people and teach them the revolutions of Atatürk. 
For instance, Selçuk Duman argues the People’s Houses had a difficult mission 
because they, on the one hand, had to reach to all people around the country, most of 
whom were illiterate, and on the other hand they had to teach people the fundamenta l 
principles of the Turkish republic and the revolutions of Atatürk.114 Similarly, Nurcan 
Toksoy maintains that Atatürk sought to protect Turkish people from the harmful 
effects of foreign ideologies. He considered the People’s Houses the most suitable 
environment to create national unity and cooperation.115 Obviously, for these authors 
ideological indoctrination of people does not constitute a ‘problem’ provided that the 
ideology is ‘national’. They make a clear distinction between those ‘harmful foreign 
ideologies’ aiming to deceive our people, and our own ‘national ideology’ which is 
‘necessary and beneficial’ to our people. Oblivious to the critical debates in social 
sciences on ‘ideology’ and ‘ideological state apparatuses’, mainstream scholars in 
general do not entertain the possibility that ‘our own ideology’, rather than being 
beneficial, may be an instrument for control over a society because in their 
understanding a ‘national ideology’ has only positive functions such as improving 
social cohesion and creating a national identity. This uncritical ready acceptance of the 
official ideology is highly illuminative of the state-centric nature of the mainstream 
approach.  
 
Third, the mainstream approach celebrates the experience of the People’s Houses as a 
part of the ‘cultural development’ and ‘enlightenment’ of Turkey116; without 
considering the possibility that these institutions may also have had certain negative 
functions. For instance, Çeçen maintains that at the time of the collapse of the Ottoman 
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Empire Turkish society was in a state of a ‘medieval sleep’-characterized by 
backwardness, underdevelopment, and inactivity. After the War of Independence and 
the foundation of the republic, however, Atatürk did his best to awaken his people.117 
In fact, the People’s Houses were established for this very purpose: to educate and 
enlighten people, start a national cultural renaissance, and to modernize the country. 
In these institutions people spent their free time productively, engaging in several 
activities such as fine arts, literature, theatre, sports, social assistance, village studies, 
taking courses in several subjects etc.118 According to Nurcan Toksoy, people showed 
an enormous enthusiasm for these institutions, and they voluntarily participated in their 
activities, making great sacrifices for their country and people without any personal 
expectations. Moreover, the Houses helped to close the gap between the village and 
the city, intellectuals and the people, and the old and the young. They created a mutual 
understanding among those groups, enhanced their cooperation, and strengthened the 
national unity in Turkey.119 
 
As we can see, the mainstream approach shares the simplistic modernist dichotomy 
between torpid and ‘backward’ societies and dynamic modern societies, and it thus 
attributes a totally positive role to the People’s Houses as institutions that modernized 
Turkey. Here I need to clarify a point. I am neither arguing that People’s Houses did 
not modernize Turkey, nor that they should not have. Rather than taking equally 
simplistic pro or anti-modernist positions, my critical point is that modernization may 
also have some negative outcomes as well as positive ones. In other words, 
‘modernization’ or ‘modernity’ should not simply be construed either as an ‘all 
positive’ or an ‘all negative’ process. However, this is exactly what the mainstream 
approach does: it construes modernization process as a totally positive and desired 
goal. Looking at the People’s Houses through uncritical, modernist, nationalist, and 
state-centric lenses, it is quite natural for the adherents of this approach to hold such a 
positive perception of them.  On the other hand, we do not necessarily have to share 
this perception. As the critical studies in the following part will demonstrate, a more 
critical approach may as well depict a different picture of these institutions.  
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2.2. The Critical Approach 
Compared to the mainstream approach, critical studies on the People’s Houses are 
fewer in numbers, but more original in content. The first representative of this 
approach is Neşe G. Yeşilkaya’s book Halkevleri: İdeoloji ve Mimarlık. In the book 
Yeşilkaya examines the relationship between ideology and architecture within the 
context of the People’s Houses. She begins her analysis with a theoretical discussion 
of the concept of ‘ideology’ and its evolution, and lists its main functions : 
mobilization, legitimation, naturalization, rationalization, and universalization.120 An 
ideology may mobilize and organize people around a common cause by generating 
consent. Similarly, it may also legitimize a regime in the eyes of people, or at least 
guarantee their tacit approval of the regime. Once subjects begin to judge themselves 
according to the judgement of the power, then its domination over the subjects would 
be legitimized. Through this act of legitimization ideology also naturalizes and 
rationalizes domination by rendering it natural and inevitable in the eyes of subjects. 
Fourth, ideology may unite certain groups of people under an identity, and improve 
social cohesion. Lastly, universalization also means depriving of a history and 
location. Then, Yeşilkaya discusses the relationship between ideology and architecture 
through several examples from the Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union. She argues 
that architecture was seen by both regimes as an instrument of propaganda. Both 
regimes encouraged and sponsored the construction of colossal buildings and 
monuments in order to display their power to people and to impress them.121 
 
In the second chapter of the book Yeşilkaya focuses on the intellectual history in 
Turkey and Kemalism. Summarizing the ideology of the Young Turks, the author 
continues with an examination of the Kemalist ideology and its main principles such 
as populism, nationalism, laicism, and revolutionism as they relate to the missions of 
the People’s Houses. The third chapter of the book deals with the organizationa l 
structure of the People’s Houses. Yeşilkaya first gives a brief historical account of the 
establishment of the Houses. Second, she explains the objectives of these instiut ions 
as follows:  
 
The primary objective of these institutions was to spread the Kemalist ideology 
and the principles of the party, and to entrench the revolutions in the society. As 
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a ‘modern project’ Kemalism aims to create a ‘new society’ and a ‘new life’. 
The new habits, behaviors- ways of thinking, tastes in arts and music, ways of 
entertainment, or in short the mindset required by the ‘new life’ were instilled in 
people through these institutions. … As the ‘educator’ of the society the People’s 
Houses educate the society, and teach people the ‘correct doctrines’ through 
inculcation and discipline/education (terbiye). 122 (Emphasis added)  
 
In the remainder of the third chapter Yeşilkaya examines the activities of each branch 
of the Houses in some detail. In the fourth chapter, she focuses on the relationship 
between architecture and the official ideology in Turkey between 1930 and 1940 with 
examples from several People’s Houses and other buildings built in this period. She 
notes that the establishment of a railroad network around the country enabled the 
regime to reach to the remotest corners of the country. Typically, the regime built the 
following building in city centers to represent the new nation state in remote regions: 
republican squares with statues of Atatürk, municipality buildings, court houses, 
primary schools that were usually named ‘Ghazi’, and the People’s Houses. Yeşilkaya 
also demonstrates how the official ideology shaped the professional ideology of 
architects in this period. She notes that ‘national architecture’ was expected to conform 
to the principles of the republic, and it should be in line with the revolutions. With 
their designs and creations architects should assist the gradual creation of the ‘ideal 
individual’ envisaged by the revolutions through education/discipline (terbiye). The 
last chapter of the book examines in more detail the People’s Houses and other 
republican buildings in terms of architecture, spatial organization of cities, and their 
relation to the official ideology. In her conclusion Yeşilkaya defines the People’s 
Houses as the embodiment of the official ideology of the period in architecture. 123 
Overall, Yeşilkaya’s critical examination of the complex relations between power, 
space, ideology, representation, and architecture within the context of the People’s 
Houses is highly illuminative. 
 
Another example of the critical approach is present in Mesut Yeğen’s book Devlet 
Söyleminde Kürt Sorunu. In examining the Turkish state discourse on the Kurdish 
question, Yeğen challenges the view that the state discourse conceals the undermining 
of the Kurdish identity by the Turkish state through a misrepresentation of the Kurdish 
question as ‘reactionism’, ‘regional backwardness’, ‘tribal resistance to central 
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authority’, or ‘the problem of banditry’. On the contrary, Yeğen argues, by drawing on 
Michel Foucault’s archeological discourse analysis, that rather than misrepresenting 
it, the Turkish state has in fact perceived the Kurdish question as ‘reactionism’, 
‘regional backwardness’, ‘tribal resistance to central authority’, and ‘the problem of 
banditry’. Therefore, he proposes to read the state discourse not as a distortion of the 
fact that the Kurdish identity has been undermined by the state; but as the language, 
the story, and the evidence of this very undermining.124  
 
In addition to tracing the historical formation of the Turkish state discourse on the 
Kurdish question and its complex relations with other discursive practices, Yeğen also 
analyzes core republican institutions, such as the Turkish Hearths, the People’s 
Houses, the Turkish History Association, and the Village Institutes, which assisted the 
formation of the state discourse in several ways. The author underlines the wide gap 
between the new regime and the peasants in Anatolia in the early republican period. 
The modernization project and reforms of the republican elite were not enthusiastica l ly 
endorsed by ordinary people, and there were expressions of discontent towards the 
regime as indicated by the popular support for the two opposition parties in 1924 and 
1930. However, Yeğen notes that the republican elite were not discouraged by these 
obstacles and the popular resistance. They realized that formal education system alone 
was not sufficient to overcome these obstacles. Thus they decided to establish 
institutions for folk education that can spread the symbolic regime of the republic into 
Anatolia by undermining the symbolic regime of ordinary people, which was based on 
Islam; popularize the reforms, and accelerate the national integration process. The 
People’s Houses were established to achieve these goals.125 
 
Yeğen notes that the peasants presented a particular obstacle to the national integrat ion 
process designed by the regime. Their passive resistance to the reforms, the prevalence 
of the Islamic symbolic regime in the countryside, and the traditional disconnection 
between the center and the countryside complicated the national integration process at 
the cultural level. In order to overcome these problems, the rulers decided to extend 
the activities of the Houses to the villages. In 1939 the government started to establish 
People’s Rooms in villages around Turkey. Yeğen states that the Houses played an 
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active role in national integration by teaching Turkish to Kurds and Arabs living in 
Mardin.126 Nevertheless, the national integration process was not devoid of difficulties. 
For instance, Yeğen cites an observation about a village trip organized by the Ankara 
People’s House to a nearby village just outside of the capital. Despite the proximity of 
the village to the capital, the People’s House convoy, which consisted of the House 
members, politicians, intellectuals, civil servants, doctors, dentists, students, poets etc., 
appeared to be exploring an unknown continent with a huge supply of canned food. 
The convoy planted a Turkish flag at the village center, delivered the peasants a 
harangue, examined the sick in the village, and took several pictures of the village and 
the peasants. The village was perceived as an unknown and unsafe territory to be 
explored, and the convoy needed to represent the state with the flag and state 
institutions in this nearby village. Yeğen notes that the village trip should be seen as 
an indication of the wide gap between the regime and ordinary people.127 
 
Sefa Şimşek presents the third example of the critical approach in his book Bir 
İdeolojik Seferberlik Deneyimi: Halkevleri (1932-1951). The book is fairly 
comprehensive, and I am only going to refer to the most relevant parts. To begin with, 
Şimşek analyzes the People’s Houses in terms of political propaganda and 
mobilization. In the beginning of the book he argues that during the 1920s the Kemalist 
elite were occupied with the creation and entrenchment of the new state. A series of 
radical reforms were introduced in a top down-manner, and the superstructure of the 
ancient regime was replaced by new institutions. However, at the popular level the 
traditional values of the society were still prevalent, and the reform policies of the new 
regime widened the traditional gap between the state and the society in Turkey. 128 
Referring to the famous saying of Massimo d’Azeglio, Şimşek asserts that the 
Kemalist elite, having created the Turkish Republic, then set out to create the 
republican Turkish citizens. In other words, the new regime required a new society. 129 
 
According to Şimşek, single party states require politicized societies more than plural 
political systems. In this respect, the People’s Houses were one of the most important 
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propaganda institutions of the single party regime in Turkey. Their main mission was 
political indoctrination and mobilization of ordinary people according to the princip les 
of the regime. In this way, they were expected to close the gap between the state and 
the society.130 In the second chapter of the book, Şimşek discusses the concept of 
‘political propaganda’ and its evolution with examples from the Soviet Union, Nazi 
Germany, and Fascist Italy. Şimşek notes that the republican elite had the propaganda 
institutions in those countries examined before the establishment of the People’s 
Houses.131  
 
After a brief account of the establishment of the Houses, Şimşek examines speeches 
of several CHP rulers, intellectuals, and other prominent figures to see how they 
defined the goals of the Houses. Based on those speeches, Şimşek argues that one of 
the primary missions of the Houses was creation of an ‘imagined community’ as 
designed by the party. Second, they were expected to create ‘critical symbols’ to alter 
the tastes and demands of the society in line with the party ideology.132 In the eighth 
chapter Şimşek pays attention to the village studies of the People’s Houses. He notes 
that the views of Kemalism on the peasants are contradictory. On the one hand, 
peasants are usually praised by the regime; but on the other hand there are many 
negative descriptions of peasants in the writings of Kemalist intellectuals. Therefore, 
Şimşek holds the opinion that the praise of peasants by Kemalism was far from 
genuine, only a discourse to get support from peasants for the new regime.133 
 
The ninth chapter deals with the ‘Turkish History Thesis’ and the ‘Sun Language 
Theory’. In the tenth chapter Şimşek looks at the relationship between sports and 
ideology within the context of the People’s Houses. Before discussing the view of 
Kemalism on sports he cites a few examples from national sports program of other 
countries such as Italy, Germany, and the United Kingdom as these countries 
influenced the Turkish program. All these countries paid special attention to the 
physical training of the youth, and encouraged ordinary people to participate in sports 
activities for they wished to physically prepare their citizens for a possible war. For 
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instance, in Nazi Germany twenty-two million people were actively involved in sports, 
and there were twenty-two thousand sport facilities in the country. However, Şimşek 
maintains that physical discipline and improvement were not the only motivat ion 
behind these national sports programs. In addition to physical discipline, those regimes 
intended to indoctrinate people with their ideology and worldview.134 
 
Similarly, Şimşek notes, Kemalism viewed sports as a mechanism of ideologica l 
indoctrination, and racial improvement also known as eugenics. In other words, all 
Turkish people were encouraged to participate in sport activities, and in doing so they 
would also endorse the republican values. Şimşek also points out that Kemalism 
wished to keep all sport activities under state supervision and control. In this way, 
Şimşek argues, the CHP wished to enhance its popular standing by translating the 
interest and enthusiasm of ordinary people for sports into support for itself and the 
regime.135 In this respect, the primary mission of the sports branches of the Houses 
was to promote sports among local people. 
 
The eleventh chapter of the book focuses on the theater activities of the People’s 
Houses as a means to spread the Kemalist ideology. Şimşek notes that in societies with 
low literacy rates, theater serves as a more efficient instrument of propaganda 
compared to printed materials and conferences.136 In this respect, the theater branches 
of the People’s Houses were held responsible to spread the principles and values of 
the republican regime. However, Şimşek argues that the theater branches largely failed 
due to low literary and artistic quality of the plays, exaggeratedly expressed ideologica l 
messages, overly simplistic dualism between good and evil characters, and poorly 
decorated theater stages combined with poor performance of actors majority of whom 
were amateurs. These factors prevented ordinary people from identifying with 
characters in plays, and hindered the effectiveness of ideological messages.137 In his 
conclusion, Şimşek argues that even though the People’s Houses may have failed to 
popularize the Kemalist ideology and its values among ordinary people; in the long 
run they nevertheless had a great impact on the ideas of teachers, intellectuals, writers, 
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and artists whose cultural and intellectual identity was formed in these institutions. 
Those intellectuals in turn transferred their knowledge and ideas to the future 
generations.138 
 
Lastly, Alexandros Lamprou carries out a brilliant examination of the People’s Houses 
from a bottom-up perspective by focusing on the “…interplay between the reforms 
introduced by the ruling elite and their enactment and consumption by social subjects 
in concrete social settings, within local societies and power networks.”139 Underlining 
the limitations of previous studies that emphasize the ‘textbook’ version of the Houses, 
rely on a strict distinction between state and society, and look at these institut ions 
through the lenses and the discourse of the political center; Lamprou treats the Houses 
as a ‘juncture of state and society’, and seeks to shed light on how the power relations 
between the center, local party elites, and other local actors influenced, modified, and 
sometimes reversed the plans and intentions of the political center. In other words, 
Lamprou aims to see how, and to what degree, the designs and intentions of the center 
were carried out in local settings, and how local actors coped with these designs. The 
author focuses on the Kayseri and Balıkesir Houses as case studies, and in order to 
lend an ear to the voices of local actors he draws on petitions, and complaint letters 
about the (mis)conduct of the Houses which were sent to the Party headquarters.  
In the first chapter of the book Lamprou describes the historical background and the 
main tenets of the People’s Houses project as it was designed by the political center. 
In the second chapter, Lamprou sketches “… a human geography of the Halkevi space 
and its clientele and manpower in provincial towns, where the majority of the Houses 
were established.”140 He provides statistical data about the composition of the ruling 
cadres and members of the Kayseri and Balıkesir Houses, including their occupation, 
gender, and level of education. As several other authors, Lamprou notes that usually 
the majority of the ruling cadres of the Houses consisted of civil servants, and 
teachers.141  
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Lamprou also points out that there was a substantial difference between the Houses 
that were established in major cities in the West with greater state presence, and those 
Houses that were established in the Eastern cities with a weak state presence and 
predominantly non-Turkish populations (Kurds or Arabs). The Houses located in big 
Western cities were much more active compared to those located in the east. In 
addition to the small numbers and isolation of the non-local civil servants from the 
local society, the linguistic, social, cultural, and ethnic differences between the local 
society and the state actors severely hindered the interactions between the two groups. 
As a result, most of the Eastern Houses were exclusively staffed by non-local civil 
servants, and in some cases the Houses only served as gathering and socializing points 
for bureaucrats in the locality.142 As Lamprou states:  
 
  Allowing for exceptions and regional variations, the Houses in the Kurdish-
populated east were definitely less- if at all- integrated into local societies than 
the Houses in the west and appeared to be isolated state colonies in the middle 
of the vast ethnic, linguistic, and, cultural otherness they were supposed to 
eradicate by facilitating the assimilation of its people and the colonization of its 
space through deportations and population settlement. An unambiguous part of 
such a state project over local society, the Eastern Halkevi appears almost as a 
colonial state office or a recreational space for colonial administrators, a space 
built upon the differentiation and segregation between colonizers and colonized. 
143 (Emphasis added) 
 
In the remainder of the second chapter and in the third, Lamprou engages in a detailed 
analysis of some petitions, complaint and denunciation letters that were written by 
local actors and sent to the center. His analysis demonstrates that the actual working 
of several local People’s Houses differed greatly from the ideal designs of the politica l 
center. In their speeches and writings the republican elite usually depicted the People’s 
Houses as institutions in which people cooperated and worked together harmonious ly 
for the national goals. In reality, however, most People’s Houses were caught up in 
personal conflicts, and political rivalries between various local actors and their 
alliances. To cite one example from the book, there were three denunciation letters 
against the People’s House chairman (who was also the party chairman) of Artvin that 
resulted in an investigation. The first letter claimed that on several occasions the 
chairman did not allow House members to listen to the news on the radio. Instead he 
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changed the radio station and listened to music with his friends. The second letter 
complained about the arbitrary and tyrannical rule of the chairman. The third 
denunciation letter argued that due to the unlawful and unplanned activities of the 
chairman, the Artvin House became inactive. Upon these accusations, a party inspector 
conducted an investigation. His report revealed that the chairman had been 
systematically targeted, with fake charges, by two former chiefs of the Artvin House 
orchestra who were removed from their positions by the chairman. Lamprou notes that 
such plots to remove a chairman or an officer from their positions by their rivals 
occurred quite frequently across many People’s Houses.144 
 
In the fourth chapter, Lamprou focuses on some complaint letters about the 
exclusionary spare time practices of People’s Houses managers. He notes that since 
the Ottoman times the state viewed coffee houses as uncontrollable and dangerous 
venues where subversive popular political ideas and bad habits such as drinking and 
gambling flourished. The republican regime inherited this negative view about coffee 
houses, and condemned them through a moralistic discourse which depicts coffee 
houses as places ‘hurting family life’, ‘lodges of the idle’, and ‘nests of gossip’ where 
the youth wasted their time doing nothing, but gambling and drinking. In this respect, 
in the official discourse the People’s Houses were presented as alternatives to the 
coffee houses, and people were encouraged to participate in their activities. The 
Houses were celebrated as cultural institutions where intellectuals and ordinary people 
would come together and learn from each other.  
 
However, Lamprou demonstrates that in practice the situation was much more 
complicated, and that in most cases House managers drew a line between themselves 
and ordinary people. Many complaint letters criticized civil servants and intellectua ls 
for monopolizing People’s Houses that belonged to the people, excluding people from 
certain rooms which they reserved for themselves, and performing the very bad habits, 
such as gambling and drinking, that the center sought to keep away from the People’s 
House space. Lamprou notes that authors of complaint letters successfully employed 
the official moralist discourse on coffee houses as a tactic for their own advantage. 
Usually, the complaint letters argued that due to the exclusionary and immora l 
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behavior of House managers the local youth could not find any proper place to 
socialize, and unfortunately they started to waste their time in decadent coffee houses. 
Another method used by House managers to segregate themselves from ordinary 
people was the system of invitation cards. By issuing invitation cards for House 
activities such as theater, movie screening, and musical performances, House 
managers were able to exclude ordinary people from such events. Thus, the invita t ion 
card system was heavily criticized in the complaint letters.145 Overall, the fourth 
chapter of the book indicates that, despite the idealism of the political center, the 
integration of intellectuals and ordinary people at People’s Houses remained limited.  
 
In the fifth chapter Lamprou focuses on the tension produced by the introduction of 
mixed-gender entertainment and social interaction within largely sex-segregated local 
societies. Lamprou notes that the ‘women issue’ was an integral part of the Kemalist 
modernization and nation-building project.146 However, on the one hand the new 
regime gave civil rights to women and encouraged them to participate in professiona l 
and social life. On the other hand, the republican elite expected women to continue to 
perform their traditional duties as mothers and wives. The People’s Houses had the 
responsibility to promote women’s participation in its activities. However, this created 
tensions in local societies, such as Balıkesir and Kayseri, where women were expected 
to remain in the private sphere. Lamprou notes that local party members faced a 
dilemma. On the one hand, they could allow their womenfolk to participate in public 
life and politics to earn support from Ankara. On the other hand, public visibility and 
participation of their female relatives in public affairs could easily damage their 
families’ reputation among the local population, and their local political rivals would 
probably use this situation by spreading rumors to discredit them. Thus, most local 
party members chose to keep their female relatives out of public life. 
 
In the by-law of the People’s Houses men were forbidden to play women’s roles in 
theater plays. Lamprou points out that this created a real problem for House officia ls. 
Due to the lack of women willing to go on stage in public, the House executives 
occasionally allowed men to play women’s role. But the primary method employed by 
the House officials was to exert pressure on female teachers to act on the stage. They 
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also offered financial compensation to women who agreed to perform in theater plays. 
In addition, in order to solve this problem, many Houses arranged itinerant theater 
companies to perform on their stages. However, this practice often created a reaction 
among local people. There were many complaint letters about these plays claiming 
that such plays led to moral decay and undermined family life.147 Lamprou states the 
most employed practice by House managers to cope with such problems was the tactic 
of limited inclusiveness through invitation cards during mixed-gender activit ies. 
Usually, local bureaucrats and their families attended such activities, and they 
excluded local ordinary people to avoid tensions. 
 
Finally, in the last chapter Lamprou examines some village excursions organized by 
the Kayseri House and compares them with the detailed village activities program of 
the political center. The author notes that the participants of such excursions were 
usually the same people: the House chairman and his family, members of the Village 
Studies branch, civil servants and their wives, teachers, an army officer etc. For non-
local party members and civil servants these excursions were an opportunity to come 
into contact with peasants for the first time. Provincial elites such as merchants and 
tax farmers, on the other hand, had already been in contact with peasants, providing 
them with credit and buying their products, as well as mediating between peasants and 
the state. Lamprou highlights the paradox of the regime with respect to its peasantist 
discourse and its reliance on provincial elites in its relations with peasants. The 
peasantist discourse of the regime seeks to liberate peasants from those oppressors who 
exploit them. However, in reality the regime was dependent on the same oppressors to 
carry out its policies in rural areas.148  
 
Lamprou also notes that in the village activities reports they sent to the center, House 
chairmen and other managers usually followed the same program prepared by the 
center, and they emphasized their own achievements to win the favor of the politica l 
center.149 In other words, if a researcher studies the village activity reports of the 
People’s Houses alone, (s)he would probably conclude that during those excursions 
House members and peasants established close relations and had discussions about 
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their problems, and patients were treated etc. However, Lamprou argues that the 
village excursions were characterized with authoritative behavior of House managers 
as the House chairman ordered the ‘masters of the country’ to sit and listen, and report 
their complaints. As a result, Lamprou states that village excursions could not make 
any contributions to the country side: “The village operation either established or 
reinforced existing relations between urban elites and villagers, as they replayed the 
power relations between them.”150 In the conclusion of the book, Lamprou argues that 
the policies and designs of the state were domesticated; that is renegotiated, 
accommodated, and adopted by local agents in order to turn these products into 
something more agreeable to local conditions and more meaningful for their users.151 
As he puts it: 
 
The center’s ideas and plans- without necessarily being rejected- were blended 
with activities, perceptions, and practices they were supposed to eradicate. Given 
the novelty of many state-sponsored practices and ideas and the expressed goal 
that they replace ‘older’ or ‘backward’ ones, their consumption in the Halkevi 
was also a process of negotiation of contested categories- modern vs backward, 
Western vs. national/local- but also of the identities of both their carriers and 
refuters. 152 
 
In sum, the critical studies offer critical insight and greatly enhance our understanding 
of the People’s Houses by examining these institutions from a variety of novel 
perspectives. These studies especially shed light on the ideological and assimila t ive 
functions of the People’s Houses that the mainstream approach tends to overlook.  For 
instance, in her book Yeşilkaya examines the relationship between ideology, space, 
and architecture within the context of People’s Houses. Similarly, Sefa Şimşek 
scrutinizes activities of the People’s Houses and their role in spreading the offic ia l 
ideology. Mesut Yeğen, on the other hand, analyzes the formation of the Turkish state 
discourse on the Kurdish question through several republican institutions, and 
emphasizes the designated role of the People’s Houses in national integration process. 
Lastly, Alexandros Lamprou analyzes these institutions from a bottom-up perspective 
to demonstrate how the reform policies of the political center were enacted in local 
settings. His study suggests that there was a great discrepancy between the plans and 
intentions of the republican elite, and the way these policies were carried out by local 
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actors. Overall, these critical studies depict a quite different picture of the People’s 
Houses and their operations than the mainstream approach presents. 
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CHAPTER III 
 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND THE RESEARCH HYPOTHESIS 
 
3.1. Theoretical Framework 
The idea of studying the People’s Houses through a Foucauldian approach was 
inspired by a passage in Timothy Mitchell’s famous book Colonising Egypt. In the 
beginning of the fourth chapter namely ‘After We Have Captured Their Bodies’, 
Mitchell refers to a report written by a French military officer in Algeria to the French 
authorities in Paris on a recent local insurrection. In his report the officer informs Paris 
of methods of establishing effective control over the local population: 
 
In effect the essential thing is to gather into groups this people which is 
everywhere and nowhere; the essential thing is to make them something we can 
seize hold of. When we have them in our hands, we will then be able to do many 
things which are quite impossible for us today and which will perhaps allow us 
to capture their minds after we have captured their bodies. 153 (Emphasis added) 
 
Even though this report was written within a specific colonial context, it can 
nevertheless give us an idea of how modern power operates in general. In order to be 
able to establish ideological control over a certain group of people through 
indoctrination, modern power first requires to establish a degree of ‘physical control’ 
over them. In other words, control over bodies precedes control over minds. However, 
the critical studies summarized above mainly focus on ideological functions of the 
Houses. In fact, it is true that the primary function of these institutions was 
indoctrination and establishment of ideological control over people. However, a sole 
focus on ideology cannot demonstrate other less visible, but not insignificant, 
functions of the Houses. Drawing on Michel Foucault’s concepts of ‘disciplinary 
power’, ‘bio-politics’, and ‘governmentality’, this study shall argue that the People’s 
Houses were also designed by the republican elite to perform disciplinary functions as 
well as ideological functions, and they provided the central government, to a certain 
degree, with the necessary information and instruments to govern the Turkish 
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population more effectively. Now I will first elaborate on these three concepts, and 
then introduce my research hypothesis. 
 
3.1.1. Disciplinary Power 
In the 1970s Michel Foucault shifted his focus from analyses of discursive formations, 
and returned to analyses of social institutions and practices of confinement. In the 
Discipline and Punish he conducts a genealogy of disciplinary institutions and 
techniques that gradually arose throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. 
Simply defined, disciplinary power refers to a series of calculated techniques, methods, 
and regulations carefully applied to the body in order to render it more productive and 
docile. Foucault argues that the classical age discovered the body as object and target 
of power. As he puts it: “The human body was entering a machinery of power that 
explores it, breaks it down, and rearranges it. A ‘political anatomy’, which was also a 
‘mechanics of power’, was being born…”154 Foucault admits that many disciplinary 
techniques had long been in existence; but in the course of the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries they began to reach out to ever broader domains, as if they tended 
to cover the entire social body. These techniques did not suddenly emerge from a 
single source either; they were the result of a multiplicity of minor processes which 
overlap, repeat, imitate, and support one another, gradually converging and producing 
the blueprint of a general method. For instance, these techniques circulated from one 
institution to another: from secondary education to primary education, then to 
hospitals, and then to military organizations etc.155 
 
Disciplinary power relies on certain procedures and techniques such as enclosure, 
partitioning, division of duration into successive or parallel segments, drawing 
timetables, hierarchical observation, normalizing judgement, and examination. First of 
all, disciplinary power requires confinement of a group of individuals in a specified 
and closed space such as schools, or barracks. However, enclosure alone is rarely 
sufficient; discipline also requires partitioning of individuals in a certain and fixed 
location. As Foucault puts it: “Each individual has his own place; and each place its 
individual. Avoid distributions in groups; break up collective dispositions; analyze 
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confused, massive, or transient pluralities. Disciplinary space tends to be divided into 
as many sections as there are bodies or elements to be distributed.”156 Third, time is 
divided into successive segments, and periods of each activity is isolated from one 
another. Period of training and period of practice should be strictly separated, 
instruction of new recruits and practice of veterans should not be mixed. Following 
time tables facilitates this partitioning of time; in this way work and leisure, or study 
time and breaks can be strictly separated. However, one also has to assure the quality 
of time used through constant supervision and the pressure of supervisors. As Foucault 
says: “Time measured and paid must also be a time without impurities or defects; a 
time of good quality, throughout which the body is constantly applied to its exercise. 
Precision and application are, with regularity, fundamental virtues of disciplinary 
time.”157Lastly, normalizing judgement and examination establish norms, standards, 
and criteria of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ behavior; set up ranks, measure grades; and in doing 
so they judge individuals, establish hierarchies among them as ‘good’ or ‘bad’ subjects 
in relation to one another; punish ‘bad behavior’ or ‘deviations’ from norms through 
repetitive exercises or decrease in rank; reward ‘good behavior’ through promotions, 
and distribute privileges and distinctions. Through these mechanisms of punishment 
and rewards disciplinary institutions compare, differentiate, hierarchize, homogenize, 
and exclude. In short, they correct behavior and normalize individuals.158 
 
Foucault notes that Jeremy Bentham’s Panopticon provided an ideal architectura l 
model for disciplinary institutions. In the Panoptic model a tower is located at the 
center, and surrounded by an annular building which consists of numerous cells. A 
supervisor positioned at the tower can observe individuals in the cells without being 
seen. The major effect of the Panopticon, according to Foucault, is to induce in the 
inmate a state of conscious and permanent visibility that assures the automatic 
functioning of power. Bentham maintained that power should be visible and 
unverifiable: “Visible: the inmate will constantly have before his eyes the tall outline 
of the central tower from which he is spied on. Unverifiable: the inmate must never 
know whether he is being looked at any one moment; but he must be sure that he may 
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always be so.”159 Thus, inmates will have to autocorrect their behavior, and over time 
they will internalize discipline. 
 
Bentham devised the Panopticon to serve multiple purposes. With certain 
modifications one can apply this model to various institutions. Foucault summarizes 
the functions of the panoptic model as follows:  
 
It is polyvalent in its applications; it serves to reform prisoners, but also to treat 
patients, to instruct schoolchildren, to confine the insane, to supervise workers, 
to put beggars and idlers to work. It is a type of location of bodies in space, of 
distribution of individuals in relation to one another, of hierarchical organizat ion, 
of disposition of centers and channels of power, of definition of the instruments 
and modes of intervention of power, which can be implemented in hospitals, 
workshops, schools, or prisons. Whenever one is dealing with a multiplicity of 
individuals on whom a task or a particular form of behavior must be imposed, 
the panoptic schema may be used. 160 
 
Moreover, the Panopticon can also serve as a laboratory to carry out experiments, to 
alter behavior, to train and correct individuals; to experiment with medicines and 
monitor their effects; to try out different punishments on prisoners, according to their 
crimes and character, and to seek the most effective ones; to teach different techniques 
simultaneously to the workers, to decide which is the best. As Foucault states, one can 
even try out strange pedagogical experiments with orphans: “…one could bring up 
different children according to different systems of thought, making certain children 
believe that two and two do not make four or that the moon is a cheese, then put them 
together when they are twenty or twenty-five years old…”.161 
 
In sum, with his meticulous analysis of disciplinary power and institutions Foucault 
demonstrates how the body has become an object and target of power relations in 
modern societies. He calls this phenomenon as the emergence of a ‘polit ica l 
technology of the body’, or a ‘political anatomy of the body’. His analysis discloses 
operations of this political technology that are usually difficult to discern at first sight 
in daily life. Throughout their lives people engage with modern institutions such as 
schools, factories, army, hospitals, prisons etc. without realizing they have been, in 
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one way or another, subjected to certain disciplinary techniques and procedures. Yet, 
disciplinary techniques are not the only political technology of modern power to which 
people have been subjected.  
 
3.1.2. Biopower  
In one of the lectures of 1976 at College de France Foucault introduces a new concept 
to define another technology of modern power: biopower. In order to explicate the 
concept he compares biopower with the traditional power of sovereignty over life and 
death. In the classical theory of sovereignty the sovereign has the right of life and 
death, which means he can either put people to death or let them live. However, the 
sovereign can exercise his power only when he kills; thus his power can be called ‘the 
right to take life or let live’. Foucault asserts that in the nineteenth century this right of 
the sovereign was complemented by a new and opposite right: the power to ‘make’ 
live or ‘let’ die. 162 
 
Foucault points out that biopower is not disciplinary; but it does not exclude 
disciplinary power. On the contrary, biopower integrates disciplinary techniques, and 
takes advantage of them when necessary. However, biopower operates at a different 
level: whereas disciplinary power or the political anatomy deals with individual bodies 
to render them more productive and docile, bio-politics focuses on the social body as 
a whole; it is “…applied not to man-as-body but to the living man, to man as living 
being; ultimately, if you like, to man-as-species.”163 In other words, the object and 
target of biopower is the ‘population’ with its various characteristics and regularit ies. 
Foucault also discusses the emergence of the concept of ‘population’ as an 
administrative and technical category different from ‘society’ as a political or legal 
category. He states: “One of the great innovations in the techniques of power in the 
eighteenth century was the emergence of population as an economic and politica l 
problem: population as wealth, population as manpower, or labor capacity, population 
balanced between its own growth and the resources it commanded.”164  
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Liberal political theory and politico- legal discourse of jurists usually rely on the 
concept of ‘social contract’ that defines the relationship between the sovereign and his 
individual subjects. In other words, the ‘society’ is a politico- legal concept. On the 
other hand, the concept of ‘population’ has a more technical connotation. As Partha 
Chatterjee puts it in a nutshell: “Citizens inhabit the domain of theory, populations the 
domain of policy. Unlike the concept of citizen, the concept of population is wholly 
descriptive and empirical; it does not carry a normative burden.”165 The emergence of 
statistics and demography by the end of the eighteenth century gave rise to the concept 
of population as a new category. 
 
The mechanisms introduced by bio-politics to deal with the population and its 
problems include forecasts, statistical estimates, and overall measures. Unlike the 
disciplinary power, they do not aim to deal with such problems at the individual level, 
or to improve the condition of an individual. On the contrary, they aim to intervene at 
the general level.166 For instance, even though it is not possible to prevent death at 
individual level since it is unpredictable, at the level of population death becomes more 
visible, traceable, and predictable thanks to the statistical knowledge of the population. 
Thus, it becomes possible for governments to intervene in the constant struggle 
between life and death in favor of the former through regulatory policies and measures. 
In other words, the level of generality enables policy makers to detect regularit ies, 
patterns, and continuities in collective phenomena such as death and birth rates, and to 
intervene accordingly.  
 
Foucault notes that biopower requires a detailed knowledge of the population, its 
characteristics, and habits. In fact, one of his essential arguments throughout his 
studies is that power produces knowledge, and vice versa. Challenging the traditiona l 
view that knowledge can thrive only when it remains outside of power relations, 
Foucault argues: “…there is no power relation without the correlative constitution of 
a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at 
the same time power relations.”167 Elsewhere he states that a ‘medico-administrative’ 
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knowledge began to develop from the eighteenth century onward. This knowledge 
focuses on society, its health and sickness, its conditions of life, and housing and 
habits.168 It is such a knowledge of the population that enables government 
functionaries to observe, design regulatory policies for, and intervene in such 
collective phenomena. 
 
A series of natural processes and collective phenomena such as ratio of births to deaths, 
the rate of reproduction, the fertility of a population; endemics as permanent factors 
that sap a population’s strength, shorten the working week, waste energy, and cost 
money (because of both the fall in productivity and costs of treatment); accidents, 
anomalies, and inevitable phenomena that incapacitate individuals such as the problem 
of old age; the direct effects of the geography and climate on the population; all of 
them constitute the field of intervention of biopower. For instance, operations of 
biopower include: campaigns to increase birth rates or for birth control, providing free 
healthcare for poor people, campaigns to maintain and increase hygiene in public and 
private areas, to enforce safety regulations in the workplace, vaccinating school 
children against epidemics, campaigns against drugs, alcohol and smoking; campaigns 
against obesity which urges people to exercise regularly and maintain a healthy diet, 
public spotlights and TV programs concerning health, insurance policies, taking care 
of the elderly in nursing homes, and social pensions etc. These are the problems that 
policy makers have generally concerned themselves with since the late eighteenth 
century in terms of population. Bio-politics deals with the population as a politica l 
problem, as a problem that is at once scientific and political. In short, with the concept 
of bio-politics Foucault refers to the increasing ‘state control of the biological’.169 
 
3.1.3. Governmentality 
In his lectures in 1978 Foucault introduces the concept of ‘governmentality’ to deepen 
and refine his analyses of technologies of modern power, and put biopower into a 
broader historical context. He argues that in the sixteenth century there emerged a 
literature on the ‘art of government’ in opposition to the notion of ‘juridica l 
sovereignty’ as exemplified in Machiavelli’s The Prince. Whereas territory constituted 
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the fundamental element of sovereignty in the latter; it became only one of the factors 
in the new ‘art of government’. In the traditional system of juridical sovereignty a 
ruler’s exercise of power usually consisted only of taxation, recruitment of soldiers, 
and maintenance of public order. As James Scott observes, the pre-modern state was 
partially blind; it did not know much about its subjects, their wealth, their landhold ings 
and yields, their location, their very identity.170 On the other hand, in the sixteenth 
century ‘governing’ acquired a new meaning different from ‘reigning’ or ‘ruling’. 
Foucault argues, unlike today, ‘government’ in this period did not have a strictly 
political meaning, and it exploded as a general problem in this period: for example, 
how to govern oneself, how to be governed, how to govern others, by whom the people 
will accept being governed, and how to become the best possible governor etc.171 In 
the new understanding government may have multiple ends(such as government of 
children, of families, of a household, of souls, of a community etc.), and it is defined 
as“…the right disposition of things, arranged so as to lead to a convenient end.”172  
 
It can be argued that governmentality has two complementary dimensions. The first 
one refers to policies, regulations, and institutions of government aimed to increase the 
productivity of a population, and in this sense it is closely interrelated to, yet distinct 
from biopower. According to Foucault, prior to the emergence of population as a 
category, economy was conceived as the management of a family, and it was not 
possible to conceive the ‘art of government’ except on the model of family. In other 
words, with the replacement of ‘family’ by ‘population’ as the unit of analysis, and the 
more or less simultaneous introduction of economy into political practice led to the 
‘governmentalization of the state’.173 Foucault calls this new governmental rationality, 
which replaced juridical sovereignty, ‘governmentality’, and defines it as follows: 
 
The ensemble formed by the institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, 
the calculations and tactics that allow the exercise of this very specific, albeit 
very complex form of power, which has as its target population, as its principle 
form of knowledge political economy, and as its essential technical means 
apparatuses of security. 174 
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Whereas biopower deals with the population in terms of its biological well-being, 
governmentality takes matters a few steps further. It takes population into account in 
its relation to other things such as wealth, resources, means of subsistence, the territory 
with its specific qualities, climate, irrigation, customs, habits, ways of thinking and 
acting etc.175 The emphasis here is on economic productivity of the population and its 
use of natural resources. In other words, governmentality meticulously takes care of a 
multiplicity of factors that can affect a population’s health, productive capacity, and 
wealth. It can be best explained with the metaphor of ‘governing a ship’. As Foucault 
puts it:  
 
What does it mean to govern a ship? It means clearly to take charge of the sailors, 
but also of the boat and its cargo, to take care of a ship means also to reckon with 
winds, rocks, and storms; and it consists in that activity of establishing a relation 
between the sailors who are to be taken care of and the ship which is to be taken 
care of, and the cargo which is to be brought safely to port, and all those 
eventualities like winds, rocks, storms and so on; this is what characterizes the 
government of a ship. 176 
 
The second dimension of governmentality is more abstract, and it can best be 
expressed as ‘conduct of conduct’. As stated above, ‘government’ did not only refer 
to political institutions. One can also speak of government of others, directing their 
actions or conduct. As Foucault puts it: “It [government] did not only cover 
legitimately constituted forms of political or economic subjection but also modes of 
action, more or less considered or calculated, which were destined to act upon the 
possibilities of action of other people. To govern, in this sense is to structure the 
possible field of action of others.”177 Exercise of such a power cannot rely on coercion, 
or on legal enforcement, for in Foucault’s understanding freedom is a condition of 
exercise of power: “Power is exercised only on free subjects, and only insofar as they 
are free. By this we mean individual or collective subjects who are faced with a field 
of possibilities in which several ways of behaving, several reactions and diverse 
compartments, may be realized.”178 
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In other words, governmentality does not directly command individuals or groups, as 
juridical sovereignty does; but it creates certain dispositions and desires among 
subjects. Perhaps, a simple example from everyday life may help clarify this crucial 
point: As stated above, modern power requires people to be healthy and physica lly 
strong, and perhaps the best way to keep the body healthy and strong is to exercise 
regularly and engage in sports activities. Yet, governments, or public authorities in 
general, usually do not force their citizens to participate in sports activities. Instead, 
they build sports facilities in which individuals can voluntarily engage in sports 
activities. Moreover, there is a widespread discourse on health and fitness promoted 
not only by ministries of health, but also other public institutions, and civil society 
organizations; doctors, experts, TVs, and magazines that induces individuals to 
exercise regularly and eat healthy. People who engage in sports are not, in any way, 
forced to do so; and they are truly free to participate in or refrain from sports activit ies. 
However, by structuring a possible field of action for free individuals; building sports 
facilities, and promoting a discourse on healthy life etc. governments exercise a subtle 
and indirect form of power over their populations.  
 
Therefore, governmentality cannot operate through coercion. It rather “…operates by 
educating desires, and configuring habits, aspirations and beliefs.”179 Education of 
desires, and configuration of habits, aspirations, and beliefs actually amounts to 
formation of certain subjectivities. For instance, the famous ‘homo economicus’ of 
modern economy can be considered as an example of such a subjectivity. Homo 
economicus is expected to conform to certain rationalities and modes of action such as 
being self-interested, competitive, industrious, self-sufficient, making rational 
calculations in the market, certain consumption habits etc. Formation of such a 
subjectivity relies on a variety of discourses and practices such as economic theories, 
modern education, regulation of markets, advertisement, consumer credit to name but 
a few. Modern power governs individuals through conduct of conduct or 
governmentality that constitutes certain subjectivities. As a result, Foucault argues that 
subject is an effect of power: “The individual, with his identity and characteristics, is 
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the product of a relation of power exercised over bodies, multiplicities, movements, 
desires, forces.”180 
 
In sum, Foucault’s concepts of disciplinary power, biopower, and governmenta lity 
form a series. While disciplinary power emphasizes ‘micro-physics’ of power that 
targets individual bodies, biopower and governmentality refers to regulatory 
technologies that focus on populations. Foucault’s analyses first shed light on subtle 
power relations that seems to have largely escaped from the attention of the classical 
political theory with its traditional focus on the formal political systems, institutions, 
and procedures; sovereignty, laws, democracy; rights, freedoms, and liberties of 
individuals etc. Second, his analyses challenge the long-held view that power is 
inherently negative; that through laws it forbids, constrains, limits, and represses; and 
that power and truth are external to each other (the repressive hypothesis).181 In 
contrast, throughout his analyses Foucault convincingly demonstrates that power does 
not only have negative effects; he maintains that if that was the case it would not be 
possible to reproduce and perpetuate relations of domination in society. It rather, as 
discussed above, has positive effects as well; it increases productivity, makes people 
healthier, creates desires, produces knowledges, and forms subjectivities. Here, one 
may raise an objection and rightfully ask: “If these technologies of modern power has 
such positive effects, why criticize them?” However, Foucault’s critical point is that 
technologies of modern power objectify people, establish a subtle control over them, 
and turn them into subjects. In other words, Foucault’s criticism can be seen as an 
attack on the modernization theory and the idea of ‘progress’, which assume that the 
process of modernization will eventually liberate people from relations of domination.  
 
3.2. Research Hypothesis 
Earlier in the literature review we have seen that the critical studies underline the 
ideological and assimilative functions of the People’s Houses. In light of the 
theoretical framework above, I will argue that in addition to their mission to spread the 
Kemalist ideology and to assimilate non-Turkish people, the People’s Houses were 
also designated by the republican elite to perform disciplinary and regulatory functions 
that modern governmental rationality requires to manage a population effectively. In 
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other words, these institutions were designed as a socio-cultural space where 
disciplinary power, biopower, and governmentality would jointly operate in order to 
make the Turkish population healthier and economically more productive. Having 
created a nation state, the republican elite also aimed to create a modern society. In 
this modernization project they utilized, to a certain degree, disciplinary and regulatory 
technologies of modern power described above.  
 
Even a cursory overview of the activities182 of the People’s Houses as described in 
their bylaw would reveal the similarities between the intentions of the republican elite 
and the modern governmental rationality. To begin with, participation of ordinary 
people in the activities of the Houses would increase their visibility. Through the 
People’s Houses in urban areas and the Rooms in villages, the government was going 
to able to see, inspect, and report certain, if not all, segments of the population; 
rendering them ‘something they can seize hold of’. Reports, statistics, membership 
records, and publications of the Houses provided the government with a knowledge of 
the population that biopower and governmentality rely on. The special reports on 
minority groups prepared by the Tunceli Houses that Mesut Özcan presents provide a 
perfect example. In his interesting book Özcan presents a compilation of the offic ia l 
documents and correspondence between the People’s Houses and Rooms in Tunceli 
and the CHP headquarters. Those documents basically reveal how the Houses in 
Tunceli functioned to culturally assimilate local Kurds and especially children to the 
Turkish identity by teaching them Turkish. Özcan points out that some managers of 
the Houses also prepared special reports on minority groups, such as Zazas and 
Alawites, to be presented to the government and İsmet İnönü.183 Given the traditiona l 
gap and disconnectedness between the center and the countryside, this increased 
visibility of locals, being one of the conditions of disciplinary power, was something 
new; and it was crucial for the management of the population by the government. In 
short, the Houses and the Rooms operated as the eyes of the regime in the countryside.  
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Second, the Sports branches of the Houses were designed as an important instrument 
of disciplinary power. By encouraging local people to participate in sports activit ies  
such as gymnastics, cycling, swimming, wrestling, boxing, hunting, fishing, and 
horseback riding etc.; this branch aimed to increase their physical strength and 
endurance. Yiğit Akın observes that in the early republican period sports activit ies 
were encouraged both for military purposes (national defense) and increasing 
economic productivity.184 Moreover, at a more general level sports activities would 
also improve the health of the population, by increasing people’s immunity to diseases, 
and helping them to avoid bad habits. In other words, the sports branch was expected 
to both increase physical capabilities of individuals at the local level; and at the same 
time complement the bio-political social policies of the government at a more general 
level by improving the health of the population as a whole. The Social Assistance 
branch was another instrument of biopower at the local level. By financially and 
medically helping the poor, the sick, helpless women and children, the disabled, and 
the elderly; who are usually economically inactive and in need of care; and by assisting 
other health care institutions in their operations; this branch intended to improve the 
health of the disadvantaged segments of the population. This branch also worked in 
cooperation with the Village studies branch to be able to reach the disadvantaged 
people in villages. 
 
Third, the Educational Courses branches aimed to integrate local people into the 
modern economy and increase their economic productivity by teaching them various 
subjects. Courses on foreign languages, accounting, natural sciences, and handcrafts 
were designed to equip people with the skills and abilities that the modern economy 
demands. Moreover, the Village Studies branches organized practical courses on 
modern agricultural methods to educate villagers about the most efficient methods of 
cultivation. It also cooperated with other branches to increase the literacy rate in 
villages. All these policies can be seen as local implementation of governmenta lity 
which takes population into account in terms of its economic productivity and use of 
natural resources. 
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Fourth, the Houses also had a ‘civilizing mission’. This ‘civilizing mission’ can be 
directly related with the second dimension of governmentality: conduct of conduct. 
With their various activities the Language, Literature, and History; Fine Arts, Theatre,  
Library and Publication, Village Studies, and Museum and Exhibition branches 
intended to instill in people certain new behavior, manners, and habits, and cultivate 
modern aesthetic tastes. As I have discussed above, conduct of conduct does not rely 
on coercion as it requires free subjects; and in the case of the People’s Houses people 
were free to choose any activities (music, painting, theater, sports etc.) that interested 
them. In other words, the activities of the People’s Houses were designed to form new 
subjectivities and create new individualities, or the ‘ideal Turkish citizens designed by 
the republic’ by structuring a possible field of action for ordinary people, and by 
creating certain dispositions.  
 
For instance, this ideal citizen can be described as follows: Someone who is docile and 
obedient to authority, full of patriotic feelings and willing to sacrifice themselves for 
their country; who is secular and rational with a scientific mindset, and devoid of 
superstitious beliefs; who is economically productive and efficient, disciplined and 
equipped with the skills, know-how, and other abilities that modern economy requires; 
who is physically strong and healthy to endure harsh conditions, capable of 
performing difficult military missions; who has modern aesthetic tastes in fine arts, 
theatre, and music; and finally someone who is communitarian and helpful, devoted 
to his community and nation. As we shall see, a careful look at the writings and 
speeches of the republican elite in the early republican period reveals that this was, 
more or less, the ideal citizen they wished to create. It can be argued that the People’s 
Houses were established to create these ideal citizens through conduct of conduct. 
 
However, it would be wrong to assume that these technologies and techniques of 
modern power were suddenly introduced in the republican period. In other words, the 
founders of the republic did not have to invent these technologies from scratch. On the 
contrary, they had their roots in the Ottoman reform project, as they gradually 
infiltrated185 the Ottoman system from the early nineteenth century onward as a result 
of the modernization process. Ottoman reformers, who had been to Europe for 
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education, adopted modern administrative techniques and technologies of power from 
European countries, and they implemented them, with varying degrees of success, on 
the Ottoman population. From the Tanzimat period onward, the Ottoman state started 
to collect demographic data of the population through censuses, and designed various 
social policies to increase the economic productivity and war capacities of the 
population. In this respect, it can be argued that there is continuity between the late 
Ottoman period and the republican period. For instance, Füsun Üstel demonstrates and 
underlines this continuity in her analysis of the civic education in Turkey since the 
second constitutional period. She argues that civic education constituted an essential 
dimension of the nation building projects of both the CUP intellectuals and the 
founders of the Turkish republic.186  
 
Therefore, this study should not be seen as a narrow critique of the Kemalist policies 
in the early republican period. It rather aspires to engage in a critique of the mode rn 
governmental rationality; as an attempt to demonstrate how modern nation states 
design policies to exercise a subtle but enormous power over their populations by 
examining the case of the People’s Houses. Put differently, my main purpose in this 
study is to examine the ideas, intentions, and plans of the republican elites through a 
Foucauldian perspective, and to show that the modern governmental rationality was 
inherent in their projects like the People’s Houses. For this purpose, in the next chapter 
I am going to focus on numerous articles from the Ülkü magazine that were penned by 
prominent intellectuals and policy makers of the early republican period. 
 
However, this study does not intend to assess the ‘success’ of the People’s Houses in 
implementing the policies designed by the political center. It rather focuses on the 
discourse of the republican elite on the management of the Turkish population, and 
seeks to demonstrate the elements of the disciplinary power, bio-political reasoning, 
and governmentality inherent in their mindset. In other words, this study aims to 
understand the intentions and plans of the republican policy makers and intellectua ls,  
and it does not focus on the actual performance of the People's Houses on the ground. 
For, there seems to be at least three factors that make such a general assessment of the 
ultimate ‘success’ or ‘failure’ of the People’s Houses project nearly impossible. 
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First of all, it is extremely difficult to make a general and accurate assessment of the 
activities and performance of all the People’s Houses and Rooms (478 Houses and 
4322 Rooms in total) that operated all around Turkey for 19 years because there were 
substantial regional variations between different People’s Houses. A map showing the 
distribution of the People’s Houses and Rooms around Turkey naturally creates the 
impression that these institutions managed to reach to even the remotest corners of the 
country. However, as Lamprou demonstrates in his study, there were enormous 
differences between the Houses in the West and those in the East. The Houses that 
were located in the West usually had much better performance thanks to their 
proximity to the political center, relatively higher level of development, and cultura l 
integration of the Western regions, as well as having more financial resources and 
more competent staff. The Eastern Houses, on the other hand, performed quite poorly 
because of the ethnic, cultural, and linguistic barriers between the non-local staff of 
the Houses and the local people; the weaker presence of state institutions in the East; 
limited resources, and the incompetence and reluctance of several House managers 
who were usually exiled to a post in the East as a punishment. Moreover, the majority 
of the People’s Rooms established in villages usually remained inactive.187 
 
Second, it appears that even performance of a single People’s House varied greatly 
throughout time. For example, Küçükuğurlu and Okur argue in their analysis that the 
performance of the Erzurum House fluctuated over time: Initially the House was 
almost inactive and it received warnings and criticisms from Ankara. In the mid-1940s 
the House experienced its golden age under the presidency of Murat Uraz. After 1946, 
the activities of the House slowed down again as a result of the political atmosphere 
of the multiparty era, the ensuing budget cuts, and resignation of some of its top 
managers. These fluctuations in the performance of the Erzurum House imply that the 
People’s Houses around Turkey did not have a uniform, steady, and synchronized 
performance throughout their life span. It rather appears that the location of a House, 
the competence and enthusiasm of its managers, and availability of financial resources 
and facilities had a substantial effect on its ability to attract local people’s attention, 
and its overall performance.  
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Last but not the least, another problem arises with respect to the credibility of offic ia l 
documents, and especially activity reports of the People’s Houses. As we have seen in 
the previous chapter, mainstream studies predominantly rely on the activity reports 
that were written and sent by local People’s House managers to the center. By 
uncritically relying on these documents mainstream studies conclude that the Houses 
successfully performed their tasks, and played an important in the sociocultura l 
development of their respective regions. However, we also know that some, if not all, 
House managers penned activity reports in such a way to please the political center, 
and win its favor by exaggerating the achievements of their Houses and themselves. 
Therefore, we cannot know for certain whether ordinary people’s participation level 
in activities of a certain People’s House declared in an activity report by its managers 
was completely true or not. For instance, İlhan Başgöz and Howard E. Wilson argue 
that the statistics and reports about the activities and professions of their participants 
should be approached with suspicion because in most cases House chairmen 
exaggerated their activities and fabricated false statistics to impress their superiors in 
Ankara.188 All these factors prevent us from making a definitive and accurate 
assessment of the ‘success’ or ‘failure’ of the People’s Houses as a whole in carrying 
out the orders of the political center at the local level. 
 
Nevertheless, it is still possible to make a few tentative inferences from some small 
pieces of information about the actual operations of the Houses that primary and 
secondary resources provide. First, as many scholars argue, the management cadres of 
the most People’s Houses were dominated by civil servants, local politicians, and 
professionals like teachers. This trend indicates that ordinary people’s active 
participation in the activities of the People’s Houses may have generally remained 
limited. For example, Başgöz states that ironically, even though he had participated in 
the activities of the Ankara House- which officially declared that it had 3339 working 
class members in 1934- for five years, he never saw any workers during those 
activities. Thus, the authors maintain that despite their name, these institutions failed 
to become the Houses of the people.189 Similarly, in his book on the Adapazarı House 
Kenan Olgun shares statistics about a sports competition called ‘Gürbüz Çocuk 
                                                                 
188 İlhan Başgöz and Howard E. Wilson, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti’nde Eğitim ve Atatürk , p. 197, Dost 
Yayınları: Ankara, 1968. 
189 Ibid., p.198. 
82 
Müsabakası’ between children for the celebration of April 23 National Sovereignty 
and Children’s Day in 1949. According to the statistics, the overwhelming majority of 
the competitors were children of the local military officers; and children from ordinary 
local families do not seem to have participated at all.190 Such scattered details about 
the activities of the People’s Houses indicate that ordinary people’s participation in 
those activities remained quite low; and even if ordinary people were officia l ly 
registered as members of the Houses, they usually did not tend to actively participate 
in their activities. On the other hand, we should also note that, given the usually higher 
numbers of membership in Sports branches, more entertaining sports activities like 
football or skiing seem to have attracted the attention of ordinary people more than 
any other activities of the People’s Houses. 
 
Based on such details, and in light of Lamprou’s analysis of the operations of the 
People’s Houses in local settings, I shall argue that the People’s Houses were designed 
by the republican elites as an ideal project to perform disciplinary and regulatory, as 
well as ideological and assimilative, functions in line with the modern governmenta l 
rationality. However, it seems that in practice the capacity of the People’s Houses to 
continuously perform these functions at different local settings across Turkey varied 
greatly, and in general ordinary people’s active participation in their activit ies 
remained rather limited. Therefore, it can be argued that the People’s Houses generally 
could not meet the high expectations of the political center. Put differently, the 
‘success’ of the Houses in implementing the ideal design, and social policies of the 
political center remained limited. In the following chapter I am going to examine this 
ideal project and intentions of the republican elite, and highlight the elements of 
disciplinary power, biopower, and governmentality that were inherent in their mindset. 
For this purpose, I am going to zero in on numerous writings of leading republican 
intellectuals and policy makers that were published in the Ülkü magazine, and examine 
their ideas and intentions about the Turkish population. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 THE ÜLKÜ MAGAZINE 
 
Continuously published by the Ankara House for seventeen years, the Ülkü magazine 
was the main publication of the People’s Houses. It was a non-profit magazine to 
which authors voluntarily contributed without any payment. The main motivat ion 
behind the publication of the Ülkü was to create some kind of a national discussion 
platform for intellectuals to share information, discuss social policy issues, and to find  
solutions for problems the country was facing. In this way, Recep Peker argues, it 
would be possible to organize the individual efforts of intellectuals under one banner, 
and to harness this collective energy for the goal of modernization.191 In this respect, 
the Ülkü is a valuable source of information for understanding the mindset and 
intentions of the Kemalist reformers. As the main publication of the People’s Houses, 
the magazine also provided instructions and guidance to the Houses. 
 
Firdevs Gümüşoğlu classifies the authors who regularly penned articles for the 
magazine into three main groups. The first group consisted of those authors, such as 
Nusret Kemal (Köymen), Recep Peker, Necip Ali Küçüka, Reşit Galip, M. Fuat 
Köprülü, Şevket Aziz Kansu among several others, whom sought to formulate the 
main principles of the republican ideology with their writings. These authors also 
occupied several important policy making positions in the government. In the second 
group there were professionals such as doctors, architects, engineers, teachers, jurists, 
and artists who contributed to the magazine with various articles in their respective 
areas of expertise. The third group of writers included members of the People’s Houses 
and Rooms, and local intellectuals, poets, and young artists who sent their essays, short 
stories, and poems to the magazine.192  
 
The Ülkü was continuously published from February 1933 to August 1950; but in three 
different series. The first series of the magazine was published monthly between 
February 1933 and September 1941, and it contains 102 issues. The second series was 
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published fortnightly from October 1941 to December 1946, and consists of 126 
issues. The third series was again published monthly from January 1947 to August 
1950, and it includes 44 issues. In total, there are 272 published issues of the Ülkü. In 
general, the magazine covered a wide range of subjects; but its focus and emphasis 
changed over the years. In the period between 1933 and 1938 the magazine focuses 
more on subjects such as the principles and the character of the regime, modernizat ion, 
economic development, village studies, the issue of population, folk education, civic 
duties and responsibilities of citizens, and public hygiene. After 1938, however, the 
emphasis on contemporary social issues declines and the Ülkü becomes more of a 
history and literature magazine in which articles on history and Turkish literature 
constitute the majority of the content. In the second series the emphasis shifts from 
history and literature onto articles about culture and art; but there is also a renewed 
interest in village studies, and there are several articles focusing on the folkloric culture 
and traditions of Anatolian peasants. This trend continues during the third series along 
with discussions about democracy as a result of the transition to multiparty politics in 
Turkey in 1946. As Gümüşoğlu points out, it appears that in its later series the Ülkü, 
to a certain extent, lost its earlier enthusiasm and revolutionary radicalism, and 
attempts to revive its earlier spirit largely failed.193 
 
Interestingly, I could not find much information in the existing literature on the Ülkü 
magazine as to why it was closed in 1950, one year before the closure of the People’s 
Houses.194 In his article in Toplum ve Bilim Hakkı Uyar compares the Kadro magazine 
and the Ülkü magazine in terms of their role in the formation of the official ideology. 
Yet, the article does not contain any information on the closure of the Ülkü 
magazine.195 On the other hand, in an article Bülent Varlık states that the Ülkü was 
closed and republished in a new format as a result of its inability to perform its init ia l 
mission, which was to create a discussion platform and common language among 
intellectuals where they can discuss about the revolutions.196 It appears that Varlık 
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refers to the closure of the first series of the Ülkü and the publication of the second 
series in its stead. Apart from this statement, I could not find anything about the closure 
of the Ülkü magazine, and for now the reasons for its closure in 1950 remains a 
mystery. 
 
The primary target audience of the Ülkü was not ordinary people, but the intellectua ls 
themselves. This point was stated in an anonymous article arguing that Ülkü was 
published for those educated and enlightened persons in the country who were to 
provide guidance to ordinary people.197 This is not to say that the magazine did not 
also have a mission to propagate the official ideology to a wider public, but this was 
not its primary mission. Overall, the Ülkü served as a discussion platform for Kemalist 
intellectuals and reformers, and it reflected their ideas, intentions, and projects. As the 
leading publication of the People’s Houses, and a representative of the ideas of the 
ruling elite in the early republican period, articles in the Ülkü magazine can help us 
examine their understanding of, and approach to the management of the Turkish 
population.  
 
4.1. Methodology 
In this long chapter, I am going to examine 68 articles from the Ülkü magazine written 
by 46 authors. However, some articles were written anonymously. At first sight my 
method for choosing articles from the Ülkü may seem random and arbitrary. However,  
during my readings of the Ülkü I carefully scanned all of its issues and collected all 
articles that seemed relevant to this study. Then, I aimed to represent at least one article 
for each year between 1933 and 1950 to be able to see the evolution of the ideas of 
Ülkü authors. However, as mentioned above, the focus and emphasis of the Ülkü 
shifted over the years, and the majority of the articles on modernization, economic 
development, the issue of population, and village studies concentrated in the period 
between 1933 and 1938. Therefore, I had to focus more on this period. Nevertheless, 
I tried to include as many articles as possible from later periods. 
 
For analytical purposes the chapter is organized into four parts, and each part relates 
to one of the three concepts: ‘disciplinary power’, ‘biopower’, and ‘governmentality’. 
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However, several articles in these parts include elements from several concepts. For 
instance, village monographs in the second part also relate to the articles on the 
peasantist movement in the fourth part. Therefore, some articles do not exclusive ly 
belong to one theme, and they may include elements from more than one of the three 
concepts.  
 
Through a detailed examination of the 68 articles, I am going to demonstrate that 
disciplinary reasoning, bio-political reasoning, and other modern governmenta l 
rationalities were inherent in the mindset of the republican policy makers and 
intellectuals. As a general rule, I will first relate each theme to its theoretical concept. 
Then, I am going to provide detailed summaries of each article, without much 
interference, to be able to objectively present the ideas of its author. However, I will 
add some occasional explanations and commentary when necessary. At the end of each 
part I am going to provide a general overview and analysis of the articles by connecting 
them to my research hypothesis. 
 
4.2. Physical Education: Not Individual Champions but Robust Masses 
In this part I am going to analyze 12 articles and 3 conference speeches about physical 
education (beden terbiyesi) that were published in the Ülkü. In these articles and 
speeches authors discuss and analyze various aspects and issues of physical education 
from different perspectives, whether it be health, economy, or national defense. 
Despite their different perspectives, however, all authors argue that the government 
needs to promote physical education in Turkey, and all citizens should make 
gymnastics and sports an integral part of their lives. By drawing on the concept of 
disciplinary power I intend to trace and demonstrate the disciplinary reasoning 
inherent in these articles and speeches.  
 
Yet, before starting I should mention a few general points about the views of the 
republican elite on sports and physical education. First, they strongly believed that 
sports were an instrument for regeneration of the Turkish population in terms of health 
and physical capabilities. The republican elite had inherited a weak, scattered, and 
impoverished population that suffered long periods of warfare and epidemics; and as 
the founders of a modern nation state they wished to create a healthy and productive 
population. Thus, they employed sports and physical education as an instrument for 
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the regeneration of the Turkish population. Therefore, the Kemalist intellectua ls 
frowned upon any individualist approaches to sports; and they argued that sports had 
to be organized at the national level and for the nation. Hence, they had a strong dislike 
for individualist and competitive sports like football that rendered the majority of 
people a mere passive audience. In their eyes, sports should not be competitive; they 
should rather be participatory, and focus on improving the physical strength and health 
of all citizens. In this respect, they favored gymnastics and similar physical exercises, 
which ordinary people could actively participate, rather than passively watch; over 
competitive and individualistic sports.  
 
Second, the republican elite had huge economic constraints, and they knew quite well 
that they could not build modern and expensive sports facilities in every town or 
village; or quickly train 40,000 professional trainers for each village. Therefore, they 
rather searched for economic and straightforward methods that would make ordinary 
people physically more active. This is another reason why gymnastics and culture 
physique were the favorite sports of the republican elite. These exercises do not require 
expensive facilities or equipment, and they can be easily performed indoors or 
outdoors by individuals or groups. Therefore, the ruling elite desired to create a 
national sports culture in which ordinary people would realize the importance of 
physical activity for their lives, and adopt gymnastics and other beneficial sports as a 
daily habit. As we shall see, the People’s Houses, along with many other institutions, 
were held responsible by the republican elite to promote physical education and sports 
among ordinary people.  
 
To begin with, Burhan Asaf wrote an introductory article on the issue of sports in the 
first issue of the Ülkü. In this short article the author tries to answer the following 
question: “What should Turkey’s approach to sports be?” He believes that the issue of 
sports constitutes an integral part of the national cause (reaching the level of 
contemporary civilizations). According to Asaf, Turkish generations have physica lly 
weakened and degenerated in the last few centuries. Because of diseases such as 
malaria, and malnutrition, children have had feeble and fragile bodies. Therefore, the 
author suggests, unlike European countries, which have an individualist approach to 
sports, Turkey should design a nationwide sports policy and establish a national sports 
organization. Asaf contends that no other regime in Turkey paid attention to sports as 
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much as the republican regime has. However, the author does not completely approve 
the way sports affairs are conducted in the country. In order to improve its national 
sports policy Asaf suggests that Turkey, having a population of 17 million, should be 
able to establish a nationwide sports organization that would integrate at least 3 million 
youth.198 
 
Instead of achieving mediocre scores and records in international Olympiads, Asaf 
asserts, Turkey should find ways to recover from the physical deterioration of the last 
150 years caused by lack of healthcare and sanitation. In his opinion, Turkish sports 
affairs are not meant to be an exhibition or show. They should rather be employed as 
a method of physical education of the Turkish nation which has been seeking to 
reconstitute itself on all fronts. According to the author, making an artificial distinct ion 
between amateur and professional sports is one of the greatest mistakes and disgraces 
of the West. Unfortunately, since Turkey uncritically endorses everything from the 
West, she has also adopted this false distinction. The author also criticizes those people 
who boast of having a few great tennis players or 5-10 good football players, despite 
the fact that Turkey still cannot get to the finals. Asaf believes that having a few 
individual great sportsmen does not bring to Turkey any honor or consolation. At the 
end of the article he perfectly summarizes the outlook of the republican regime on 
sports: “We demand sports be for the nation, and organized at the national level. Rather 
than single individual champions, we wish to have masses with beautiful and well-
built bodies who endorse the republican moral system.”199 (Emphasis added)  
 
In my opinion, Asaf’s ideas and propositions in this article reflects the disciplinary and 
bio-political reasoning inherent in the mindset of the republican policymakers quite 
well. He considers sports as an instrument of social policy to regenerate the population, 
and thus favors collective sports activities over competitive and individualistic games. 
Moreover, his article indicates that the republican intellectuals and policy makers were 
equally concerned about molding bodies of individuals as they were concerned about 
shaping their minds. Therefore, I argue that Asaf’s ideas and concerns about sports 
were primarily shaped by disciplinary and bio-political reasoning. 
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In November 1935, the Ülkü translated and published a conference speech delivered 
by Prof. Dr. Yean Demoor about physical education at the 7th International Physical 
Discipline Congress at the Universite libre de Bruxelle. The translation is titled ‘The 
Meaning and Importance of Physical Education’. The fact that Ülkü translated and 
published this speech indicates that physical education was an important issue for the 
Ülkü circles. In his speech Demoor notes that physical education has become a crucial 
issue that is daily discussed in the majority of the civilized world. In 1918, it became 
evident that male teenagers between the ages of 14 and 16 in Belgium were not 
physically and mentally ready for the difficulties of the WWI. Thus, Demoor contends 
that they should prepare the youth physically for national defense and other hardships 
in life.  
 
In this respect, Demoor talks about the principles of physical education. The first thing 
that comes to mind about physical education is physical activities and exercise which 
increase the activity of muscles and increase blood circulation. However, Demoor 
warns his audience that one should be careful about the intensity of such activit ies : 
Each body should be supplied with the precise exercise it needs. Physical training 
should be well-coordinated; all parts of the body should work harmoniously and 
continuously. Gymnastics does not have positive effects only on the body; it also gives 
will power, determination, courage, and character to people who regularly do it.200 Yet, 
Demoor criticizes football and the unnecessary importance attached to it by people. 
For instance, a football player who happens to score a goal usually gets too much 
praise, and people treat him like a war hero. Such praise often leads football players to 
think that they are more important than they actually are. Demoor argues against such 
an individualistic understanding in sports because for him sports should not be an 
activity undertaken for individual satisfaction and success. Rather, the primary goal of 
sports is to improve health, enhance coordination and proper functioning of various 
organs, and to teach people moral values. After all, Demoor concludes, our goal is to 
raise useful men, not individual champions.201 
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Like the previous article, Demoor’s speech represents the ideas of the republican elite 
on sports. Both for Demoor and republican intellectuals, sports activities had the 
mission of improving health of the population, and propagating moral values. Also, 
we see that republican intellectuals closely followed new trends and developments 
about sports that took place in other, especially Western countries, and they aimed to 
integrate new ideas about sports into Turkish sports policy by translating and 
publishing speeches and articles by foreign experts. In my opinion, their close 
monitoring of European intellectual trends on sports supports my claim that both the 
late Ottoman and republican reformers adopted modern technologies of power like 
disciplinary and bio-political reasoning from European countries through their 
interactions with their European counterparts. 
 
Another speech about physical education was delivered by Zehra Cemal at a People’s 
House in December 1935. In this short speech Cemal highlights some deficiencies in 
the Turkish national sports system. She states that Turkey does not have a strong sports 
movement; and only a small percentage of the population are members of sports clubs. 
Cemal makes a distinction between ‘sports’ and ‘gymnastics’, which roughly 
corresponds to a distinction between professional sports and amateur sports. 
According to her, whereas only physically strong and capable people engage in sports, 
everybody –old, weak, strong etc. - can do gymnastics. Gymnastics prepares body for 
life by making it stronger and more resistant. Cemal admits that so far they (the 
government) have only advised people to do gymnastics rather than sports; but they 
have not been able provide them with the necessary facilities and equipment. For 
instance, in schools, gym classes are compulsory, yet there are not suitable locations 
for gymnastics. Similarly, most cities do not have any sport facilities where people can 
exercise. Higher education institutions, for their part, have neglected the issue of 
physical education, and not conducted a scientific research on sports yet.202 Thus, 
Cemal congratulates the People’s Houses for the special importance they have placed 
on gymnastics and sports. She states that, having seen all those deficiencies, the 
People’s Houses have made huge sacrifices from their budgets and allocated 
substantial resources to build a facility for sports in their compounds. 
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Then, Cemal gives some information about gymnastics and health by noting that one 
of the pre-conditions of health is a well-functioning blood circulation. Therefore, 
instead of exercising once a week or even once a year, people should make exercise a 
part of their lives: one hour for exercise per day. The physical activity during a job 
usually exhausts people and weakens the body; but gymnastics, on the other hand, 
nourishes it. Cemal also encourages women to do gymnastics to become healthier. 
Cemal sadly points out that in the West Turkish women are still depicted as a ‘fat doll 
lying on a coach’. Did ancient Turkish women, Cemal asks, who rode horses in Central 
Asia have any signs of laziness? Who can claim that the peasant Turkish women, who 
worked so hard to deliver ammunition to the battlefield, and bread to their children, 
were physically inactive? In the West women, even working class women, always do 
gymnastics in the morning before they go to work. Thus, Cemal asks those women, 
who would enroll to the sports branches of the Houses, to think of sports and 
gymnastics not as a luxury or as a leisure activity, but as a daily necessity. They should 
do gymnastics not to be a champion, not to be as fit as this or that actress, but only for 
their health. Whatever their daily routines and activities are, they should not neglect 
gymnastics and sports. Cemal concludes by noting that if everybody- thin or fat, young 
or old- adopts this mentality, they will have the courage to work together for the ideals 
of health and beauty.203 In this speech we see that Cemal urges ordinary people, and 
especially women, to get physically more active, and she emphasizes the importance 
of daily regular physical activity. Therefore, in my opinion, her speech perfectly 
reflects the disciplinary reasoning which aims to increase the physical capacities of 
individuals through regular exercise. 
 
In an article published in January 1936, Rahmi Apak discusses the new direction the 
sports affairs in Turkey have recently started to follow. First, the author summarizes 
the developments in the field and the sports policy of the republican government in its 
first decade. Apak argues that in this period the government realized the importance 
of sports, and thus sports activities were centralized under the Association of Turkish 
Exercise Organizations (Türkiye İdman Cemiyetleri İttifakı). 
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Second, the number of sports clubs in the country has increased from a small number 
of 5-6 in 1923, all of which were located in big cities, to hundreds that were mainly 
founded in many towns and villages of Anatolia. Third, in the past football was the 
most played sports, and other sports were almost non-existent. Today, with the 
encouragement of the state, other sports like athletics, water sports, cycling, and hand 
ball are played as well. The state has also resuscitated traditional Turkish sports like 
wrestling, which almost fell into oblivion in the last centuries.204  
 
Apak notes that the government also undertook to build stadiums and other sports 
facilities around Turkey; one stadium in Ankara, three in Istanbul, and smaller 
facilities have been built in other cities. Currently, there are 150 sports facilities in 
Turkey in total. Apak proudly notes that ten years ago no such facilities existed. In 
general, public interest for sports has been growing, and people begin to realize that 
sports are more of a necessity rather than a leisure or luxury. In schools the weekly 
hours of gym classes have been increased, and scientific methods of physical education 
are now applied.  The government founded an education institute to meet the need of 
qualified trainers.205 Having summarized the developments in the first decade, the 
author argues that Turkish sports have gained a new meaning and direction after 1934. 
In this new period, the government has set out to establish the national Turkish sports 
which, according to Apak, refers to a sports system that will equip Turkish citizens 
with the necessary fighting skills to gain the upper hand against enemies in warfare; 
and will supply the Turkish army with soldiers who are nimble, courageous, heroic, 
resistant, and obedient in the battlefield. (Emphasis added) Apak concludes by stating 
that this is the new mission and responsibility of the Turkish national sports system.206 
In my opinion, this article is important for two reasons. First, it demonstrates the 
importance that the government attached to physical education. Second, the italic ized 
sentence above clearly explains the expectations of the republican elite from sports: 
improvement of the physical capacities of individuals for national defense. 
Rahmi Apak penned another article in June 1938 about the role and responsibilities of 
the sport branches of the People’s Houses. According to Apak, in addition to 
encouraging establishment of local sports clubs in their locality and participation of 
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the local youth in their activities, the sports branches of the Houses have other duties 
as well.  The 47th clause of the People’s Houses bylaw confers on these institutions the 
responsibility of popularizing sports and other physical activities among Turkish 
people, especially the youth.207 In this respect, the Houses, first of all, should incite 
local people and the youth, they either be members of sports clubs or not, to do 
gymnastics and exercise. Second, the Houses can organize collective hiking trips to 
different locations in their region so that people will get to know other parts of their 
country. Third, all Houses ought to establish indoor and outdoor sports facilities, and 
equip them with the necessary gymnastic equipment like shots and trapeze. Fourth, the 
Houses need to make certain that gymnastics and other physical activities should 
follow scientific rules, and be undertaken under the supervision of professional and 
experienced trainers. The sports branches should create an appropriate program and 
separate timetables for men and women so that hundreds and even thousands of 
citizens can easily access and use those facilities.  
 
Another responsibility of the sports branches is to organize vivid and spectacular 
gymnastic shows and parades during national holidays and other special occasions. 
Lastly, the Houses should organize more conferences on physical education and 
sports.208 Apak also warns the Houses not to present the activities of the local clubs 
(like football games) as their own activities in their semi-annual reports. In this article 
we see that Apak reminds the sports branches of the People’s Houses about their 
responsibilities and duties. In my opinion, the duties that Apak assigns to the sports 
branches clearly indicate that the People’s Houses were designed by the republican 
elite to perform disciplinary functions on local people. First of all, Apak urges the 
People’s Houses to promote not only football, but also gymnastics and other less 
performed sports in their locality to prepare ordinary people for national defense. He 
also reminds the Houses that in order for these activities to be effective, they need to 
follow scientific rules and norms. In my opinion, his insistence on adherence to 
scientific norms shares a great deal with disciplinary reasoning which emphasizes 
enhancement of physical capacities of individuals through carefully calculated and 
applied techniques and procedures. 
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In 1938 Şinasi Şahingiray wrote an article, which was published in two consecutive 
parts in the Ülkü, about sports facilities in the People’s Houses. He starts the article by 
noting that one of the primary duties of the Houses, which have been established all 
around Turkey to meet the cultural, educational, and artistic needs of the Turkish 
people, is to provide them with appropriate facilities and environment where they can 
easily engage in sports activities.209 Şahingiray argues that sports facilities do not 
necessarily have to be huge or expensive stadiums, swimming pools, or gyms. Rather, 
People’s Houses can also easily establish much smaller and humbler, but useful 
facilities in which local people can exercise and play games at their leisure. The 
facilities that the Houses should build consist of two groups: indoor and outdoor.  
Şahingiray first discusses outdoor facilities, such as volleyball, basketball, and tennis 
courts, which are easier and less expensive to build. In the article, the author shares his 
own drawings of sample basketball and volleyball courts and explains the details so 
that People’s Houses can use them, and he points out that those courts also needs to 
changing rooms and showers.  According to Şahingiray, even with such a simple 
volleyball court it will be possible to get 10-14 young people physically active at a 
time.210  
 
In the next issue of the Ülkü the second part of Şahingiray’s article was published. In 
the second part the author discusses the indoor facilities that would enable people to 
continue to do gymnastics during winter rather than wasting their time in coffee shops. 
He admits that indoor facilities are more expensive and hence more difficult for the 
Houses to build than outdoors facilities; but the Houses should use all availab le 
resources at their disposal. If possible, the Houses should create a separate building for 
the sports facility. If not, then the facility should be established inside the main House 
building at a convenient location. In the worst case scenario where there is no such 
location, the People’s Houses should at least allocate one small room for gymnast ics. 
At the end of the article Şahingiray maintains that the sports branches of the Houses 
should focus more on building such facilities than organizing football games because 
in this way they will have accomplished their duties and achieved their goals defined 
in their bylaw.211 
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In this article, Şahingiray advises the People’s Houses to build simple and inexpens ive 
sports facilities so that local people would become physically more active. Well aware 
of the financial difficulties that the government faced, Şahingiray encourages the 
Houses to allocate at least a small room for sports because he does not want people to 
remain physically inactive. Here I would like to underline his desperate insistence on 
building the smallest sports facility possible. Even building a simple volleyball court 
at a People’s House means a lot for Şahingiray because it will get at least 10-14 young 
people physically active. Thus, in my opinion, like the previous ones, this article also 
indicates that the republican elite attached a great deal of importance to physical 
education and the smallest physical exercise that ordinary people could possibly 
engage in. Also the article demonstrates that the People’s Houses were assigned the 
task of exerting physical discipline on local people by any means necessary. 
 
In October 1938, Nizamettin Kırşan wrote an article to criticize sports branches of 
some People’s Houses, which do not follow the instructions of their bylaw, and to 
remind them their responsibilities defined by the new Physical Education Law of 1938. 
Kırşan states that certain People’s Houses, including the Ankara and Beyoğlu Houses, 
have done a great job in terms of sports and gymnastics; and he praises them for their 
efforts and success. Many other Houses, however, seem to have misinterpreted the 
relevant clauses of the bylaw about the responsibilities of the sports branches. For 
example, such Houses have formed their own football teams, and started to compete 
with other local clubs. Yet, Kırşan points out that this is not what the People’s Houses 
are supposed to do. Instead of engaging in a rivalry and competition with local football 
clubs, the sports branches of the Houses are rather expected to assist them in their 
activities, and encourage formation of clubs if there are no clubs in the region. In other 
words, the sports branches of the Houses are not sports clubs themselves; and they 
should not act as one. Moreover, Kırşan states that the branches have misinterpreted 
the bylaw in another fundamental way: Even though the bylaw clearly defines all the 
sports activities the branches should undertake, they only focus on organizing football 
games. Fortunately, Kırşan notes, the new Physical Education Law corrects this 
misunderstanding: The People’s Houses should encourage local people to do the 
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following sports: Gymnastics, fencing, wrestling, trekking, salon sports, and national 
dances.212 
 
Kırşan argues that the sports branches can easily create facilities and provide 
equipment to promote gymnastics, fencing, and wrestling. For gymnastics all they 
need to do is to allocate an appropriate location where 20-30 people can do gymnast ics, 
and to find a trainer for them, who can be the teacher of the local primary or secondary 
school. As for fencing, the Houses can provide people with the equipment, and help 
them train. Kırşan notes that fencing is an important sports because it helps the body 
in several ways: it increases intelligence, improves reaction time, and makes people 
stronger with better fighting skills. Lastly, the Houses can promote wrestling by 
teaching amateur wrestlers the modern wrestling techniques and organizing local or 
regional tournaments.213 This article indicates that the republican elite were not happy 
with the way some sports branches conducted their activities. Ironically, many sports 
branches of the Houses seem to have predominantly focused on football, which was 
despised by the republican elite. Rather, Kırşan urges them to promote other collective 
and cooperative sports activities like gymnastics. Again, we see that Kırşan advises 
the Houses to make the most out of limited resources, and provide local people with 
simple but effective sports facilities. Thus, this article epitomizes the willingness of 
the republican elites to exert physical discipline on ordinary people through simple and 
inexpensive methods. 
 
On the occasion of the 15th anniversary of the foundation of the republic, Rahmi Apak 
wrote an article in which he summarizes the sports policies of the government thus far. 
According to Apak, the main reason of the decline of sports in the Ottoman period was 
the bigotry of Muslims. As a result, people and administrators lost their connection 
with sports for one century. The rulers themselves had become lazy and fat. The reign 
of the CUP was quite short-lived, and as for many other things, they did not have 
enough time for sports. Nevertheless, scouting in schools began in this period. The 
republican regime was first to realize the importance of sports, and thus focus on the 
issue. In 1923, some sportsmen in Istanbul formed the Alliance of Turkish Sports 
Association, and applied to the government for assistance, which the government did  
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not turn down. There were four main goals of the alliance. The first goal was to expand 
sports activities all around the country, and to train the qualified sports personnel. In 
this way, the youth would play sports in their spare time, and refrain from bad habits 
like alcohol, gambling etc. Second, the alliance aimed at the centralization of all sports 
organizations under one banner. The third goal was management of sports activit ies 
and events through this umbrella organization. Lastly, the alliance would make contact 
with sports clubs in other countries.214 
 
Apak continues by stating that the government has financially supported sports 
organizations and clubs, and in 1926 it allocated 40,000 liras for sports. By 1938, this 
amount has increased 6 times and reached to 239,000 liras. In 1923, there were only 
14 clubs; it increased to 230 by 1933, and to 442 by 1938. Again, in 1923 there were 
only 827 registered sportsmen; by 1938 this number reached to 27,601. In 1936, the 
alliance was reorganized and renamed “Turkish Sports Institution”. From that year 
onward, Apak notes, the government has begun to allocate even more resources for 
sports, and hence sports have been developing faster. The new institution has 
established closer links with its branches in the countryside, and began to organize 
more competitive tournaments (like a football league) for each sports.  
 
Second, skiing started to develop rapidly: Skiing centers were opened in Bursa, Sivas, 
Erzurum, Ankara, Kastamonu, and Manisa. All of a sudden 2000 skiers emerged in 
Turkey. Similarly, the Sports Institution encourages traditional sports like wrestling, 
archery, and javelin throwing. It organized a nationwide wrestling audition to select 
potential talented wrestlers for the national team. An archery school was established 
in Istanbul. Fourth, a trainer school has been established to guarantee the scientific 
conduct of sports. So far, 30 trainers have graduated and started to educate sportsmen 
around the country. Finally, Apak points out that the government has also funded 
construction of sports arenas, which will include football pitches, athletics fields, 400 
meters long running tracks, swimming pools, shooting ranges; tennis, basketball, and 
volleyball courts, and bleachers with a capacity of 5000-10000 audience, in 22 cities. 
215 This article summarizes the sports policies of the government in the first 15 years, 
and shows that the government began to attach even greater importance to sports 
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activities. The government took several measures to spread a sports culture around 
Turkey, increased the amount of resources allocated to sports, built new facilit ies 
around the country, and to centralize all sports activities under its control. All these 
measures suggest that physical education constituted an integral element of the social 
policies of the government to regenerate the population. 
 
In March 1939, Nüzhet Abbas (Baba) wrote an article to discuss the potential benefits 
of cooperation between the newly established General Directorate of Physical 
Education and the People’s Houses on physical education and sports. The author starts 
the article by listing certain preconditions of a successful physical education in Turkey. 
First of all, people need to realize that education of the mind and the body are 
inseparable. Second, Turkey needs sufficient numbers of trainers. Third, physical 
education requires indoor and outdoor sports facilities, and sports equipment like 
clothes. An additional issue is the proper nutrition of children. Abbas points out that 
in England the government provides each child with 2-3 glasses of milk every day in 
schools. Factors such as having healthy parents free of genetic diseases and being well-
fed have an impact on the physical education of the youth. The author admits that 
Turkey does not have these resources in abundance.216 
 
Baba notes that the General Directorate of Physical Education has made an appropriate 
distinction between intramural and extramural sports activities. In this respect, three 
institutions are responsible for promoting physical education in Turkey: The 
Directorate, the Ministry of Education, and the People’s Houses. In the article Abbas 
focuses on extramural sports activities, and examines the possibilities of cooperation 
between the Directorate and the Houses. According to the author, the two institut ions 
can cooperate in the following areas: First, the Directorate can supply the Houses with 
sports education books/booklets that it publishes. Second, the two can work together 
and share the responsibility of propagating sports. Third, the Houses can send talented 
youth in their locality to the courses that the Directorate shall open to educate trainers. 
The author notes that currently there are 367 People’s Houses, which means that they 
can help finding at least 367 prospective talented trainers. Fourth, the Houses can build 
humble but useful sports facilities in their locality. Fifth, the two institutions can 
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organize conferences to promote sports among people. The Houses can also promote 
and encourage traditional Turkish sports like wrestling at the local level. In his 
conclusion, Baba maintains that a cooperation between the Directorate and the Houses 
on those areas will facilitate the promotion of physical education in Turkey.217 This 
article suggests that the republican elite wished to expand physical education in Turkey 
by coordinating activities of different institutions with similar goals. In this respect, 
they continuously contemplated on the issue of physical education, and developed new 
plans and strategies. The article also shows that the republican intellectuals and policy 
makers expected the People’s Houses to perform various functions in promoting 
physical education and discipline among ordinary people. 
 
Nüzhet Baba penned another article on physical education and scouting in August 
1939. At the beginning of the article, Baba states that if he were asked to define 
scouting, he would, without any hesitations, reply: “It is a complimentary school that 
educates the minds and bodies of the youth in a country.”218 He argues that through 
scouting children can learn about the nature and their country in a more fun and easier 
way than they would in schools. Scouting is a unique instrument to teach a child about 
his country and himself, and to raise them as more beneficial individuals to their 
country. Baba points out that once upon a time scouting was taken seriously in Turkey. 
Until the WWI, the CUP paid special attention to scouting. At the time the prominent 
British scouting expert M. Parfitt visited Istanbul and assisted the establishment of the 
first Turkish scouting organization. However, the world war and the ensuing chaos 
until the end of the War of Independence interrupted this process, and the development 
of scouting in Turkey halted. 
 
According to Baba, the current state of scouting in Turkey is not necessarily bad; but 
it certainly needs improvements. Among the three institutions responsible for physical 
education in Turkey, the Ministry of Education and the People’s Houses can spearhead 
the promotion of scouting. The Directorate, on the other hand, currently does not have 
enough resources and personnel, and thus is not in a position to assist the promotion 
of scouting. Moreover, Baba argues that scouting can be more beneficial if it is taught 
to children at an early age. Hence, scouting should be considered as a part of the 
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education system, and the ministry can play the leading role in this issue. Simila r ly, 
with their wide network around the country, the Houses can promote scouting. 
Therefore, the ministry and the Houses should cooperate on this issue. In the remainder 
of the article Baba also discusses the costs of scouting. He argues that since scouting 
is a quite expensive activity, the state alone should not be responsible for the expenses. 
Financially able parents should also contribute to scouting because scouting has 
several benefits: It educates the youth, raises them as organizers, helps them learn 
about their country, prepares them for national defense, and promotes solidarity among 
them.219 Similarly, in this article Baba searches for ways to promote physical education 
in Turkey. By teaching children scouting, Baba aims to equip them at an early age with 
the necessary physical and organizational capabilities that national defense requires. 
Those children who engaged in scouting at an early age would become prepared for 
future military assignments and internalize military discipline. 
 
Major general Cemil Tahir Taner, the General Director of physical education, wrote 
an opinion piece about the People’s Houses and sports clubs in the same issue of the 
Ülkü. In the beginning, he states that in addition to educating citizens about cultura l 
and spiritual matters, the People’s Houses are also responsible for improving their 
physical conditions. Only then the Houses can consider themselves to have 
successfully completed their national duty. This is why the bylaw of the Houses also 
instructs them to create a sports branch. However, some Houses have created their own 
sports clubs and started to compete with other local football clubs. Taner points out 
that this is not the mission of the People’s Houses; and that sports branches of the 
Houses should not be organized as clubs. Taner notes that the Houses are expected to 
provide the necessary conditions and facilities for sports activities, incite local people 
to participate, and inspire feelings of cooperation and brotherhood, not of competition 
and enmity, among them.220 Also, the Law of Physical Education expects sports clubs 
and other physical education associations to be education institutes that increase 
physical capacities and morale of the youth. In this sense, the Houses and sports clubs 
share the same goal, and they should work in a cooperative and complimentary 
manner. It is their responsibility to prepare the youth for national defense through 
physical education. Club managers should always bear in mind those principles, and 
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they should act not as separate clubs, but as units of an army. The Houses should leave 
competitive games to clubs, and instead prepare citizens physically.221 
 
In the following pages of the same issue, the Ülkü publishes some sections from the 
activity reports of sports branches of certain People’s Houses; and there is an 
anonymous review on those reports. The anonymous author praises certain Houses 
like Bergama, which have done well with respect to sports activities. On the other 
hand, the author criticizes sports branches of many People’s Houses for only 
concentrating on football. Given the generally negative opinions of the ruling elite on 
football, this situation is ironic and illuminative of the disparity between the ideal 
designs of the center for sports and the actual practices of local People’s Houses.  
 
The anonymous author concludes by deridingly stating: “When our Houses realize that 
sports are not limited to football, they will have a huge step forward towards proper 
conduct of sports activities.”222 Both the opinion piece by Cemil Tahir Taner, and the 
following anonymous review clearly represent the expectations of the ruling elite from 
the People’s Houses with respect to sports and physical education: The Houses should 
promote collective and cooperative sports activities in their locality, and restrain from 
competing with local football clubs because such competition might undermine 
feelings of solidarity and cooperation among local people. In other words, the 
republican elite expected sports activities to be undertaken in cooperation and harmony 
by as many people as possible. In my opinion, these two articles, along with the 
previous ones, indicate that the raison d’être of the sport branches of the People’s 
Houses was to impose physical discipline upon local people. 
In July 1940, Nüzhet Baba wrote an article about Turkish peasants and sports. He notes 
that the General Directorate of Physical Education, military schools, and other related 
institutions, by all available means, seek to promote sports and physical education in 
Turkey. However, Baba states that there had been a fear that this campaign would only 
be limited to cities, not being able to reach to villages. Then, he discusses whether 
peasants, who live in the harsh conditions of the nature and undertake difficult tasks, 
really need exercise and sports. He notes that peasants naturally enjoy certain 
advantages such as more sunlight, fresh water and air. Yet, they do not have the 
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hygienic environment of cities. Moreover, peasants only work during certain periods 
and seasons of the year. For the rest of the year they are usually physically inactive, 
which limits the harmonious development of the body. Hence, the author argues, 
peasants do need exercise and sports in their daily lives.223 
 
Baba notes that physical education prepares people for national defense, promotes 
social solidarity, and helps to generate a more favorable village youth (daha elveriş li 
köy gençliği elde etmek); and thus he argues that it is more crucial to promote sports 
in villages than in cities. He believes that teachers will play the primary role in 
promoting sports in villages. In general, peasants are not aware of sports except for 
their traditional sports such as wrestling, horseback riding, javelin throwing, and 
country dances; but due to long years of neglect these sports are almost forgotten. 
Therefore, Baba states, the government should start with reviving national sports in 
villages by organizing wrestling games and other competitions at special occasions, 
such as wedding ceremonies. He also notes that those games must be competitive so 
that people will become more enthusiastic about sports. As for modern sports like  
gymnastics, Baba suggests that it should begin with the most basic exercises, such as 
running, jumping, climbing, that does not require expensive equipment. In his 
conclusion, Baba states that these are their responsibilities and debt towards the 
Turkish peasants in the field of physical education, and that they should do their best, 
by all means possible, to realize these goals.224 In this article, we again see the 
willingness of the republican policy makers to expand physical education in Turkey, 
even into the villages, by using any means possible. Despite their lack of financ ia l 
resources, facilities, and trainers; policy makers nevertheless sought to promote 
physical education, and to exert disciplinary power upon the population through both 
republican institutions like the General Directorate of Physical Education, the People’s 
Houses, and military schools, as well as by urging village teachers to promote 
traditional and modern sports activities in villages. 
 
In another article published in October 1940, Nüzhet Baba touches upon the urgent 
need of qualified trainers in Turkey, and makes a suggestion to establish an institute 
for educating trainers. He notes that the primary demographic target of physical 
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education in Turkey is the youth between the ages of 15 and 20; but currently there are 
not enough trainers for even 35 % of this group, let alone the entire population. 
Therefore, Baba argues, the state needs to establish a higher institute for physical 
education to educate trainers. The General Directorate of Physical Education has 
already laid down the principles of physical education with a bylaw. However, Baba 
notes, there is still a need for trainers who can put those principles into practice.225 
According to Baba, a trainer should have the following traits: He should be talented, 
virtuous, equipped with the ability to lead the youth, and have a strong character. On 
the other hand, the author also notes that this urgent need for trainers should not lead 
the government to allow prospective students who have no talents or interest in sports; 
the selection committee should be very careful and selective.  
 
Then, Baba discusses the curriculum of the new institute to be established. The 
curriculum should not be too abstract and theoretical. Rather than aiming for an ideal 
and perfect sports system, the curriculum needs to be more practical, and address the 
needs of Turkey. Rather than bringing foreign experts into Turkey, Baba believes the 
government should send young and talented students to Western countries so that they 
can learn the proper techniques of physical education. The government should also 
prepare course material of the institute because currently there are not many 
comprehensive books on physical education in Turkey. In the conclusion, Baba argues 
that if Turkey initiates the establishment of the new institute now, the government will 
be in a much better position to implement the physical education policies once the 
great calamities of the WWII end.226 In general, we see that Baba aims to 
institutionalize physical education in Turkey by creating new institutions and 
coordinating their activities, training trainers, and creating course material for physical 
education institutions. In other words, Baba and other authors attempted to form a 
discourse on physical education with their writings, and they also sought to expand 
physical education in Turkey through coordination of non-discursive activities of 
institutions such as the People’s Houses, the Ministry of Education, and the Directorate 
of Physical education. 
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On July 1 1942 the Ülkü published a speech delivered by Mehmet Emin Erişirgil. In 
his speech Erişirgil talks about a youth organization project he envisaged while 
listening to a problem that some villages were having about irrigation channels. 
According to his plan, university students will gather in summer period around a few 
teachers who knows how to organize and lead the youth. This large group will go and 
set up a camp near the aforementioned villages to clean and repair the blocked 
irrigation channels according to a detailed plan designed by experts during the winter 
period. This endeavor, Erişirgil maintains, will be an opportunity for univers ity 
students to do sports, work together, and a source of satisfaction from charity work. 
Erişirgil believes that this idea, which occurred to him as a response to a specific 
problem in a region, can be broadened and implemented all around the country. The 
government can specify certain camp regions with beds, kitchens, dining tables, and a 
small library etc. Students will also be provided with work uniforms. They will get up 
early, have breakfast together, raise the Turkish flag with a ceremony, and then go to 
work. Using simple hand tools like pickaxe and shovels, students will build or repair 
infrastructure that nearby villages require. 227 
 
Erişirgil notes that students will do this as a beneficial activity for their health because 
during the school year they usually use their brains alone; such camps will teach them 
physical discipline, strengthening their muscles and making them more enduring 
against challenges. They will work for an hour, take a rest for ten minutes, and then do 
some exercise for five minutes to work other muscles that they do not use while 
working. In this way, they will work for five hours until noon, then they will go back 
to their camp, have lunch together, and rest for one and half hour. Afterwards, they 
can do one of the following based on the schedule of the day: a) collective sports, b) 
cooperatively doing a task at the camp, c) discussing about those who have done great 
services to Turkey, d) a collective recreational activity such as reading and discussing 
a useful book or article together, and e) visiting a nearby village. In the conclusion, 
Erişirgil argues that such voluntary camps may spread around the country, and ten 
thousand youth might want to work in those camps.228 This short article is important, 
for it demonstrates the ideal plan of the Kemalist intellectuals for the youth in terms 
of physical education. Erişirgil designs a plan that will shape the daily activities of 
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university students in detail, and channel their physical energy and free time into 
various state projects. As I mentioned in the theoretical framework section, 
disciplinary power aims to divide time into successive segments, and to define a 
definite time period for each activity. In this respect, Erişirgil’s plan and daily schedule 
for students has a striking similarity to the prison timetable that Foucault refers to in 
the beginning of the Discipline and Punish.229 
 
Finally, Sadi Irmak wrote an article about the relationship between sports and 
economic development on June 16, 1944. According to the author, modern sports are 
based on the understanding that body and spirit form a whole and unity, and each one 
should develop and improve to the fullest extent possible; thus education of the body 
and the mind cannot be separated. Therefore, Irmak argues that an efficient sports 
organization, which can provide citizens with knowledge, ideals, health, and joy; must 
be organized at the national level. He notes that sports are not only for the youth; 
everybody requires physical activity with varying degrees of intensity. Urbanizat ion 
and division of labor in modern life lead people to focus on one specific activity, which 
in turn results in deterioration of many other skills and abilities. Thus, all people 
require a systematic and lifelong physical discipline and activity.230 
 
Then, Irmak maintains that modern sports are an instrument which increases the 
efficiency of all sorts of labor. He notes that it is a known fact that the efficiency and 
productivity of industrial workers begin to increase when they exercise regularly. The 
same goes for agricultural workers. This is why, Irmak argues, building sports facilit ies 
for workers is a profitable investment. Workers who monotonously perform a certain 
task for a long time without any other physical activity are more likely to have physical 
deformities, higher risk of diseases, shorter life expectancy, and less efficiency. 
Another benefit of a national organization is to increase people’s physical strength and 
endurance for the purpose of national defense. Irmak points out that despite all the 
advancement in warfare technologies, manpower still remains as the most crucial and 
determining factor in warfare. Lastly, Irmak argues that since each country have many 
disabled people, a national sports organization can also help reduce the costs of 
                                                                 
229 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish, pp.6-7. 
230 Sadi Irmak, “Milli Kalkınmada Sporun Rolü”, in Ülkü June 16, 1944, p.3. 
106 
disabled people for the national economy.231 In this article, we see that Irmak deploys 
physical education as an instrument of improving health of the population, increasing 
its economic productivity and efficiency, and preparing it for national defense. In other 
words, for the republican elite physical education had both disciplinary and regulatory 
(bio-political) functions. 
 
In conclusion, the articles above indicate that bodies and physical capabilities of 
individuals had become an object of government policies. As we have seen, the authors 
were preoccupied with physical education of the Turkish population, and they 
designed various policies and strategies to achieve this goal. For this purpose they 
created and assisted various institutions, such as the Alliance of Turkish Sports 
Associations (later renamed Turkish Sports Institution), the General Directorate of 
Physical Education, the ministry of education, and the People’s Houses; and they 
intended to coordinate their activities. Operating under huge financial restraints, the 
republican elite aimed to promote physical education in Turkey with inexpensive and 
simple methods, both traditional and modern. These methods included establishing 
sports facilities if possible, training sports trainers, promoting gymnastics and other 
modern sports, and more traditional sports like wrestling, horseback riding, javelin 
throwing etc. In other words, the republican elite wished to get ordinary people 
physically more active by using every means available. 
 
Regardless of the ultimate success or failure of their policies and strategies, I would 
like to restate my argument that disciplinary reasoning was inherent in the plans, 
intentions, and calculations of the republican elite because, as I discussed earlier,  
disciplinary power refers to a series of calculated techniques, methods, and regulat ions 
carefully applied to the body in order to render it more productive and docile. As we 
have seen, the authors precisely desired to achieve this end. They aimed to increase 
the physical capacities of people by using any means possible, and to utilize the 
ensuing collective energy for various needs and objectives of the state such as 
economic development and national defense. For example, Şahin Şinasi Giray urges 
the People’s Houses to allocate at the very least one small room for gymnastics so that 
local people would, instead of wasting their time in coffee shops, regularly engage in 
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physical exercise. Similarly, Mehmet Emin Erişirgil designs a plan to channel spare 
time and physical energy of university students into construction projects. In other 
words, in the eyes of the republican policy makers no time and energy should be 
wasted; they rather wished to put those energies at the disposal of the state. Also, this 
physical education project can also be linked to the concept of bio-politics. Physical 
education does not only improve physical capacities of individuals; on a more general 
level it also complements biopower by generating a healthier population. In other 
words, the physical education project of the republican elite went along with their 
healthcare projects and campaigns against epidemics. In sum, it can be argued that 
their physical education project included elements from both disciplinary power and 
biopower at the same time. 
 
4.3. The Issue of Population 
In this part I will analyze 19 articles related to the concept of bio-politics by dividing 
them into two sub-categories. Articles in the first sub-category aim to produce a 
detailed knowledge of the population by collecting statistical data, and information 
about villages, and the material conditions and habits of Anatolian peasants. Articles 
in the second category, on the other hand, deal with the population as a whole, and 
treat it as an administrative problem and an object of intervention; they recommend 
social policies to grow the population and improve its health conditions; and also give 
medical advice to individuals and families on how to avoid certain diseases and 
epidemics. In this respect, I shall argue that the articles examined in this part relate to 
the concept of biopower. 
 
The first sub-category includes seven articles. To begin with the earliest and perhaps 
the most important one, the article called ‘Köy Anketi’232 was an extensive survey on 
villages, and published anonymously in June 1933. As the rulers of a predominantly 
rural society, the republican elite, in order to be able to rule effectively and to design 
adequate social policies, required detailed information about the conditions of villages 
and their inhabitants. For this purpose, the article calls on Turkish intellectua ls, 
teachers and literate people to answer some questions about villages and peasants in 
regions they dwell. The subject of the survey is defined as ‘development of our 
                                                                 
232 Anonymous, “Köy Anketi”, in Ülkü June 1933, pp.362-364. For the full text of the survey please see 
Appendix D. 
108 
villages’ (köylerimizin inkişafı). As a quite exhaustive survey it consists of 61 sections 
classified under five headings: general information about the village; social situation 
in the village; education, economic conditions, and health of peasants. Some of those  
sections include: the population of the village and the number of houses, natural 
conditions of the village and peasants (tabii halleri), its history, classification of the 
population in terms of nationality and language, their ways of entertainment (both 
collective and individual), lifestyles of women, men, and children; bigotry and 
superstitions among peasants, their understanding of morality, drinking and gambling 
habits; classification of people in terms of economic conditions (rich, middle class, 
poor), information about conditions of houses, rates of marriage and divorce, number 
of literate people and their occupations, respective vocabulary sizes of literate and 
illiterate persons, economic activities in the village, natural resources of the village,  
mortality rates, most common diseases in the village, cooking techniques, whether 
peasants undertake sports activities, hygiene (personal, house, and village)… The 
survey also asks for policy recommendations to improve the conditions in the villages 
and of their inhabitants, and encourages surveyors to send numeric data, maps, 
sketches, photographs, pencil drawings of the village,  and writing samples of peasants 
if possible.  
 
In and of itself, the survey epitomizes the willingness of the republican policy makers 
to produce a detailed knowledge of the Turkish population. In other words, this survey 
indicates that the republican policy makers intended to produce a medico -
administrative knowledge of the population. However, the survey and the responses it 
received, some of which I will analyze below, do not necessarily mean that the policy 
makers were able to produce such a thorough knowledge of the entire population; and 
that was not their goal either because policy makers knew well that it was difficult to 
collect such an enormous data about all the Turkish villages (approximately 40,000). 
Therefore, they instead aimed to collect data of some villages that were highly 
representative of the characteristics of a geographic region. As a result, compared to 
the overall number of Turkish villages at the time, the number of the subsequent village 
monographs the survey received remained quite low. Nonetheless, along with 
peasantist studies and other articles on villages, the village monographs published in 
the Ülkü certainly provided the central government, policy makers, and intellectua ls 
with some information about the villages. 
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In the years following its publication the survey received numerous responses from the 
Ülkü readers in the form of village monographs. For example, Osman Nuri, the teacher 
in the Ahırlıkuyu village of Haymana, replied to the survey in July 1934. In his 
response he provides detailed information about the village and the peasants, their 
lifestyles, habits and traditions, superstitions, economic conditions, language, literacy 
rate, health conditions, birth and death rates etc. He also shares a few letters written by 
the peasants, perhaps as sample of their vocabulary size. According to his report, the 
village consists of 100 houses and 500 people, whom are Tatarian immigrants. In terms 
of lifestyles, male peasants usually work in fields, and females take care of housework 
while children usually grow up in neglect and dirt.233 Nuri notes that the majority of 
women are more prone to believe in superstitions and traditional folk medicine; but 
some have finally come to realize that modern medicine is more effective in treating 
patients.  
 
Osman Nuri notes that there are 12 wealthy families, and 40-50 middle class families 
in the village; the rest are poor, and there are only five households without any debt. 
Usury continues to be a great burden on the peasants, and keeps them in poverty. There 
is a primary school with one teacher, three classrooms, and 78 students. 
Approximately, five students graduate every year, majority of who do not continue 
further education. Literacy rate among the men is eighty per cent, but among the 
women it is less than one per cent. Most people have never been outside of their 
village; only some have been to Eskişehir, Ankara, or Istanbul for work or to visit their 
relatives. The village does not have a post office, and it hardly receives any newspapers 
or books. In order to increase literacy rate in the village Osman Nuri recommends 
opening compulsory reading rooms in the village during winter.234  
 
The rest of his village report was published in the next issue of the Ülkü. He continues 
by stating that the average number of births per month is two, while for deaths it is 
one. There are 85 children between the ages of six and sixteen, but nineteen of them 
have not been officially registered since their births. In total, there are 80 unregistered 
children in the village. In addition, there are 30 widows, 6 widowers, and one harmless 
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mentally ill person.235 In order to pave the way for the development of the Ahırlıkuyu 
village Osman Nuri makes a few recommendations. First, he maintains that the state 
should fight against usury because it severely reduces the profits of peasants, and 
hinders economic growth. Second, the road to Polatlı needs to be repaired, for in winter 
it becomes more difficult to travel from the village to the town. Third, the peasants 
face an integration problem due to the language barrier. As Tatarian immigrants they 
speak Tatar, which limits their interactions with the nearby Turkish villages and 
hinders their integration into the Turkish national identity and culture. Therefore, the 
state should implement policies that would establish Turkish as the common language. 
In his conclusion, Osman Nuri notes that laws should give teachers more authority to 
fight against ignorance, darkness, bigotry, and superstitions prevailing in villages; and 
teachers in return should put in much more effort and make sacrifices for this noble 
cause.236  
 
In this village monograph we see that Osman Nuri, as the agent and representative of 
the regime in the village, provides the government with statistical data and information 
about the lifestyles and habits of the peasants. He shares birth and death rates, the 
number of unregistered children, the economic conditions of families in the village, 
and the literacy rate etc. In this way, the government would acquire a general 
knowledge about the conditions of the population, and be able to design various social 
policies accordingly. For instance, with the demographic data about the village, the 
number of unregistered children, the economic status of peasants, and their general 
health conditions the state would easily be able to know how many soldiers it can 
enroll into military service, or the amount of tax to be collected from the village, or 
lastly design specific healthcare policies to fight against diseases that were common in 
villages. In this respect, regulatory (bio-political) policies of governments require such 
a knowledge of a population.  
 
Likewise, in the following village monographs authors provide a great deal of 
information about the villages they reside, and the peasants. The second example of 
the village monographs was written by Bahadır R. Dülger about the Orhaniye village, 
40 km away from Ankara. Dülger notes that the village consists of 120 houses, and it 
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has 295 male and 324 female residents. The primary school in the village has three 
classrooms and two teachers. There are 33 first graders, 33 second graders, and 20 
third graders. In the last three years 45 students graduated from the school. Among the 
adults around 250 people are literate, but they are about to forget how to read because 
they rarely read if any. There is no reading room or coffee house in the village, and it 
does not receive any newspapers or magazines either. A health officer visits the village 
monthly for vaccination, to examine the sick, and to circumcise children. Other 
officials that visit the village include a tax collector, and a school inspector. Dülger 
believes that those officials do not, in any way, assist the development of the village.  
 
Peasants do not go to cinema or theater, and nobody shows any interest in fine arts. 
Moreover, they continue to believe in all kinds of superstitions. Healthwise, the 
peasants are generally in good condition, but they do not know how to protect 
themselves against diseases. The birth rate is greater than the death rate. Child death 
is most frequent among those younger than seven, mostly caused by pertussis. There 
are not any physical deformities among the village population. People in the village 
do not have any genetically inherited diseases, and there are not any mentally ill 
persons either. Individually the peasants are not hygienic, and children are lousy. The 
streets are covered with mud and manure. The peasants generally do not have any bad 
habits, and they do not commit crimes. Their daily diet includes bulgur, tarhana soup, 
yogurt, potatoes, cabbage, beans, and eggplants. 237 
 
Dülger notes that rich families usually have one or two horses, a couple of oxen, and 
two or three cows; middle class families have one to three oxen and one donkey; while 
poor families have either two oxen or one ox and one donkey. There are not any 
landless families in the village, but size and fertility of the lands vary greatly. Rich 
families possess larger and more fertile lands near water sources, whereas poor 
families have smaller and less fruitful soil. Wheat and barley are the most grown crops 
along with beans, eggplants, and cabbage. Dülger says that he has not seen any 
willingness among the peasants to improve their cultivation methods, and to diversify 
their products. As in other villages, cultivation methods are primitive; only five 
persons have plows, the rest have primitive plows (karasaban). The only tractor in the 
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village collects dust due to the high gas prices. In total, the peasants have 30 horses, 
150 donkeys, 55 cows, 230 oxen, 3000 sheep, 1500 goats, 400 ducks, 300 turkeys, and 
1500 chickens. Collectively, the peasants owe the Agricultural Bank 4000 liras, but 
they spent this credit not on agriculture, but for their personal needs. Dülger believes 
that the peasants are not capable of managing their money wisely. For example, the 
village collectively received a sum of 30,000 liras from the government for 
confiscation of a nearby land, but the peasants did not use this money productive ly. 
Instead, they wasted the money for consumption.238  
 
Another village monograph was penned by A. Süreyya İşgör about the Zıhar village 
of Giresun in February 1937. According to the author, the village has a population of 
917 women and 758 men. The primary school has one teacher and one class of 70 
students. Among adults there are only 96 literate people, and only two of them 
graduated from middle school. The only small library in the village belongs to a family 
called Paçoğulları, and it is available to other peasants. The only newspaper the village 
receives is Yurd, which is read by the teacher and the muhtar alone. In addition, the 
village does not yet have a post office. There are no gramophones or radio in the 
village, the people play traditional instruments like kemancha, drum, and shrill pipe. 
İşgör notes that the village does not have a People’s House or room, and the peasantism 
branches of the Giresun House or other nearby Houses have not yet visited the village 
to contact the peasants. Most people in the village go to nearby cities and towns to 
work for six months because the land in the village is not sufficient to feed the whole 
population. Among those who go outside of the village for work, only a few have been 
to a cinema or theater. People generally believe in superstitions, and apply traditiona l 
medical methods that are actually more harmful than beneficial. Those males who have 
been to other cities for their military service care more about the material and cultura l 
development of the village, and share their knowledge and experience with other 
peasants. 239  
 
İşgör states that the peasants do not know much about sanitation and protection against 
diseases; mothers remain unaware of proper childcare methods. Similarly, house 
construction methods and materials are unsanitary. Fortunately, thanks to the 
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abundance of clean air, water, and sunshine in the village the people are robust in 
general. Rates of premature mortality are higher among children and young people. 
The birth rates exceed death rates, and the population has been growing. The people 
are usually tall; the average height is between 170 and 175 cm. People are quite careful 
about personal hygiene, but they do not pay attention to public hygiene: the streets are 
dirty and the village does not have a sewerage network. Cold related diseases are the 
most common ones in the village, but there are also some people with malaria and 
syphilis. There are not any doctors even in the nearest Alucra town, let alone villages. 
Thus, 30,000 people in the whole region depend on one single health officer for 
medical care. As a result, peasants rely on unhealthy, primitive, and wrong methods 
advised by unqualified persons, such as their neighbors, to treat diseases.240 They do 
not engage in sports activities because they view their daily labor as exercise, but for 
Süreyya İşgör such unsystematic activities do not yield the expected benefits of sports. 
Among the good habits of peasants are washing hands before and after meals, 
maintaining personal hygiene; but they do not take ventilation and sun lighting of 
rooms seriously. Nobody in the village uses toothbrushes. In order to improve the 
health of the peasants İşgör suggests that the relevant clauses of the Village Law should 
be enforced strictly in the village, and the government should educate people on health 
and preventive measures. In addition, if a doctor could visit the village at least once a 
year it would greatly improve the health of the people. 
 
The average age of marriage ranges between 12 and 16 both for women and men; 
despite the efforts of authorities child marriage cannot be prevented because peasants 
always find a way to elude restrictions. In order to prevent this harmful practice 
muhtars should always be vigilant, and never tolerate it. Polygyny is not common 
among villagers: there are only three men with multiple wives. There is no feud in the 
village, and fortunately homicide occurs very rarely if any. As other Turkish villages, 
the Zıhar is also known for its hospitality, and the peasants behave respectfully towards 
guests and old people. However, there is also a long-held prejudice against, and distrust 
towards urban people; the peasants believe that urban people always try to deceive and 
take advantage of them. According to İşgör, this prejudice has something to do with 
the old tithe, and he suggests that all possible measures should be taken to break this 
                                                                 
240 Ibid., pp.447-449. 
114 
prejudice and close the gap between peasants and city dwellers. People in the village 
are full of patriotic and national feelings; six of them were awarded the War of 
Independence medal.241 
 
Agriculture is the primary economic activity of the peasants; there are also two 
blacksmiths, two tinsmiths, two carpenters, and six stonemasons. Among the most 
grown crops are barley, rye, potatoes, and cabbage. There is only one barely rich 
family in the village with an annual income of 300 liras, and 75 per cent of the 
population is poor. Every year more than half of them leave the village and work in 
other counties for about six months to earn a living, and to be able to pay their taxes. 
The total 2200 decares of agricultural land is divided among peasants with shares 
ranging from 2-3 decares to 50 decares. There are no families without any land, but 
with the current agricultural methods, the land is not sufficient to feed the people. 
Therefore, more than 10 families permanently left the village in recent years. 
Previously, the village was surrounded with forests, but due to lack of environmenta l 
sensibilities among the people, and long and hard winters the region has been 
deforested, and it may become a desert in the future. The peasants still cultivate their 
land with primitive and traditional methods; there are only two threshers in the whole 
village. Annually, they produce 25 tons of barley and 17 tons of wheat; and sometimes 
they have to import grain. In total, there are six horses, 207 cows, 312 oxen, 300 goats, 
420 sheep, three donkeys, and more than 1000 poultry in the village. Unfortunate ly, 
there are not any agricultural cooperatives, and no attempts to establish one. The debt-
ratio of the village is quite low compared to coastal villages (10-15 thousand liras), 
and the average debt amount ranges between 50 to 315 liras. According to İşgör, the 
economic conditions of the village can be improved by educating the peasants on 
modern and scientific methods of agriculture and animal husbandry to increase 
production. Otherwise, the current levels of production will not be sufficient to feed 
the whole village, and people will continue to live semi-nomadic lives between the 
village and urban centers.242 
 
As mentioned above, in its second series the emphasis and format of the Ülkü changed. 
Village monographs written in this period were not an exception: they became shorter 
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(1-2 pages), and they also started to put more emphasis on folkloric aspects and 
traditions of village life. For example, on January 16, 1942, Avni Çakır wrote about 
the Aşağı Yanlar village of Çankırı. This small village consists of 30 houses and 220 
inhabitants.  Two-thirds of the agricultural lands in the village belong to city dwellers, 
and most peasants have to work as sharecroppers in these lands. The most cultivated 
fruit include plum, apple, and berries. This year there was a bad harvest, and only a 
few rich families were able to meet their needs and store some seeds for the next year. 
Since there is no trade or craft other than agriculture, some peasants had to go to cities 
and work until spring to compensate the harvest failure. The village does not meet the 
hygiene standards; but people are generally heathy. The biggest problem in the village 
is the lack of a primary school; even the much smaller Yukarı Yanlar village has its 
own school.243 
 
One year later Mehmet Tuğrul wrote a short monograph on the Kelevran village of 
Denizli. It is a very small village with 18 houses and 52 people who are all related. 
They are very clannish, and do not like outsiders settling in their village. All men in 
the village are literate; among the women only five can read and write. All families 
subsist on their own land, and they are well-to-do. They grow barley, wheat, corn, 
chickpea, cotton, and sesame in their fields, and various vegetables in their gardens. 
There is no grocery store in the village, thus people go to nearby villages for shopping. 
Despite the campaign and great efforts of the government, the village still rema ins 
plagued with malaria. Previously, a man with tuberculosis had travelled to Istanbul for 
treatment, but unfortunately he passed. Now there is another man with the disease, but 
he refuses to go to Istanbul fearing that he would share the same fate. The village does 
not have a school, and children go to the neighboring Dayılar village for education. 
The author concludes the article by sharing the lyrics of a folk song sung by the 
peasants.244 
 
Lastly, Avni Altıner reported on the Tarhala village of Soma on January 1, 1944. The 
author presents a sketch of the village, and discusses the history of the village and 
etymology of its name at some length. According to official reports, the village was a 
town center 150 years ago, but in time it shrunk into a village of the burgeoning Soma 
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district. In the late 19th century the village consisted of 500 houses; but today remains 
only 130 houses and 600 inhabitants. The population might have declined because of 
the Great War, and the endogamic traditions of the peasants. The village contains 
historical ruins from the Roman, Byzantium, and Seljuk times.245 Being a mountainous 
village, the land in Tarhala is not appropriate for farming. Therefore, the primary 
economic activity is leather trade; there is one factory and eight tanneries. Moreover, 
nearly every family has a tannery loom, and they sell their products in nearby markets. 
Poor people, on the other hand, work in coal mines in Soma. The peasants are 
hardworking, and also very skillful in trade, and sell shoes, fruit, ice cream, and fabric 
in markets and fairs. Unlike several other Turkish villages, Tarhala is a wealthy village, 
and many village houses are better decorated than those in cities. Avni Altıne r 
concludes the article by describing certain traditions and dances of the peasants.246 
 
As we have seen, the village monographs presented above provided the government 
with copious amounts of information about the health condition, economic activit ies 
and wealth, level of education, habits, and beliefs etc. of peasants. Here, I would like 
to underline the ‘will to knowledge’ of the policy makers. By publishing the village 
survey and encouraging teachers, intellectuals, and literate people to send village 
monographs, the Ülkü circles sought to constitute a detailed knowledge of the Turkish 
population. With such a knowledge, which is a requirement of biopower, the 
government would be able to intervene in demographic phenomena such as births, 
deaths, and epidemics at a general level, and design and implement more accurate 
economic policies to increase the productivity of the population. In fact, the following 
articles represent examples of such policy designs. 
 
The second sub-category contains 12 articles that focus on the issue of population as a 
whole, dealing with questions such as: ‘How to boost the Turkish population?’, and 
‘How to improve its health?’ For example, in June 1933 Dr. Zeki Nasır penned a short 
introductory article in which he discusses these issues. He starts by underlining the 
importance of the issue of population for states: a large and healthy population is the 
key to power and wealth. As a result, states started to pay more attention to this issue, 
especially after the Great War. Nasır argues that in order to guarantee population 
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growth a state must first take measures to decrease infant mortality rates. Nasır states 
that Turkish women living in cities have recently started to have fewer babies. 
Fortunately, majority of those babies survive thanks to higher living standards and 
childcare knowledge of mothers in urban areas.247 In rural areas, on the other hand, 
Turkish women usually have more babies; but the infant mortality rate remains higher 
in villages due to poverty, unhygienic conditions, and lack of proper childcare. 
Therefore, Nasır suggests, the material conditions in villages should be improved, and 
women need to be educated on proper methods of childcare.  
 
In addition, Nasır argues that the state should also fight against those diseases such as 
malaria, pox, and tuberculosis, which affect not only the current generation, but also 
the future ones. The author notes that it is a well-known fact that in regions plagued 
with malaria population gradually declines. Malaria also leads to miscarriage, 
premature births, and loss of sexual desire. Fortunately, campaigns against malaria in 
Anatolia have started to produce positive results: in malaria-endemic regions birth 
rates have been rising, infant mortality decreases, and the population is growing 
again.248 The pox is another disease that had long played havoc with the Anatolian 
population; but its influence has been decreasing thanks to pox eradication campaigns. 
Yet, tuberculosis still continues to kill thousands of people around the world, and 
governments need to wage a two-front war against it by both taking protective 
measures against the disease and reducing poverty. The author concludes by 
reemphasizing the importance of the issue of the population for the young Turkish 
republic, and encourages policy makers to implement the necessary economic and 
healthcare policies.249 In my opinion, this article perfectly reflects the bio-politica l 
reasoning of the republican policy makers. Nasır underlines the importance of 
population growth for the state; identifies negative factors that hinders population 
growth in Turkey and offers various social policies to eradicate them. Here I should 
also note that his analysis and policy suggestions were rendered possible by a statistica l 
knowledge of the population and its trends. 
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In May 1934 Prof. Dr. Fahrettin Kerim published an article on the issue of eugenics. 
According to Kerim, eugenics is undoubtedly a crucial matter that the Turkish 
republic, which has achieved numerous progressive reforms, should consider. He 
makes an interesting analogy between plants, animals and people that reveals how the 
bio-political reason works: He argues that just as Turkey expends a great deal of money 
on animal breeding and improvement of seeds by employing foreign experts and 
establishing institutes, it should also invest in protecting and improving the hereditary 
characteristics of the Turkish nation, which constitutes the core capital of our country, 
because “Today, individual has become the most profitable resource for the state.”250 
Then, the author discusses at some length the economic burden of containment and 
treatment of mentally disordered people on Western governments with several 
examples from European countries such France, Germany, and Switzerland. 
Accordingly, the French government annually spends 300 million francs on mentally 
disordered patients; similarly in 1911 Germany spent 33 million Deutsche marks. 
Whereas education of a normal student costs 120-130 marks a year, education of a 
mentally retarded child costs 250 marks. Based on these data Kerim argues that an 
increase in the number of mentally disordered people puts a great burden on normal 
people. Governments should, and do ban marriage and reproduction of mentally 
disordered people for the greater good; Kerim argues that in this way the good 
hereditary characteristics of the nation will be preserved, and there will not be an 
economic burden on governments.251  
 
Fahrettin Kerim also warns against diseases and bad habits that deteriorate hereditary 
characteristics of nations. According to scientific studies, there is a correlation between 
alcohol consumption and number of people with psychological disorders. Kerim states 
that one-third of epileptics, idiots, and stupid people have alcoholic parents. Among 
the descendants of alcoholic people the first generation is more likely to be immora l, 
whereas the second generation tends to become mentally disordered.252 Syphilis also 
has harmful effects on the hereditary characteristics of future generations, and people 
with the disease should not be allowed to get married until they completely recover. 
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According to Galton, one of the prominent eugenicists, the only way to protect and 
improve a race is to limit the reproductive capacities of those with genetic flaws. Since 
it may lead to certain psychological traumas, castration is considered as an inhumane 
method by eugenicists. In its stead, vasectomy and tubal ligation were advised by the 
International Eugenics Congress as viable alternatives that can protect a race without 
limiting the ability of patients to have sexual relationships. Accordingly, in 1933 Hitler 
passed a legislation authorizing sterilization of patients with mental illnesses, 
dementia, imbecility, epilepsy, and people who were born blind. In addition, this 
policy is implemented in certain provinces and cantons of Switzerland, Canada, 
Denmark, and the United States.253  
 
The author continues by discussing the harmful outcomes of miscegenation with 
various examples. He notes that biracial children of white and black people in America 
are known to have psychological problems. Similarly, miscegenation of French and 
black people has produced negative outcomes. Therefore, Kerim maintains that only 
intermingling of those races with similar hereditary characteristics would create 
positive results.254 He also makes some recommendations on marriage. Marriages 
should be based more on reason than romantic feelings; any marriage based entirely 
on romance or on materialism is doomed to failure. Women should get married young, 
stay at home and take care of their children. He concludes by reemphasizing the 
importance of eugenics for the Turkish population policy.255 
 
In my opinion, this article presents an example of social engineering par excellence. It 
may be argued that it is rather an extreme and unusual case. After all, it was written 
under the strong influence of an ‘international eugenics movement’, and the rising tide 
of Fascism and Racism in the 1930s made it possible to discuss, and in some cases 
even implement such ideas. The idea of a pure, perfect, and superior race even led 
policy makers and scientists in this period to perform extreme and inhumane 
experiments on subjects. Nevertheless, this article is a perfect example of how far 
modern (state) power can possibly go while it governs a population; and this is 
Foucault’s main criticism of biopower: Even though its techniques are usually 
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deployed by states to make a population healthier and more productive, they also give 
states an enormous and extremely dangerous power over their populations. 
 
Şevket Raşit Hatipoğlu wrote a short article on the issue of population in May 1942. 
In the beginning he emphasizes the significance of population for states. Strong and 
affluent countries have large populations; thus all states follow policies to grow their 
populations. The author points out that despite the long and successive wars, poverty, 
famines, and epidemics the Turkish nation has managed to survive. Today, however, 
it needs to grow faster than any other nation to compensate for the losses it suffered in 
the past. Fortunately, it has been growing consistently: In 1927 Turkey had a 
population of 13,648,270; and now it is 17,826,697.256 The author hopefully 
anticipates that Turkey’s population will exceed 50 million in a relatively short time. 
According to the statistics of 1940 the birth rate in Turkey is 4%; but the death rate is 
2.3%. This means that the Turkish population grows at an annual rate of 1.7%. 
Hatipoğlu states that Turkey can achieve a higher population growth rate by increasing 
birth rates and decreasing death rates. 
 
Hatipoğlu notes that the easiest way to increase birth rate is to encourage marriageab le 
people to get married as early as possible. Fortunately, Turkish people tend to marry 
their children as soon as they are marriageable; but it appears that some intellectua ls 
in big cities either get married later or avoid marriage all together. The second way to 
increase the birth rate is to encourage people to have more children. Hatipoğlu argues 
that in order to achieve the goal of a 50 million population, every Turkish family must 
have at least six children. Those people who avoid having children for their own 
comfort and pleasure should be considered as traitors by the national morality.257 In 
addition, the state needs to take pre- and after-birth care measures to decrease infant 
mortality rate so that not even one drop of our nation’s ability to reproduce will be 
wasted. Therefore, the state should build maternity hospitals all around the country to 
take care of both children and their mothers. The author ends the article by restating 
his hope that Turkey will soon become a more crowded country full of healthier, more 
robust, and happier children.258 As we can see, Hatipoğlu takes the issue of population 
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quite seriously, and defines it as part of the national cause, to the extent that he 
considers those people who do not perform their duty traitors. In his article, one can 
see several traces of bio-political reasoning: Hatipoğlu aims to prevent all factors 
hindering population growth, and encourages people to have more children. He also 
urges the state to take the necessary measures so that not even ‘one drop of the nation’s 
capacity to reproduce’ would be wasted. 
 
1945 was an important year in terms of the issue of population. The fourth nationwide 
census was conducted in October, and it created excitement and expectations among 
the Ülkü writers. Right before the census Tahsin Banguoğlu wrote an article in the 
Ülkü and expressed his expectations. First, Banguoğlu explains why the Turkish 
population declined in the last centuries. He argues that the consistent decline in the 
Turkish population had three causes: the despotism of the degenerate Sultanate regime, 
the ensuing internal conflicts and chaos, and successive wars. The despotism of Sultans 
oppressed people and condemned them to turmoil, poverty, and diseases. Simila r ly, 
continuous external attacks and warfare led to the massacre of too many people, and 
the empire lost huge territories with large populations. As a result, Banguoğlu notes, 
the Turkish republic inherited a weakened, scattered, and destitute population of 12 
and half million, and a war-torn country. However, the author believes that the War of 
Independence did not only mark the end of calamities and suffering the Turkish nation 
had endured; it also marked the end of the long population decline in Turkey. The 
mission of the new republic was to secure the borders of the country, and render it and 
the people prosperous because in this age being a great nation requires a large and 
affluent population.259 
 
Then Banguoğlu states that in the republican period policy makers have followed 
certain policies and taken the necessary measures to prevent another great population 
decline. They have avoided unnecessary foreign adventures like the Second Word 
War, tried to prevent deaths from poverty and diseases, and taken measures to increase 
the reproduction rate. These policies include campaigns against tuberculos is, 
trachoma, pox, and malaria; and financial aid and tax reduction for families with many 
children. Moreover, Turkish policy makers learned valuable lessons from the mistakes 
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of European countries. The author argues that, unlike European countries, Turkey will 
not allow concentration of large numbers of people in certain urban areas. The Turkish 
peasantry, having sufficient land and being protected by the laws, will be healthy and 
wealthy; will have moral values, and thus will always maintain the high population 
growth rate that the country requires. On the other hand, Banguoğlu also argues that 
the developing Turkish industry will neither lead to social antagonisms nor moral 
decay because Turkey has protected its working class since its birth. Therefore, 
increasing industrialization will not hinder the population growth in Turkey. Having 
fortunately avoided the destruction of the WWII, and taken the necessary measures, 
Banguoğlu concludes, the Turkish population will continue to grow and prosper.260 As 
other authors, Banguoğlu emphasizes the importance of having a large population for 
Turkey, and summarizes the policies that the government implemented for population 
growth. 
 
The census results were quite encouraging: the Turkish population increased by 
1,050,253 and reached a total of 18,871,202.261 After the census Banguoğlu penned a 
short analysis of the results. He notes that the population was expected to exceed 19 
million; but due to the effects of the WWII, it did not. Even though Turkey managed 
to stay out of the war, it still had negative effects on the population growth rate of 
Turkey. First, Turkey had to keep nearly one million young men under arms in reserve 
in the event that Turkey might have to enter the war. This, in return, slowed down the 
population growth for five years. Second, the economic conditions in Turkey 
deteriorated due to the war, and it also negatively affected the population growth. 
Nevertheless, according to the statistics, the number of metropolises and medium sized 
cities in Turkey doubled: Now, there are four metropolises and six medium sized cities. 
In his conclusion, Banguoğlu states that the census results are quite encouraging 
because in a period when tens of millions of people died in the war Turkey managed 
to grow by one million. After all, Turkey could have easily lost 3-5 million people in 
the WWII.262 In this article, we see that Banguoğlu and other republican policy makers 
effectively took advantage of censuses and other statistical data, which are crucial 
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instruments of biopower, to measure the population growth and other trends, and they 
used this knowledge to design future social policies. 
 
Zeki Nasır, a recurrent author on these matters, published an article about public health 
in the first issue of the Ülkü in February 1933. In the beginning, he notes that health 
of an individual, a family, and a nation are all interrelated. A country’s state of health 
relies on a variety of factors: the life expectancy, the physical strength of the people, 
their reproduction ability, constant improvement of their bodies and souls towards 
perfection, and their protection against epidemics and endemics.  Nasır argues that the 
state of health in a country can only be promoted through improvement of sanitation 
and hygiene, and it requires a lot of effort and time. Therefore, it behooves the state, 
through laws and regulations, to protect the health of individuals and the society as a 
whole. State of health also depends on the economic conditions in a country. A poor 
nation is less likely to have a healthy population. The author makes a comparison 
between European countries and India. Whereas the life expectancy in European 
countries is 55-57 years, it is only 23 in India. This is an indication of the 
underdevelopment of the economy and healthcare system of India compared to 
European countries.263 
 
Health education plays a crucial role in protection and promotion of health, and Nasır 
notes that it starts with the family. Until children reach school age they should be 
educated by their parents about hygiene. When they start school they will learn from 
their teachers. Another factor affecting health of people is criteria for marriage. Nasır 
argues that men and women, who will get married, should not have any diseases such 
as pox, tuberculosis, or malaria. Otherwise, their children will be unhealthy and weak, 
if they can survive the first year.  Parents are responsible for the health of their children. 
They should take measures to protect children from smallpox, diphtheria, measles, and 
brain fever. Children should also be protected against bad habits such as alcohol and 
drugs. The energy of the youth should be channelized into sports activities which will 
make them healthier and keep them away from bad habits and criminal activities.264 In 
this article, Nasır emphasizes the role of the state in promoting health in a country, and 
aims to promote health education. Also, he urges parents to protect their children 
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against bad habits, and channel their energy into sports activities. He calls for 
cooperation between parents and state institutions to educate the youth about hygiene. 
In other words, Nasır wishes to make parents and the institution of family an integra l 
part of the state's healthcare policy. In my opinion, all the measures that Nasir 
recommends reflect the bio-political reasoning that was inherent in the mindset of 
republican policy makers. 
 
In another related article called “Sıhhat ve İktisat”, Zeki Nasır underlines the close 
relationship between a healthy population and a strong economy. He notes that today 
all states focus on population-welfare politics (nüfus-servet siyaseti). The primary 
basis of the population welfare politics is health. Nasır argues that only those countries 
with healthy and strong populations can reap the benefits of economic development 
and wealth. A person with a weak body or a mental illness cannot be a source of wealth 
to his/her country. (Emphasis added) On the contrary, such persons would be a burden 
for they would reduce the welfare of their families and the society. For example, 
epidemics and other infectious diseases kill young people, and thus causes enormous 
levels of economic damage. Moreover, much simpler diseases such as common cold 
causes more economic damage than one expects. Millions of people around the world 
cannot go to work, or work properly because of this simple disease. It is reported that 
the economic losses due to this sickness amount to half a billion dollars in the United 
States.265 In this article we can clearly see how bio-political reason operates. The bio-
political reason aims to decrease death rates and prevent epidemics which reduce the 
strength of a population, shorten the working week, and waste energy. In this respect, 
we see that Nasır shows interest in the health of the Turkish population in terms of its 
economic consequences, and he considers death of young people from the point of 
economic losses that such deaths inflict on the economy.  
 
In November 1947 Hamdi Dilevurgun wrote an article in which he summarizes the 
Turkish healthcare policy since the establishment of the republic. He begins by noting 
that in today’s world healthcare services constitute an integral part of social policy 
agenda of states. Establishment of Ministries of Health around the world is a clear 
indication of this trend. The concept of ‘public health’ (halk sağlığı) is at the core of 
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these developments. Dilevurgun notes that traditionally medicine only dealt with 
treatment of individual patients who were in pain; it did not include society as a whole. 
Today, thanks to the concept of public health, healthcare policies have three goals: 1) 
Eradication of harmful environmental factors and maintenance of hygiene, 2) 
Establishment of a nationwide healthcare organization and treatment of patients as 
soon as possible, and 3) Establishment of a social security system to protect citizens 
against diseases, accidents, and other risks.266 
 
Then, the author makes a comparison between the Ottoman period and the republican 
period in terms of healthcare system. He notes that in the late Ottoman period there 
were various efforts to establish a nationwide modern healthcare system; but due to 
lack of financial resources and lack of sufficient numbers of trained personnel, the 
limited number of medical schools to train them, and the destructive effects of long 
wars, these efforts could not fully produce the desired outcomes. From 1925 onwards, 
the republican governments have taken important steps. In 1925, a nationwide 
campaign against malaria was launched. Now patients with malaria are treated in 
public hospitals free of charge. A research institute for malaria was established in 
Adana, and now doctors are required to do a malaria internship during education. 
Today, 229 doctors and 1150 health officers who specialize in malaria treatment serve 
in 40 anti-malaria campaign zones consisting of 53 cities, 229 towns, and 13317 
villages. Similar campaigns were launched against diseases like pox and trachoma.267 
 
Dilevurgun notes that as of 1947, there are 112 public hospitals and maternity hospitals 
with a total capacity of 12,310 beds. 40 % of the 5000 doctors in Turkey work in public 
hospitals. Following the first 10-years healthcare plan of 1946, policy makers intend 
to establish hospitals and dispensaries around the country, send doctors and nurses to 
villages. More specifically, they will establish 10-beds dispensaries for every 40 
villages, and 500-beds hospitals in the seven geographical regions of Turkey. They 
will also create a social security system that will cover working men and women, and 
their families. In addition, the Ministry of Health and Social Assistance publishes 
brochures, posters, books, and booklets to inform citizens about healthcare.268 Again, 
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in this article we see that the government took the issue of population quite seriously, 
and invested in construction of hospitals and medical schools. The campaigns against 
epidemics, and health education campaigns, along with the other measures, present 
examples of the bio-political policies of the government to render the Turkish 
population larger and healthier. 
 
Two years later Ali Süha Delilbaşı wrote a similar article about the healthcare policies 
in the republican period. He states that in today’s understanding healthcare, is not only 
about saving lives. The point is to protect healthy people against diseases, not to leave 
armies without soldiers, farms without farmers, and factories without workers. 
(Emphasis added) Delilbaşı writes: “Despite the increasing industrialization of warfare 
and economy, the WWII made it clear that the most crucial factor has been, and will 
always be manpower and human intellect. In order for these bodies to fight, these arms 
to work, and these brains to create; and in order to maximize the efficiency of human 
energies people must be healthy and strong.”269 (Emphasis added) Therefore, Delilbaş ı 
defines the target of the Ministry of Health as follows: Minimization, and if possible 
prevention of work time losses by protecting healthy people against diseases, healing 
sick people so that they can go back to work as soon as possible, and decreasing death 
rates. 
 
In line with these goals, the first thing the Ministry of Health did after its establishment 
was to build hospitals in Ankara, Sivas, Diyarbakır, and Erzurum. Then, it launched 
campaigns against malaria, pox, and trachoma. Delilbaşı notes that since then the 
mission of the ministry can be summarized in two words: expansion and specializat ion. 
On the one hand, the ministry seeks to build more hospitals and establish a nationwide 
healthcare system. On the other hand, it aims to specialize and adopt the new 
healthcare technologies. For example, the Refik Saydam Hygiene Institute has been 
studying vaccinology, and thanks to its efforts Turkey now can produce her own 
vaccines. The author concludes the article by stating that there is much more work to 
do, and encourages the state and healthcare personnel to work harder.270 In my opinion, 
this article perfectly presents the bio-political reasoning of the republican policy 
makers and intellectuals: Bodies need to fight, arms need to work, and brains need to 
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create; work time losses need to be minimized, and efficiency of human energies must 
be maximized. In order to achieve these goals, they designed and implemented various 
social policies, and created new institutions. 
 
Lastly, there are a few more articles that I would like to briefly mention. These articles 
are of a more technical nature, and focus on specific diseases. The primary goal of 
such articles is to inform people about infectious diseases, and teach them how to 
protect themselves from such diseases. Therefore, I will just mention some examples 
without going into much detail. For example, in March 1935 Hamid Osman wrote an 
article on diphtheria. In the article, he explains how the disease spreads, its symptoms, 
and how to fight against it.271 Similarly, Hamdi Dilevurgun wrote several articles on 
various diseases. In February 1947, he focused on tuberculosis which was the primary 
cause of death for people between the ages 15 and 35. He discusses the recent scientific 
developments in tuberculosis treatment in some detail, and then notes that patients with 
the disease should be quarantined, and rest in a place with fresh air and sunlight, and 
eat well.272 In November 1947 Dilevurgun also wrote about cholera: how it spreads 
and factors that facilitate its development, its symptoms, rates of date and recovery, 
and the preventive measures.273 Finally, in January 1948 he wrote a lengthy article 
about some common winter diseases such as cold, flu, quinsy, laryngitis, bronchit is, 
pneumonia, and bronchopneumonia. He explains, one by one, how these diseases 
emerge and spread; preventive measures, and their treatment.274 With such articles, the 
authors aimed to promote health education among ordinary people. 
 
Taken together, all the articles above give important clues to the ideas and intentions 
of republican intellectuals and policy makers about the Turkish population. One can 
see several similarities and parallels between their ideas and the bio-political reason, 
which has the population, with its various characteristics, trends, and regularities, as 
its target. First, we see that the republican policy makers sought to produce a detailed 
knowledge of the Turkish population through censuses, surveys, village monographs, 
and other statistical data. The village monographs collected information about the 
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village population, their conditions, economic activities (crops they produce, their 
annual production, and number of animals), life styles, habits, and culture etc. Such a 
knowledge of a population is a prerequisite of the modern statecraft, and various 
government policies rely on it as it enables policy makers to deal with the population 
at a more general level, and design policies to intervene in collective phenomena such 
as births, deaths, and epidemics.  
 
Second, as we have seen, all authors emphasize the importance of having a large and 
healthy population for states; hence they encourage Turkish people to have more 
children, and they seek to decrease mortality rates by eradicating all harmful 
environmental and social factors that damage the health of the population. Admitted ly, 
their concern for, and emphasis on population growth was, to a certain degree, related 
to the existential threat they felt during and in the aftermath of the WWI and the War 
of Independence. The continuous population decline and successive wars in the late 
Ottoman period, and later the imminent danger of the WWII triggered such an 
existential threat among the founders of the republic. Nevertheless, I argue that the 
willingness of the republican policy makers to grow the Turkish populatio n, and to 
render it healthier and more productive cannot be explained solely by this fear of 
extinction. Because, as we have seen, many authors considered population growth as 
a prerequisite for increasing the state's economic capacities and military power; and 
they defined the well-being and productivity of the population as an end in itself. 
Therefore, the authors also sought to render the population healthier and more 
productive with various healthcare and social policies. For example, Zeki Nasır makes 
policy recommendations to the government on how to decrease infant mortality, and 
eradicate epidemics. In addition, he points out that even common diseases cause huge 
economic losses by reducing productivity of people. Likewise, Ali Süha Delilbaş ı 
defines the target of the ministry of health as minimization of work time losses so that 
armies will not be left without soldiers, farms without farmers, and factories without 
workers. Consequently, all these articles indicate that policy makers and intellec tua l 
in the early republican period sought increasing control of the biological by the state; 
and that bio-political reason was an integral part of their mindset.  
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4.4. Economic Productivity 
In this part I am going to examine 16 articles from the Ülkü about the Turkish politica l 
economy. Having secured political independence in 1923, economic development was 
a priority for the republican elite. As their many counterparts in other newly 
established modern nation states, they wished to create a strong and self-suffic ient 
modern national economy. Economic development was essential because it would 
serve both their ideals of modernization and westernization, and their more immed iate 
political interests by increasing the legitimacy of the regime in the eyes of ordinary 
people. For these reasons, they designed and implemented economic policies to 
industrialize and modernize the Turkish economy. In the following articles the authors 
examine and discuss various problems in the Turkish economy, and share their own 
designs for economic development. The topics and issues authors discuss in the articles 
include a debate on industrialization vs. agricultural economy, integration of the 
countryside into the national economy, the role of the state in the economy and 
especially in industrialization; specialization and efficiency, vocational training, land 
reform, regulation of work environment and conditions, and social policies to protect 
workers and their families against accidents and diseases. I shall argue that the articles 
directly relate to the first dimension of governmentality which refers to policies, 
regulations, and institutions of government aimed to increase the economic 
productivity of a population. As we have seen, in the previous part authors were more 
concerned with biological well-being and growth of the population. The articles in this 
section, on the other hand, focus more on economic modernization and 
industrialization, as well as increasing the economic productivity and efficiency of the 
Turkish population. 
 
To begin with, Nusret Kemal Köymen wrote an article about a plan he designed to 
improve the distribution network of the Turkish economy in May 1933. According to 
Köymen, the two great economic systems, namely liberalism and communism, are 
both flawed for different reasons. In liberalism too much competition leads to waste 
of huge amounts of money on advertisement, and thus prices go up; banks try to exploit 
consumers even more to able to compensate costs of advertisement, and eventually 
there will be no economic stability. In communism, on the other hand, due to lack of 
profit motive officers will be indifferent, bureaucratic processes will slow down the 
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delivery of goods; and it will lead to loss of time, and products will either be delivered 
to wrong locations, or they will get spoiled.275 
 
Köymen argues that the best alternative to these two flawed economic systems seems 
to be the retail store chains in the USA. According to Köymen, this system 
significantly reduces costs and facilitates delivery of goods. Thus, it can reduce prices 
of basic consumer goods, and create a well-functioning distribution network. The 
author suggests that Turkey should modify and adopt this system. Köymen admits that 
among the 40,000 Turkish villages perhaps 39,000 of them do not have any markets 
or grocery stores. Therefore, he asks: “Can we not at least built a small closet which 
contains some salt, sugar, olive oil, gas oil, matches, fabric, socks, shoes, paper, and 
envelopes in every village?”276 He calls these mini stores ‘public stores’ (halk 
dükkanları), and believes that these stores will bring several benefits to the Turkish 
economy and society. 
 
First, the public stores will facilitate integration of the isolated villages into the national 
economy. Second, they will create a domestic market and increase the demand for 
those products. Third, thanks to these stores people will be able to easily access to 
those products which are currently difficult to obtain in villages. In other words, Kemal 
argues that the public stores will establish a strong link between production and 
consumption. Fourth, these stores will also bring civilization to villages, and enable 
the state to educate people and teach them the ways of modern life: Peasants will 
abandon their traditional frugal economic life styles, and start consuming those 
products which are prerequisite of a modern lifestyle. The author notes that public 
stores can also be a source of revenue for the state through taxation, and they can also 
provide the state with accurate and reliable statistical data on the national economy 
and consumption. With such data the state can design a good industrialization policy 
in line with the needs and demands of the Turkish economy, and gain a greater fiscal 
control.277 
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Köymen also argues that public stores can buy products of peasants, and protect them 
against the tyranny of middlemen who buy their products at much lower prices. The 
stores will also rescue small industries, such as shoemaking and pottery, from 
bankruptcy and stimulate their growth. Moreover, the stores can also be instrumenta l 
for political education: Newspapers, posters, gramophones and radios can be placed in 
the public stores to educate peasants about the principles of the regime. The stores 
should be located at a central place, if possible next to the coffee shops, so that it will 
be possible to organize conferences and speeches for the peasants. Finally, Köymen 
concludes that, thanks to all those benefits, the public stores will break down the 
prejudices of peasants towards the state, the party, cities, and intellectuals as they will 
begin to appreciate the services provided by the regime.278 As I discussed in the third 
chapter, governmentality takes a population into account with respect to its relation to 
natural resources, and aims to increase its economic productivity. In this article, 
Köymen, being well aware of the disconnectedness of the countryside from the 
national economy, aims to integrate peasants into the economy by creating a new 
distribution network. In this way, Kemal hopes to hit several birds with one stone. 
First, he aims to increase economic production in Turkey by creating new markets 
through public stores. Second, he believes that peasants will change their consumption 
habits, and their demand for new products will grow. He also believes that the public 
stores will bring civilization to the countryside. In other words, Köymen designs his 
public stores project as an instrument of economic development, and political and 
cultural education of Anatolian peasants. 
 
In July 1933, Muhlis Ethem wrote about economic organization and business 
management. The author begins the article by emphasizing the importance of 
organization in modern economies. He states that in order for businesses to work 
properly, and for the effective functioning and expansion of economic, administrat ive, 
and even cultural institutions, they must operate in a rational and uninterrupted 
manner. Unfortunately, Ethem notes, economic institutions in Turkey do not operate 
with maximum efficiency, and they are often at loss in terms of money, labor, and 
energy. Due to lack of proper economic organization and expertise, Turkish economic 
productivity does not rise to the desired levels. There are not sufficient numbers of 
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business administrators, with the necessary expertise and skills, who can organize and 
run businesses on rational principles to increase efficiency, productivity, and profit 
maximization.279 
 
Therefore, Ethem argues that Turkey should pay special attention to business 
administration education. He defines business administration as a scientific method 
used to rationally run economic enterprises and cultural organizations with minimum 
cost and energy, and to reach their goals as soon as possible. It deals with questions 
such as how much demand there is for a certain product in domestic and foreign 
markets; how many workers, equipment, and capital the business requires; where and 
when to establish the business; how, when, from where, and in what ways workforce, 
equipment, raw materials, and capital should be provided; and it establishes the most 
efficient and rational business organization possible.280 Division of labor, cooperation, 
and specialization play a crucial role in efficiency of an economic organization. Ethem 
points out that so many people in Turkey make great efforts and spend a lot of energy 
for production; but due to lack of proper organization these energies and resources 
(equipment, labor, and money) are wasted. Thus, he concludes that Turkey should pay 
special attention to reforming the education system of business administration, and 
train business administrators in schools.281 In this article, Ethem seeks to increase the 
efficiency of the Turkish economy by minimizing loss of energies and resources 
through specialization, cooperation, and division of labor. In other words, he deploys 
business administration as a method of increasing the efficiency and productivity of 
the Turkish industries and labor force. 
 
Dr. Salahattin penned an article about the current state of animal husbandry in Turkey 
in July 1934.  In the beginning he notes that the question of animal husbandry is of 
particular importance for Turkey for the following reasons: First of all, 64 per cent of 
the lands in Turkey is available to be used as pasture; but only 4.8 percent of the lands 
are used for agriculture. This indicates the economic potential of animal husbandry in 
Turkey compared to agriculture. Second, the Turkish peasantry usually make a loss 
from agriculture, and their agricultural activities alone are not sufficient for a living. It 
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is only through animal husbandry that they can make some money. Third, the author 
notes that export of animal products annually brings 20-30 million liras into Turkey, 
and he shares one table of the number of animals in Turkey, and another table of the 
revenue animal products annually generate.282 Fourth, Dr. Salahattin argues that 
traditionally animal husbandry has been the only economic activity that has protected 
Anatolian villages against food shortages and starvation. In fact, if a peasant loses his 
animals he loses his most important means of production and subsistence; and he is 
doomed. Peasants are able to obtain financial means to pay their taxes and for other 
expenses only by selling animal products. Moreover, animals also play a crucial role 
in national defense. In sum, animal husbandry complements agriculture, has various 
economic benefits, and importance for national defense. Therefore, the author writes: 
“One of the primary national duties is to increase national wealth by rendering the 
grass, which grows on the huge Anatolian pastures, economically more valuable; by 
turning it into animals, wool, milk, and meat that have much more economic value.”283  
 
Dr. Salahattin argues that industrialization and animal husbandry in fact go hand in 
hand. Industrialization creates a domestic market/demand for animal products. 
Growing cities and populations need to be supplied with meat, milk, eggs, oil etc. Also, 
the leather trade industry supports animal husbandry. Republican governments have 
done a lot to promote animal husbandry in Turkey; but the author admits that this is a 
long-term and difficult task: It is a matter of culture and knowledge. Most peasants in 
Turkey still use primitive techniques and methods for animal husbandry. In order to 
improve animal husbandry, Salahattin argues, the village question should be resolved. 
The state should establish huge animal farms to both increase production, and to 
educate peasants about the modern methods of animal husbandry. Luckily, this huge 
project of promoting animal husbandry does not require, unlike industrializat ion, 
import of expensive machinery or employment of highly-paid engineers. The author 
concludes the article by anticipating a bright future for animal husbandry in Turkey: 
“Once the importance of animal husbandry is fully grasped, and modern/rationa l 
methods are adopted, Turkish animal husbandry will thrive.”284 In this article, we see 
that Dr. Salahattin, in line with governmentality, takes the peasantry into account in 
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their relation to wealth, animals, and natural resources such as grass; and aims to 
increase the productivity of the peasantry by educating them about modern methods 
of agriculture. 
 
In April 1935 an anonymous article was published on the Turkish industrializa t ion 
process. The author argues that it is possible to divide the industrialization process in 
Turkey into two periods: The period of liberalism, and the period of planned economy. 
Then, the article provides a general overview of the Turkish industrialization policy 
and plans for future. It also summarizes the annual production of various industr ies. 
According to the statistical data, between 1928 and 1933 the cotton industry grew 30 
percent; the wool industry 31 percent, the silk industry 49 percent; the cement industry 
70 percent, the leather trade industry 8 percent; and the sugar industry 19 percent. 60 
percent of all factories in Turkey are located in Istanbul, Bursa, Izmir, and Balikesir. 285 
 
The author notes that despite these growth rates, the pace of industrialization is still 
rather slow because the private capital in Turkey remains too weak. The weakness of 
the private capital on the one hand, and the desire to establish a strong national industry 
as soon as possible on the other, led the state to directly intervene in the 
industrialization issue. According to the first five-year industrialization program of 
1934, the state decided to invest in industries the raw material of which is already 
produced or available in Turkey. These industries include: textile, mining, cellulose, 
ceramic, and chemistry. Following the five-year plan, five cotton and textile factories 
are being established at the moment, and these factories will produce the 80 percent of 
Turkey’s textile needs. Similarly, more factories for other industries are in the process 
of establishment. In conclusion the author is hopeful that these steps will make Turkey 
the leading industrial nation of the Middle East.286 
 
Another anonymous article about industrialization was published in February 1936. 
The author notes that for centuries Turkey had been neglected, poor, and backward. 
Until the War of Independence the country had been a semi-colony, and socially 
dormant. The great leader did not only win the war, but he also liberated Turkey from 
capitulations. Unfortunately, the author states, those who undertook the mission of 
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rebuilding Turkey in its darkest hour, additionally had to fight against the effects of 
the Great Depression. In the face of these difficulties policy makers took some 
important measures. The first step was to raise tariffs, and preservation of the value of 
lira. The anonymous author argues that in an industrially and agricultura l ly 
underdeveloped country like Turkey, free trade would lead to destruction of the 
national economy. Second, it was also evident that in such a country economic 
development could not be achieved by the efforts of individual entrepreneurs alone. 
Therefore, the state decided to take responsibility and invest in certain sectors which 
could not be afforded by the weak private capital. Third, since a random 
industrialization uncoordinated with agricultural development would be harmful to the 
economy, the state created a planned and coordinated development program.287 
 
The author challenges the argument that industrialization of Turkey will negative ly 
affect the 75 percent of the population whose primary economic activity is agriculture. 
Then, he lists the benefits of industrialization for the agricultural sectors. First, opening 
of new factories will support production of certain agricultural products, such as 
cotton, and generate more income for their producers. Second, some agricultura l 
products which are currently not produced in Turkey due to lack of domestic demand 
and an inability to import them, will be produced in Turkey and consumed as raw 
material for new industries. In this way, the author argues, more people will find 
employment in agricultural sectors with higher pays. Third, factories will also bring 
civilization to the locality they were built in. With new factories in their regions people 
will start to develop economically and culturally, and their life standards will rise. 
Fourth, those people, who currently cannot find employment in agricultural sectors 
due to overproduction and protectionist policies of other countries, will have 
employment opportunities in the new industrial sectors. Fifth, the author has observe d 
an enthusiasm and sympathy among ordinary people for industrialization. In locations 
where new factories were built people seem happy and optimistic; and they think well 
of the regime and revolutions. The author concludes that for all these reasons 
industrialization will be highly beneficial to Turkey.288  
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In March 1936 Nusret Köymen wrote another article in which he contributed to the 
debate about the path Turkish industrialization should follow, and shared his 
reflections on the issue. By 1936 the first five-year industrialization plan was 
successfully carried out. At that moment the second one was being formulated, and 
there were discussions about its direction. The main question was whether Turkey 
should focus on agriculture or industrialization. Köymen analyzes this issue, and 
argues that Turkey should establish, rather than a sharp contrast between cities and 
countryside or agriculture and industry, a decentralized industry in villages across the 
country. In this way, he maintains, Turkey will be able to bypass economic, social, and 
other problems that industrialization and urbanization have created in European 
countries. The author believes that a sharp division between industrial cities and 
agricultural villages would be harmful to Turkey.289 
 
Nusret Kemal Köymen supports his proposition with the case studies of the USA and 
Japan. The first village factories were established in the USA. Especially, after the 
Great Depression this idea gained momentum with the guidance of Henry Ford. 
Similarly, Japanese peasants both engage in agriculture and work in factories because 
agricultural lands alone cannot support a family. In the USA the population of large 
cities have declined by 11 percent between 1919 and 1925. Likewise, in the period 
between 1924 and 1930 the number of village factories increased by 10 percent. Most 
of these factories use raw materials, such as cotton, wood, and leather, produced in 
nearby villages. These factories help a great deal to the economic development of 
villages as they pay peasants regular salaries during seasons in which there is no 
agricultural production. Moreover, Köymen argues that with these factories villages 
will be integrated into modern life: Radios, books, magazines, phones, higher salaries, 
more and better products, cheaper electricity, better roads and hospital buildings, and 
a better healthcare system. Peasants will be able to access all these technologica l 
advantages of modern life, and their life standards will rise.290 
 
Then, Köymen represents a guideline for establishment of village factories. First, the 
state should avoid creating a division and antagonism between cities and villages, or 
industry and agriculture. Second, Turkey should not follow the ‘big factory’ trend 
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which is also fading away in its motherland the USA. Third, factories should be 
established in regions rich with the necessary raw materials and peasant labor force, 
or in unpopulated regions which contain the raw materials. In such unpopulated 
regions the state can establish model villages and bring peasants from other regions to 
settle down. Fourth, all villages in Turkey should be examined in terms of industr ia l 
feasibility. Fifth, village crafts like carpet business, carpentry, and pottery should be 
reorganized and modernized. Sixth, consumption cooperatives and chain stores should 
be established to regulate distribution of goods. Seventh, the state should build roads 
and establish electricity infrastructure in the designated industrial regions. Eighth, the 
state should supply factories with fuel oil. Ninth, the state should search for alternative 
agricultural products, such as paper made of cornstalk and furfural, which might be 
produced more cheaply. And finally, village workers should be shareholders of the 
factories, even if with small shares, so that they will not become proletariats and their 
personal interest and fate will be directly tied to those of the factories.291 
 
Later Köymen lists the possible benefits of the village factories for Turkey if 
established. First of all; land, raw materials, labor force, and energy will be much 
cheaper. Second, harmful events like strikes, fires, robbery, and diseases will be less 
likely to occur in villages. Third, those decentralized factories will naturally be more 
secure against air bombardments during wars. Fourth, their maintenance costs will be 
much lower when the factories remain inactive. Fifth, the factories will not need so 
many permanent workers; but when there emerges a need for extra labor force it will 
be easier to find them. Sixth, there will be a natural local market for the products 
factories produce, and peasants will be able to access those goods at cheaper prices 
without any intermediaries. Lastly, during economic crises workers will be able to, 
unlike cities, survive without payments by cultivating their lands, and thus they will 
not have to leave factory regions. In his conclusion, Köymen states his belief that 
thanks to this model, which is based on the peasantist views of the Turkish republic, 
Turkey will not repeat the mistakes Western countries made, and this system will be a 
model for the whole world.292 In my opinion, along with his ‘public stores’ project, 
Nusret Kemal’s plan for village factories indicates his willingness to integrate peasants 
into the national economy, and to increase their economic production. By establishing 
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factories in villages he aims to reduce labor costs, and utilize peasants’ spare time 
during winter for industrial production. 
 
On the occasion of the 15th anniversary of the foundation of the republic Kemal Ünal 
penned a detailed report on the Turkish economic development in fifteen years. The 
statistical data in the article indicate that the state took numerous measures to increase 
economic production in Turkey.  The article analyzes the economy sector by sector: 
Trade, mining, industry, finance, agriculture. Starting with trade, Ünal notes that from 
1924 to 1929 Turkey had a negative balance of trade. From 1930 onwards exports have 
exceeded imports, and national wealth no longer leaves Turkey. The sum total capital 
of national companies, excluding banks and cooperatives, has increased from 61 
million liras to 148 million liras in 15 years. Before 1923 there were only 11 banks 
with a total capital of 46, 6 million liras. Since then, 32 new banks have been 
established, and their total capital amounts to 284 million liras.293 
 
Ünal notes that the state also nationalized the mines owned by foreign companies, and 
repaired and modernized the already existing, both active and inactive, ones. As a 
result, Turkey finally started to extract its own copper and other important minera ls. 
From 1923 to 1937 the coal production increased from 597 thousand tons to 2.3 million 
tons. Similarly, chrome production increased from 3405 tons to 192 thousand tons. 
The Institute of Mineral Search and Exploration continues to search for oil fields in 
Turkey. As for industry, the author makes a comparison between the Ottoman period 
and the republican period. In 1915 there were 264 industrial enterprises, 14,060 
workers, and an annual production worth of 7,570,000 liras. As of 1938, there are 1394 
enterprises, 100,598 workers, and annual production worth of 285,008,000 liras. In 
addition to encouraging and subsidizing private enterprises, the state also invests in 
sectors which the weak private capital cannot afford, or sectors that are crucial for 
national defense. Following the fourth five-year industrialization program, the state is 
going to establish more factories around Turkey: A coal dock in the Black Sea region, 
another dock in Trabzon, the Sirkeci-Haydarpaşa ferryboat, powerhouses in 
Zonguldak and Kütahya, and several others.294  
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With respect to finance, Ünal states that the budget during the 15 years have been well-
balanced. In 1924 the state had a budget of 140 million liras, which gradually increased 
to 229 million in 1929. The Great Depression damaged the budget; but from 1933 
onwards it started to increase again: In 1936 it was 212 million, 230 in 1937, and 250 
million in 1938. In the republican period the share of industry, agriculture, and public 
works in the budget has been much greater compared to earlier periods. In the 15 years 
the state allocated 485 million liras: 369 million for railroads, 23 million for banks as 
capital, 38 million for industrialization, 11.5 for marine works, and 38.5 for the 
formation of monopolies.295 Speaking of railroads, when the republic was established, 
Ünal writes, the 4087 kilometers long railroads in Turkey were owned by foreign 
companies. Over the years the majority of these railroads have been nationalized. At 
the same time, the state has built new railroads: In the first ten years the Ankara-
Kayseri-Sivas-Samsun, Kütahya-Balıkesir, Ulukısla-Bogazkopru, Irmak-Çankırı, and 
Fevzipaşa-Diyarbakır railroads, 2012 kilometers long in total, were built. In the last 5 
years the state built the Malatya-Diyarbakır, Çankırı-Filyos- Zonguldak, Afyon-
Karakuyu, Sivas-Malatya, and Çetinkaya-Erzincan railroads which are 1963 
kilometers long in total. In sum, the state now controls and operates railroads longer 
than 6700 kilometers. Similarly, the state placed emphasis on the roads in Turkey. In 
1923 the roads consisted of 21000 kilometers. In the fifteen years it increased to 39000 
kilometers. In addition, 7000 kilometers long broken roads were repaired, and 84 
bridges were built around the country.296  
 
Lastly, Ünal notes that since the majority of the Turkish population are farmers, 
agriculture is the largest and most important sector of the economy. Being well aware 
of this fact, the state took the necessary measures to improve this sector. First, the tithe 
tax was annulled, and peasants were set free from this cruel medieval tax. Second, the 
state provided peasants with land, credit, and agricultural equipment to increase their 
productivity and economic power. The state also established higher institutions of 
education for scientific study of agriculture. In addition, other schools in Istanbul, 
Izmir, Bursa, and Adana were established to educate technical personnel who will 
apply modern agricultural methods. In order to improve the quality of seeds, the state 
built seed improvement stations in Ankara, Adapazarı, Yeşilköy, Eskişehir, Kayseri, 
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and Erzurum. As a result, now these stations annually allocate two million kilograms 
of seeds to peasants. Thanks to seed improvement, the production of wheat increased 
to the extent that Turkey can now export it. Likewise, the state pays special attention 
to improvement of animal husbandry. Stables were founded in Karacabey, Çifteler, 
Sultansuyu, and Çukurova to improve the horse and bull races in Turkey. Simila r ly, 
the state established sheep breeding centers so that Turkey can produce its own merino 
wool. The state also launched a campaign against animal diseases. Various animal 
plagues had killed 27,541 animals around Turkey and caused a huge economic loss of 
1,377,050 liras. The majority of these diseases were eradicated by 1932, and thus only 
166 animals were killed by diseases in that year.297 
 
On November 1st 1941 İsmet İnönü delivered a speech on the opening session of the 
Grand National Assembly. In his speech İnönü, among many other topics, also touched 
upon the economic issues in Turkey. On this occasion, several writers penned short 
opinion pieces, based on İnönü’s speech, about specific sectors and issues in the 
Turkish economy. Şevket Raşit Hatipoğlu wrote about agriculture and the land issue 
in Turkey. In his first article he emphasizes the importance of increasing and 
diversifying agricultural production.298 In the second article he notes that because of 
the population increase and division of property through inheritance, so many peasants 
do not own any land. Therefore, land reform, as İnönü pointed out in his speech, 
remains one of the primary goals of the government. Hatipoğlu also suggests that the 
state should provide peasants with modern agricultural equipment. Thanks to the land 
reform and modern equipment, agricultural lands will not remain uncultivated; and 
previously landless peasants will be integrated into the national economy and increase 
economic production.299 
 
In the same issue of the Ülkü Samet Ağaoğlu wrote a short article called ‘Köylü ve 
Tezgah’. He argues that equipping peasants with looms will have several benefits for 
economy and national defense. Once provided with looms, peasants will be able to 
produce goods during seasons, such as winter, in which there is no agricultura l 
production. Second, Ağaoğlu writes, large factories will be easy targets for enemy 
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warplanes during a possible war. If factories are destroyed or incapacitated by 
bombardment, national economy will suffer a great deal. With looms, however, 
production process will be distributed across the country, and peasants will continue 
to supply crucial materials and goods, such as clothes, during war. Looms will also 
give peasants their economic freedom.300 
 
In the following pages of the same issue Saffettin Pınar wrote about regulation of 
working conditions of workers. He states that in 1941 the government passed a 
regulation called ‘Workplace Safety and Preservation of Workers’ Health’. Simila r ly, 
once the law of insurance for workers is legislated, they will be insured against 
accidents and diseases; and thus they will be free of any concerns about their future. 
Pınar argues that in this way workers will be more motivated, and the productive forces 
in Turkey will grow stronger. Thus Pınar concludes that just as well-maintained and 
taken care of machines produce more efficiently; a labor force that is well-fed, insured 
and protected against accidents and diseases will be more productive and efficient. 301 
Lastly, in the next issue of the Ülkü Nurettin Boyman wrote about vocational and 
technical education in Turkey. He maintains that mechanization in itself is not 
sufficient for increasing economic production. Turkey also needs to educate technica l 
personnel and specialists who can use, repair, and build machines. For this purpose, 
the state should establish schools for vocational and technical education. Boyman also 
suggests that the state can organize mobile courses to teach villagers how to use 
machines properly in agriculture.302 In these articles we can see that the authors make 
policy suggestions to increase the economic productivity of the various segments 
(peasants and industrial workers) of the population by giving them land and 
equipment, vocational training, and insuring them against accidents in the workplace. 
All these policy suggestions share similarities with the modern governmenta l 
rationality aiming to increase the productivity of a population in their relation to 
natural resources and other factors. 
 
One year later Ratip Yüceuluğ wrote a report on various sectors of the Turkish 
economy. At the beginning of the report the author states that the new republic 
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inherited really bad economic conditions from the Ottoman Empire. At the time 
Turkey had to fight long and successive wars, had almost no industry, prices of 
agricultural products skyrocketed due to speculation, and wheat had to be imported 
just because of the inability to transport the homemade wheat across the country. In 
short, Turkey had become a colony in terms of economy. However, the author notes 
that in the republican period the state have taken several measures to achieve economic 
independence. In the agricultural sector the state annulled the tithe tax; encouraged 
establishment of agricultural cooperatives to provide cheaper and easily accessible 
credit to farmers. Also, the state established higher education institutions, sample 
farms, and seed improvement stations; and published booklets, brochures, and posters 
to propagate correct cultivation methods to villagers. Other measures to boost 
agricultural production included: Increasing mechanization of agriculture, land 
reform, improvement and expansion of irrigation canals, use of fertilizers, construction 
of large granaries for storage etc. As a result, agricultural production has greatly 
increased in the last 25 years.303 
 
Second, Yüceuluğ summarizes the developments in animal husbandry. He notes that 
almost half of the lands in Turkey are pastures available for animal husbandry. 
Therefore, animal husbandry has been an important source of income for Turkey. The 
republican government has taken the necessary measures to increase the number and 
quality of animals in Turkey. It established bacteriology and serum institutes in Pendik, 
Mardin, Erzincan, Ankara, and Istanbul; schools to train blacksmiths and animal health 
officials; breeding centers and artificial insemination institutes. Thanks to these 
measures animal husbandry in Turkey developed: In 1934 there were 34.6 million 
livestock in Turkey. By 1939 this number increased by 53 percent, reaching to 53.2 
million.304 
 
As for industry, Yüceuluğ notes that in 1927 the government passed the law for 
stimulation of industry, and in 1929 it imposed high tariffs on foreign industr ia l 
products to protect the Turkish industry. As a result, 890 factories were established by 
private capital between 1926 and 1932. However, only two of those factories were big; 
the rest were rather small enterprises. Therefore, the state undertook the issue of 
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industrialization, and created the Sumer bank with an initial capital of 20 million liras 
to establish new factories. This institution played an important role in Turkish 
industrialization. Previously, sugar was imported; now Turkey can produce 65 percent 
of her sugar consumption. The author states that once the other three factories are 
completed in the near future, Turkey will become completely self-sufficient in sugar 
production. With respect to the textile industry, in addition to the already existing 
factories in Adana, Mersin, Bakırköy, and Izmit; the state built two weaving factories 
in Kayseri and Nazilli, one spinning factory in Bursa, one sack factory in Tire, and an 
artificial silk factory in Gemlik. Also, a paper factory in Izmit, a glass factory in 
Paşabahçe, a canned fish factory in Paşalimanı, and an alcohol factory in Tekirdag 
were built. At the moment industrialization process continues according to the four -
year plan that was laid out in 1938. In the conclusion Yüceuluğ notes that one-third of 
the Turkish industry is located in Istanbul, 10 percent in Izmir, 18 percent in Bursa, 7 
percent in Balıkesir, and the rest are located in other cities. In general, the dependence 
of Turkey on foreign goods (especially in food and textiles) has declined with the 
establishment of all those factories.305 
 
In the same issue of the Ülkü Samet Ağaoğlu wrote another article about the 
industrialization process in Turkey. As usual, he first describes this process at some 
length. Then, he argues that since 1939 industrialization has slowed down due to the 
effects of the WWII; but it is still going on. Ağaoğlu also discusses some problems he 
detected in the industrialization process. First, he states that the criteria of being 
considered an industrial firm as defined in the law for encouragement of industry is 
too low and simple. Due to this criteria any business that has a few machines, and 
employs at least 3 workers is considered as an industrial enterprise. This, in return, 
indirectly prevents establishment of larger factories because entrepreneurs, who can 
easily benefit from the above mentioned law with their small enterprises, do not wish 
to create larger ones that will probably cost more money. Second, Ağaoğlu points out 
that the measures that have been taken to educate technical personnel is far from 
sufficient. Thus, unskilled or unspecialized people are granted authority to run 
industrial firms or outlets as there are not enough trained personnel. Third, it seems 
that decisions for factory locations were not always entirely based on economic 
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considerations and factors; other factors may have influenced the judgement of policy 
makers. And finally, Ağaoğlu claims that the government did not fully pay attention 
to the social effects of industrialization: The relationship between employers and 
employees was left unattended. The author argues that a regime that outlaws strikes 
and protests should be able to provide workers with the rights that they would 
otherwise get through strikes.306 
 
In October 1945 Halil Fikret Kanad wrote an article in which he discusses the negative 
effects of laziness and unemployment on individuals and the society as a whole. He 
argues that unemployment, laziness, and reluctance to work can be observed among 
both the poor and the rich. If a person remains unemployed for a long time he will lose 
his willingness to work, and succumb to alcoholism, vagabondism, and misery. They 
also cause their families to live in poverty. This is why most bad families are located 
in poor neighborhoods. Unemployment and laziness occur the most in cities. 
Eventually, unemployed poor people start to feel hatred towards those who have better 
lives, the society, and the state. They will not fear any authority, disregard the laws, 
and engage in criminal activities like robbery, murder, and scams. However, Kanad 
notes that laziness is not always the only cause of unemployment. Some people are 
willing to work; but they cannot find jobs. In such cases their bad behavior becomes 
inevitable, and the society have no choice but to tolerate it because for a hungry person 
morality and virtues do not mean anything. Therefore, the society should provide such 
people with their basic needs such as food and shelter. This is why so many nations 
have started to deal with such social issues. One of the primary duties of a state is to 
organize the economy accordingly, and provide those who are willing to work with 
jobs, food, and shelter.307 
 
Rich people are also lazy and reluctant to work. They usually live off the interest their 
capital generates. Despite their apparent differences, the author argues, they share 
several negative traits with the poor, unemployed, and lazy people: immorality, 
hedonism, escapism, melancholy, and bad temper. Rich, lazy, and unoccupied people 
do not have self-discipline, they only follow their desires and instincts. They do not 
have determination and willpower to complete a certain task. More than its negative 
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effects on individuals, laziness and reluctance to work also affect the society. Because 
of lazy people, who live as free riders, many other people starve and live outside in the 
cold. In this sense, laziness is not different than begging. Lazy people are, Kanad 
writes, in fact parasites, harmful to the society. Unfortunately, Turkey also has too 
many lazy people. Also, many people who actually wish to work and provide for 
themselves cannot do so because of the underdevelopment of the economy. 
Consequently, lazy people and actual unemployed people negatively affect the Turkish 
society. Kanad hopes that their numbers will decline as the economy develops 
further.308 
 
On the 22nd anniversary of the foundation of the republic Mümtaz Faik Fenik wrote an 
article about the socioeconomic policies of the state. At the beginning he refers to a 
point Atatürk once made: The greatness of a country is no longer measured by the size 
of its territory; but by the development and welfare of its people. The author points out 
that the definition of ‘hero’ has changed. A hero is no longer someone who conquers 
vast territories by his sword; he is the one who contributes to the progress and 
development of his country. Then, Fenik notes that the republican government 
continued to implement policies for development of Turkey even during the bloodshed 
and destruction of the WWII. It is true that the war hindered economic growth and 
construction of public works to a certain extent; but the state mobilized all resources 
and instruments possible to enhance the quality of citizens. The nationwide campaign 
for primary education was the first of many ensuing steps. This campaign has 
accelerated in recent years. Eventually, each village is going to have a primary school, 
and all children will learn how to read and write; and they will learn about their country 
and the world. Educators do not only disseminate knowledge in the strict sense; they 
also teach people manners and a healthy life style. Put differently, they are the 
missionaries of civilization in the remotest corners of the country.309  
 
Second, the land reform law was legislated in 1945. Fenik argues that the law in itself 
is an evidence of the fact that peasants are the true owners and masters of the nation. 
With this law the Turkish peasantry will now only work for their own welfare, not for 
some big land owners. Similarly, with the establishment of the Ministry of Labor and 
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the social insurance law, the working conditions of workers have been regulated by 
the state. Fenik notes that these are important steps taken to protect the welfare of 
workers in a country where rapid industrialization has created a large working class. 
Moreover, the state has launched a general healthcare campaign across the whole 
country. On the one hand, the state wages a war against ignorance, and on the other 
hand there is a war against microbes and diseases. 
 
Mines and forests in Turkey are now administered rationally. Copper mines in Ergani 
and Murgul are fully operational. The coal mine in Zonguldak is now in a position to 
meet national demand for coal and even export it to some degree. Fenik notes, 
however, that despite all these positive developments, the inflation, having 
skyrocketed during the WWII, still continues to affect people’s everyday lives. Yet the 
author believes that Turkey should continue to tighten its belt because nobody knows 
whether another great war will occur in the near future. Also, scarcities may cause 
some troubles in daily life; but if Turkey starts importing foreign goods, which are 
mostly unnecessary luxuries, people will probably lead a pleasant life style for 5-6 
years. However, once Turkey’s resources are depleted, Fenik points out, people will 
face even worse economic conditions. Therefore, in his conclusion Fenik advises 
people to be frugal, and suggests that Turkey should reinvest the national savings in 
industry until it actually reaches high levels of economic prosperity.310 
 
Finally, in 1945 Vedat Dicleli wrote an article on social policy and the role of the state. 
He argues that the responsibilities of a state goes far beyond providing internal and 
external security, and maintaining justice. In addition to political security, a state 
should also provide its citizens with economic welfare and social security. Each state 
should, in accordance with its national and social structure, design a social policy that 
will mitigate the historical class and professional antagonisms, protect the health of 
citizens, improve their knowledge, and raise their living standards by creating job 
opportunities.311  
 
Dicleli argues that currently the issues of Turkish social policy include: Increasing the 
productivity and efficiency of the Turkish labor force and its protection, cultura l 
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development of people, and social health policy. The issue of productivity, efficiency, 
and protection of the labor force was going to be resolved by the 1936 Labor Law; but 
due to the extraordinary circumstances of the WWII certain clauses of the law- such 
as those concerning child labor, night shifts, and weekend holidays- could not be 
enforced. The two primary concerns of the government during this period were 
national security and protection of Turkish industries. With the end of the war, the 
state resumed the implementation of its labor policy. The Ministry of Labor was 
established, and the government passed a law for compulsory social insurance against 
industrial accidents and occupational diseases, and a maternity insurance for pregnant  
women. Having created the legal and institutional structure for the social policy, 
Dicleli argues, now it is time to apply these policies.312 
 
Dicle maintains that since peasants comprise the majority of the Turkish population, 
improving their life standards is one of the primary tenets of Turkish social policy. The 
Land Reform Law of 1945 was the result of such a concern. The state ought to provide 
peasants with land and agricultural equipment. It should also support peasants by 
establishing minimum food price policy to prevent food prices from falling below a 
certain threshold. In addition to increasing the income of peasants, the government 
should also raise their life standards and increase their demand for new products; 
encourage them to abandon their primitive and frugal life styles and to adopt a modern 
life style. Cultural development of citizens is also important for Turkish social policy 
goals because it strengthens political unity, increases economic productivity, and 
promotes the health of the population.313 The third issue is a comprehensive social 
health policy. Today the aim of medicine is not only to treat individual patients, but to 
protect the whole society against diseases. Living together and sharing a common fate 
require that health policies cover all citizens. Patients with an infectious disease will 
not pose a threat only to their families, but to the society as a whole. In his conclusion 
Dicleli argues that the state should address these three social issues by establishing an 
equitable tax system.314 
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In concluding this section I would like to underline the parallels between the ideas and 
projects of the authors for economic development and the modern governmenta l 
rationality, or governmentality. We can see some traces of this modern governmenta l 
rationality, for example, in the article by Mümtaz Faik Fenik where he argues that the 
greatness of a country is no longer measured by the size of its territory; but by the 
development and welfare of its citizens. In other words, with the modern governmenta l 
rationality territory loses its primary position, and becomes one of the factors that 
modern policy makers need to take into account. Population, on the other hand, comes 
to the fore, and increasing its productive capacities becomes one of the main objectives 
of policy makers. In order to achieve this objective, modern policy makers take 
population into account in its relation to other things such as wealth, resources, means 
of subsistence, the territory with its specific qualities, climate, irrigation, customs, 
habits etc. 
 
In the articles above we can see several examples of this rationality. For example, Dr. 
Salahattin takes the Turkish population into account with its relation to the territory 
and animals, and argues that the national wealth should be increased by rendering the 
grass on the vast Anatolian pastures economically more valuable through animal 
husbandry. Similarly, Şevket Raşit Hatipoğlu notes that with the land reform 
previously landless peasants will be integrated into the national economy, lands will 
not remain uncultivated, and economic production will increase. Third, Nusret Kemal, 
with his ‘public stores’ and ‘village industries’ projects aims to integrate villages into 
the national economy, establish a strong link with production and consumption, 
increase the productivity of peasants, and replace their traditionally frugal 
consumption habits with modern ones. Also, Samet Ağaoğlu proposes to equip 
peasants with looms so that they can produce certain industrial products during winter 
when agricultural production pauses. In other words, with their ideas of village 
industries and distributing looms among peasants, republican intellectuals aimed to 
accelerate integration of peasants into the national economy. They also wished to 
utilize the spare time of peasants for cheaper industrial production. Lastly, in the 
reports written by Kemal Ünal and Ratip Yüceuluğ on the Turkish economy, we see 
that the state took various measures and implemented economic policies to facilitate 
the industrialization process, to modernize agriculture and animal husbandry, and to 
increase overall economic production by teaching ordinary people modern production 
149 
methods. In sum, the articles indicate that republican policy makers adopted the 
modern government rationality, and implemented economic policies accordingly to 
achieve economic development. 
 
4.5. The Village Question and Folk Education: Disciplining Souls and Shaping 
Tastes 
In the previous section I analyzed articles pertaining to political economy and the first 
dimension of governmentality. Now in this last part I am going to analyze 15 articles 
that relate to the second dimension of governmentality which can best be summarized 
as ‘conduct of conduct’. As I discussed earlier, this form of modern power does not 
rely on coercion, and it operates by educating desires, and configuring habits, 
aspirations, and beliefs. In this respect, I am going to demonstrate how the republican 
intellectuals and policy makers intended to transform lifestyles, personalities, beliefs, 
and ideas of the Turkish peasantry through folk education (halk terbiyesi). ‘The 
Village Question’, as the republican intellectuals defined it, was an integral, yet 
problematic part of the republican modernization project. Despite the successive 
revolutions and radical transformations in the superstructure of the country, the 
republican regime could hardly touch the everyday lives of ordinary people. In other 
words, the revolutions had not taken root in the society, and the new regime could not 
muster the support it expected from the ordinary people. For this reason, the new 
regime needed to create a modern society by transforming the traditional Anatolian 
peasantry, which constituted the majority of the population, into ‘modern Turkish 
citizens’ through folk education. 
 
This folk education project was designed by the republican policy makers to 
complement formal education because the latter only focused on children studying at 
schools, and it was progressing more slowly than expected. The policy makers, 
however, wished to see rapid results, and thus they decided to include adults in the 
process. The folk education project consisted of three main components: politica l 
education and indoctrination, practical courses to teach peasants modern production 
methods, and aesthetic education to transform the aesthetic tastes and lifestyles of 
peasants. With political education and indoctrination the republican elite aimed to gain 
popular support for the regime by teaching its principles to the ordinary people, 
showing them its benefits, and protecting them against harmful and reactionary 
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political ideologies. In addition, the policy makers also wished to give ordinary people 
a scientific and rational worldview that is free of religious dogmas and superstitions. 
Practical courses, on the other hand, were designed to integrate peasants into the 
modern economy and life by teaching them modern methods of agriculture and animal 
husbandry, as well as other subjects such as house building, hygiene, protection against 
diseases etc. Lastly, with aesthetic education the policy makers desired to inspire in 
peasants an appreciation of Western music, theater, painting, operas; and to replace 
their traditional lifestyles with a modern one. 
 
The republican intellectuals, being well aware of the fact that the total material and 
cultural transformation of the countryside was beyond the financial capacity of the 
state, conferred responsibility on village teachers and designated them as the main 
agents of the folk education project. As we shall see below, young, revolutionary, and 
idealist village teachers were expected to instruct and lead peasants, and transform 
their traditional mindsets. The other instruments of folk education included, but were 
not limited to, literacy courses, courses on agriculture and animal husbandry, 
vocational courses, conferences on various subjects315, art exhibitions, theater, 
concerts, cinema, posters, brochures, books and booklets, puppet shows etc. In 
addition, the People’s Houses constituted one of the primary pillars of this folk 
education project by offering their members a variety of courses such as music, theater, 
paiting, sculpture etc. The Houses were to create a sociocultural environment, or a 
possible field of action, in their localities in which individuals could freely choose and 
engage in any activities they enjoyed, discover their talents and interests, develop an 
appreciation for modern forms of art and aesthetics, and realize their full potential as 
individuals. In other words, the People's Houses was designed to serve as a cultura l 
space for formation of subjectivities through 'conduct of conduct'. 
 
Intellectually, the folk education project was heavily influenced by the peasantist 
movement in Turkey that was pioneered by Nusret Kemal Köymen. Advocates of the 
peasantist movement believed that a village based social reorganization could offer 
solutions to the problems caused by industrialization and urbanization. With an 
idealized image of villages and peasants in mind, the peasantists wished to reverse the 
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hierarchy between the city and the village in favor of the latter; and to establish the 
village as a primary independent socioeconomic and cultural unit. They claimed that 
as a predominantly rural country, Turkey’s development and modernization depended, 
not on the decline of, but on the development of villages. For the peasantists, education 
and cultural awakening of the peasants was the key to modernization and development 
of Turkey. In this respect, they considered folk education as a panacea for the problems 
of Turkey. In the following articles some authors define the principles and objectives 
of the peasantist movement, and they offer guidelines for folk education. On the other 
hand, the other articles focus on more specific issues such as aesthetic education, 
painting courses, music courses etc. At the end of this part I will provide a general 
overview and analysis of the articles as usual. 
 
Beginning with an article published in November 1933, Ali Galip compares the life 
conditions of the Turkish peasantry before and after the establishment of the republic. 
He starts by stating that peasants constitute three-fourths of the Turkish population. 
Right after this statement, he repeats the famous saying: “Peasants are the real owners 
of this country.”316 According to Ali Galip, peasants are the backbone of the Turkish 
economy. They not only feed themselves by producing various agricultural and animal 
products, but they also provide cities with vital resources. Moreover, they provide the 
majority of the state’s tax revenue, and they are the major source of recruits for the 
army.317 Ali Galip goes on to emphasize the industriousness and purity of the Turkish 
peasants. They work relentlessly during winter and summer in fields to earn their 
livelihood. Galip also notes that the peasants are usually ignorant, but they are also 
very well-intentioned. Unfortunately, Galip notes, before the establishment of the 
republic Turkish peasants had been exploited by several actors, who took advantage 
of their ignorance and innocence by using both legal authority and sheer violence. 
These actors include thieves, bandits, gangs, and soldiers that deserted the army and 
looted products of peasants; and tax collectors, mültezims, and creditors who charged 
exceptionally high interest rates.318  
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Galip points out that fortunately the republican regime has rescued the Turkish 
peasants from those exploiters, and provided a safer environment for them. The 
government also abolished the aşar tax, and it aims to introduce a land reform to 
provide landless peasants with land. Moreover, the government also provides them 
with cheap credit through the Bank of Agriculture. The government also makes sure 
that prices of agricultural products do not decline too much by controlling the prices, 
and subsidizes farmers. All these improvements in the lives of peasants were achieved 
by the republican regime. Ali Galip concludes that the government will continue to 
take all necessary measures to increase the agricultural production of, and hence the 
life standards of the Turkish peasantry, who are the real owners and masters of the 
country.319 In my opinion, this article summarizes the paradoxical views of the 
republican intellectuals on the Turkish peasantry. On the one hand, Ali Galip idealize s 
the peasants as the ‘real masters of this country’, and emphasizes their industriousness. 
On the other hand, however, Galip states that the peasants are ignorant and gullible. In 
this way, Galip positions the republican regime as the savior of the peasantry by 
underlining the legal reforms and measures that the government introduced to improve 
their conditions. However, Galip does not take into account how effective such reforms 
and measures were in transforming social relations in villages in practice. 
 
In July 1933 Mehmet Saffet wrote an article to define peasantism. He gives an 
idealized and romanticized picture of the Turkish peasantry by saying that despite 
having been suppressed under the despotism of the Sultanate, peasants have defended 
our country and they preserve our national character, hence they are the real owners of 
this country. Therefore, these people deserve to have higher living standards. Saving 
the peasants is the ultimate goal of peasantism, as well as being one of the fundamenta l 
steps on the way to modernization. In order to achieve this goal, Saffet argues, Turkey 
needs to compensate for the centuries-long sociocultural and economic stagnation. 
Development of villages consist of two interrelated steps: cultural development and 
economic development. The former refers to cultural advancement of ordinary people 
by way of raising their intellectual, social, aesthetic, and health levels. The latter, on 
the other hand, obviously refers to improvement of the material conditions of 
people.320 
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Then Saffet summarizes the sociocultural and economic conditions in Turkey. There 
are approximately 40,000 villages with a total population over ten million, which 
constitutes two-thirds of the entire Turkish population. Saffet notes that unfortuna te ly 
90 per cent of the peasants remain illiterate. They also live under the harmful influence 
of several religious superstitions; fatalism and scholastic mentality remains 
predominant among the peasants. Moreover, certain preachers intentionally spread 
counterrevolutionary propaganda in villages. Saffet argues that such ideas should be 
replaced by a scientific outlook that frees people from religious superstitions, and 
enables them to think independently. Yet, the author also believes in the commonsense 
and intelligence of the Turkish peasants by noting that they are usually able to know 
right from wrong. Therefore, Saffet assumes that raising the cultural level of the 
peasants, despite the counterrevolutionary propaganda of some preachers, should not 
be too difficult. Revolutionary education of ordinary people should teach them their 
great history and our role in the history of civilization, the great Turkish heroes and 
epics, the evils of the Sultanate, benefits and importance of the republican regime for 
Turkey, the difficult conditions under which the war of independence was won etc. 
The government should secure the entrenchment of the regime through promotion of 
a national consciousness among the people via speeches, writings, posters, movies, 
theater plays etc. Saffet argues that the Turkish revolution is based on the principle of 
popular sovereignty; but until peasants, who constitute the majority of the people, 
realize this point, it will not be firmly established, and will remain vulnerable to the 
dangerous influence of wrong political movements. Through this revolutionary 
education peasants will learn their national duties, and the pertaining laws.321 
 
Saffet maintains that in addition to this education about the principles of the regime, 
the peasants also need guidance in other areas. For example, the government should 
teach them how to protect themselves against diseases and proper methods of 
treatment, the importance of hygiene, and how to build their homes according to the 
basic health standards. Similarly, social recreational activities are almost non-existent 
in villages, and aesthetic sentiments of the peasants remain uneducated. Most peasants 
spend their time idly in coffee houses. Instead, they could spend their time improving 
the infrastructure of their houses. Saffet believes that in essence Turkish peasants are 
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not lazy; but they need guidance (irşat). Turks have almost forgotten recreational 
activities due to religious influences. A life without such activities and some fun 
becomes dull and colorless, people would have no desire to work. Therefore, Saffet 
argues that the government should revive the traditional Turkish recreational activit ies 
such as javelin throwing, wrestling, dances, and races in villages.322 
 
Then the author goes on to describe the economic conditions in Turkey. He notes that 
Turkey has been going through an industrialization process. In his opinion, Turkey 
must industrialize; but not at the expense of agriculture. In contrast, Saffet argues that 
both sectors should go hand in hand, and agricultural production in Turkey should be 
increased. For this goal the government should educate peasants about the modern 
methods of agriculture such as vaccination of trees, seed improvement methods, 
measures against pest insects, milking, beekeeping, and animal husbandry. Saffet has 
no doubt that if peasants learn these methods agricultural production of Turkey would 
increase by tenfold. He also suggests that agricultural cooperatives can both teach 
peasants these methods in practice, and protect them against exploitative brokers.323 
 
The main agent that Saffet envisages for all these socio-economic and cultura l 
transformations is, of course, the skilled and idealist village teacher. According to him, 
as the most intellectual persons in villages, and given their constant presence there, 
village teachers have the responsibility to instruct and lead peasants. Therefore, Saffet 
argues that training village teachers is one of the most crucial issues. He suggests that 
initially the government can train talented middle school graduates and send them to 
villages as teachers. In the long run, however, teachers need to be trained at village 
teachers’ training schools. Students who enroll at these schools should know that they 
will be serving in villages as teachers for the rest of their lives. Then, Saffet describes 
a curriculum program for such teachers’ training schools, and argues that education of 
prospective village teachers should be based on the following subjects, ideas, and 
principles:  
 
1) Village teachers should learn the causes of our national calamities in the past (such 
as bad administration, autocracy, religious superstitions, hostility towards science; 
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teachers should also learn the contrast between the scholastic worldview and the 
scientific world view). 
2) They should learn why folk education is important for republican regimes, and the 
crucial role they will play in Turkey’s development as teachers; and that raising 
the economic and cultural levels of people actually leads to development of the 
entire nation; the characteristics of the Turkish regime, and what it means to be a 
good citizen. 
3) Teachers should be presented with the methods and achievements of Germans as 
a successful example of folk education. 
4) The program needs to be based on practice, and village teachers will practice 
leadership in villages. 
5) Teachers will learn our national epics, folklore, great examples of Turkish 
literature and poems; they will also learn about Turkish history, the great 
civilizations our nation has created, and our place in the world history. 
6) The program will take advantage of music, national theater plays and cinema. 
7) The program will teach prospective teachers that the true happiness in life cannot 
be attained through money or material pleasures; it lies in nothing but serving the 
society. 
8) Teachers should also learn the principles of national idealism represented by Kant, 
Fichte, and Hegel in the 19th century. 
 
Teachers will also learn, via practice in fields and shops, methods of vaccination, seed 
improvement, increasing agricultural productivity and conserving crops, house 
building; and how to establish and run trade cooperatives etc. Saffet argues that the 
government should select prospective village teachers among the village youth aged 
between 15 and 18; and the graduates will be sent back to their own villages to work 
as teachers. He concludes by saying that instructors of the village teachers’ schools 
should be idealist and revolutionary.324 In my opinion, Saffet’s article represents the 
expectations of the republican elite from village teachers. Saffet designates village 
teachers as the primary agents of social, cultural, and economic transformation of 
Anatolian villages and the peasantry. In fact, his proposition to open training schools 
for village teachers, along with other similar propositions, may have inspired the 
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establishment of the Village Institutes in 1940. However, it should also be noted that 
their expectations from village teachers were naïve and too idealist because it was too 
difficult, if not impossible, for a village teacher alone to carry out the total 
transformation and modernization of a village and its inhabitants. Therefore, it appears 
that, in the face of economic challenges and limits, the republican intellectuals opted 
for a seemingly easy, voluntarist, and idealist solution by conferring all responsibility 
to 'idealist' and 'enthusiastic' village teachers. 
 
In June 1933 Nusret Kemal published an article called “Köy Seferberliğine Doğru”. In 
this article he establishes the goals and principles of peasantist studies, and 
problematizes villages as a national issue that needs to be taken care of. He states that 
only three thousand villages, among the 40,000 Turkish villages, have schools, post 
offices, and stores. Eleven million people live in villages, and only two per cent of 
them are literate. Even the vocabulary of the most intelligent peasants does not 
probably exceed 500 words. Since the social and spiritual level of the country is so 
low, the economic level remains low as well.325  However, he also suggests that 
naturally Turkey is in a very good position: it has the best climate in the world, and it 
has abundant amounts of natural resources. Therefore, Nusret believes that if they can 
educate people, teach them the ways of modern economy, and raise their cultural level, 
they will be able to rapidly modernize Turkey. For this purpose Kemal proposes a six 
step plan: 
 
1) To increase the income of peasants, and to teach them their role in the nationa l 
economy. 
2) To raise the social level of peasants (morality, community life, cooperation, ideals, 
the joy of working, good habits, and recreation etc.) 
3) To raise peasants as citizens who understand the regime and their duties, and 
perform them. 
4) To raise peasants as people free from religious superstitions, with a scientific 
outlook, large-minded, and mature persons. 
5) To raise peasants as Turks who possess the spiritual traits of their race, and loyal 
to the Turkish traditions. 
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6) To improve the physical and spiritual traits of peasants through selective mating 
(evlilikte ıstıfa) and physical discipline/training.326 
 
Later Kemal argues that at the moment the state cannot afford physical transformation 
of all the Turkish villages due to lack of financial resources. Therefore, the state should 
selectively invest in those regions, such as coastal regions in the Western and Southern 
Anatolia, which can develop more easily. Moreover, due to the lack of financ ia l 
resources to transform material conditions in villages, education of peasants becomes 
even more crucial. The state should carefully pick talented and intelligent children 
from villages, and invest in their education. The state also should encourage young 
people to attend schools by incentives for them such as tax reduction and shorter 
periods of military service. Kemal strongly argues that discovering young talents is 
highly crucial because so many talented and intelligent young people, who can do great 
services to their country, waste their time and energy in the spiritual aridity of their 
villages.327 Teachers can play a crucial role in this mission and they are expected to 
make sacrifices for this cause. Then, Kemal also gives a long list of other possible 
instruments for folk education: Newspapers published for villages, posters, 
gramophone, radio, mobile cinemas, theaters, and libraries; bookshelves for each 
village, mobile courses on various topics (agriculture, domestic economy, house 
building, health, history, economy etc.), competitive sports games, entertainment 
activities, puppet shows, conferences, travelling midwives, doctors, and dentists; 
public stores, trips between villages and cities to strengthen the relationship between 
the two etc. Kemal concludes by inviting all intellectuals, teachers, and literate people 
to respond to the survey on villages published in the same issue of the Ülkü.328 
 
Nusret Kemal penned another article in October 1934 to discuss the philosophica l 
tenets of peasantism. First of all, he argues that, as the earliest and most natural form 
of social organization- in fact, as old as the family- the village predates the huge 
metropolitan cities of today. On the other hand, modern cities, which rely on villages 
for food and other raw materials, only date back to 100 years or so. Kemal states that 
originally cities grew out of unification of villages, and they actually exist to provide 
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villages with administrative, economic, and other services. Kemal maintains that, in 
that sense, there are no contradictions between villages and cities. In today’s world, 
however, cities are considered more important than villages, and they exercise various 
powers over the countryside. Cities dominate cultural, administrative, and economic 
instruments at the expense of villages, and use these instruments to exploit them. 
Moreover, the materialist and determinist worldview predominant in cities predict that 
villages will disappear as a result of mechanization and rationalization of 
agriculture.329 
 
However, Nusret Kemal points out that urbanization also comes with several negative 
effects. Due to growing urbanization, industrialization, and ever detailed division of 
labor ordinary people in cities will lose their autonomy and become only a cog in the 
machine as these processes lead to a huge bureaucracy, technocracy, and hierarchy. 
Moreover, the recent Great Depression and drought have deeply shaken the 
metropoles, and created a longing for villages and the scent of soil among their 
inhabitants. In cities the majority of ordinary people have no economic security, and 
urban areas are plagued with high risk of unemployment and even starvation, higher 
crime rates and more vices due to the uncontrollability of the crowded and intricate 
urban populations. Other negative effects of urbanization include weaker family 
bonds, noise, and air pollution. City dwellers usually complain about all these 
conditions, and according to Köymen, they will never be fully independent and honest 
democratic citizens because they depend on economic and social relations in cities. 
Class antagonisms in cities lead to conflicts, and hence weaken social solidarity. 
Lastly, costs and maintenance of city infrastructure, such as roads, waterworks, phone, 
electricity, and transportation; increases expenses and tax rates, which makes living in 
cities highly expensive compared to living in villages.330 
 
Nevertheless, despite all these problems of urbanization, Kemal does not suggest to 
abandon cities all together. He rather argues that the village, not the city, should 
become the starting and reference point in all policy making processes. In other words, 
Kemal proposes to reverse the hierarchy between the city and the village in favor of 
the latter. According to the peasantist outlook, the village is a blueprint of a society. It 
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should not be considered of secondary importance, or as a source of raw materials; it 
should rather be taken as a primary and self-sufficient socioeconomic unit that 
produces the most vital materials such as food, and trades its surplus with neighboring 
villages to obtain other materials it requires to reach a higher cultural level. Kemal 
claims that natural, social, and economic calamities cannot shake villages.  In this 
idealized village of peasantism everybody owns their own land and houses, and enjoy 
full economic independence; it can take care of its cultural, social, economic, 
administrative, and civic matters on its own without any assistance from the state. It 
only requires state assistance for building roads and railroads, security, administrat ion, 
healthcare, education, and national defense. In exchange for these services, peasants 
pay taxes, and male peasants serve in the military.331 
 
According to Nusret Kemal, one of the reasons of Japan’s economic success lies in its 
reliance on village industries. Village industries derive their biggest advantage from 
the fact that they do no employ ‘workers’ in the urban sense. Since all members of a 
peasant family work in their spare time, there will be no extra expenses for food or 
accommodation; and there will neither be bosses nor workers. Kemal also points out 
that village industries does not necessarily produce handmade products; industr ia l 
machines can be transported to villages. He also notes that in such a system urban 
industries should adapt their production to the products and raw materials of the nearby 
villages so that both can work harmoniously. Kemal also replies to two possible 
criticisms against the peasantist worldview. First, some critiques may argue that a 
village based agriculture would diminish food production and lead to scarcity and 
hunger. To that criticism Nusret responds by reminding that in the past small farming 
was usually able to feed the entire world, and it can no doubt continue to do so. Second, 
other critiques may argue that the deep rooted conservatism of peasants may slow 
down or maybe even prevent economic development and technological adaptation. For 
Kemal, conservatism in itself is not necessarily bad; in fact conservatism and 
commonsense of the peasants may preserve national culture and traditions, and 
compensate for the impulsiveness and frivolity of cities. Thus, the author believes that 
if peasants get rid of ignorance and bigotry, conservatism itself would not lead to any 
negative outcomes.  In concluding, Nusret maintains that the primary goal of 
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peasantism is to form economically self-sufficient and independent peasant families. 
Such families will be able to resist attempts of economic exploitation by the local rich, 
and they will be able to cast their votes freely as free citizens would do. Existence of 
such self-sufficient and independent families is a precondition of for the establishment 
of a true democratic system in a country. 
 
In another article published in September 1933, Nusret Kemal discusses a peasantist 
project. In the beginning he points out that even in the industrialized countries there is 
a movement ‘towards the village’. These countries have realized that, in order to 
achieve social, economic, and political stability, they need a peasant class that is 
economically self-sufficient and capable of feeding the whole country. In this sense, 
as many foreign observers note, Turkey stands in a quite favorable position: The 
exploitative urbanization has not taken roots in Turkey, the majority of its population 
work in production and service sectors, and there is no huge imbalance between 
production and consumption. Moreover, the peasantry has been improving cultura lly, 
and its growing needs and demands for various products creates great opportunit ies 
for Turkish industries. Furthermore, a newly carried out revolution has removed all 
barriers for progress, and the government, with all its powers, seeks to raise the 
material (civilizational) and cultural levels of Turkey. Yet, Nusret also admits that, 
despite its great achievements in the first decade, the republican regime has a great 
deal of work to do because it inherited Turkey from the ancient regime in ruins.332 
 
Then Kemal makes a distinction between civilization and culture, and argues that 
material and spiritual lives of people needs to improve simultaneously. Civiliza t ion 
refers to the material and technological basis of modern life, whereas culture refers to 
national characteristics and culture of a nation. According to Kemal, raising the 
civilizational level of Turkey includes building schools, post offices, dispensaries, 
kindergartens, shops, better houses in villages; improving the general health conditions 
of the peasants, connecting villages to the center with roads; increasing productivity 
by adopting modern techniques, forming production and consumption cooperatives, 
equipping every village with one radio, sending books and newspapers as well as 
travelling theater groups and cinemas to villages. For these goals, Kemal proposes two 
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interrelated and complimentary projects: public stores and training village leaders (köy 
rehberleri). He argues that village leaders will educate peasants through public stores 
in villages, and teach them techniques of modern economy, how to maintain hygiene 
and protect their health. Adjacent to public stores there will be a library, a classroom 
for lectures and meetings, and a gymnastic room. In general, village leaders will teach 
people to become conscious citizens who are beneficial to their community, society, 
and country. Village leaders will also work for the improvement of the Turkish race 
by making sure that healthy and smart people marry each other, and that physically or 
mentally unhealthy people refrain from marriage. In this way, Kemal believes, village 
leaders will raise both the economic and cultural levels of the peasants at the same 
time. However, Kemal also admits that, at the moment, it is materially impossible to 
build 40,000 public stores and raise that many village leaders in Turkey.333 
 
Then Nusret Kemal focuses on the question of training village leaders. He argues that 
initially it would be better to establish a training school in Istanbul, and to send  
graduate village leaders to nearby coastal villages. The subjects prospective village 
leaders should study at training schools include: sciences, health protection with basic 
medical knowledge, methods for improving the race, philosophy of civilizat ion, 
general and Turkish geography, world history, Turkish history (ancient Turkish 
civilizations and the history of the republic), folk literature, biographies of great men, 
village economy and public stores, accounting, psychology and pedagogy, history of 
religion and morality, sociology, secular ethics, philosophy of state (comparison of the 
Turkish popular democracy to other regimes such as fascism, communism, racism, 
constitutional monarchy, and federal democracy), principles of the Turkish regime and 
why it is the best system for Turkey, principles of village education and examples from 
the practices of other countries, the village law and the other related laws, practical 
courses such as village architecture and house designing, painting, masonry, pottery, 
carpentry, ironworking, repairing machines, weaving, tailoring, cooking and nutrit ion, 
vegetable and fruit growing, beekeeping, poultry husbandry, dairying, fishing, sailing, 
horseback riding, sports such as boxing, wrestling, marksmanship etc.334 
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Kemal also suggests some measures to make village leadership attractive to young 
people such as a good salary, social rights and benefits, opportunities for higher 
education in foreign countries for successful teachers, free transportation and tickets 
for theaters and movies, a certain discount for products produced by public factories, 
and a share of the public store in the village. At the end of the article Kemal touches 
upon the issue of financing these projects. He admits that they require a lot of money 
to initiate and maintain. He argues that, to a certain extent, the İş Bank and the 
Agricultural Bank may fund these projects. The rest can be financed from the state 
treasury. Once established, however, public stores can finance themselves if given 
certain revenue sources such as a monopoly over book, newspaper, gramophone, 
records, radio, stamp, and movie sales. Yet, they will initially require financial support 
from the state. Lastly, Kemal suggests to establish an association of folk education and 
public stores to coordinate and oversee these projects.335 
 
In July 1933 Hilmi A. Malik penned an article about village schools. He argues that 
the awakening of the peasants depends on the schools that the republican regime will 
open in villages, and also on a curriculum carefully prepared by knowledgeable and 
experienced persons. The goals of this education program include elimination of 
ignorance, superstitions, poverty, and diseases in villages; increasing capabilities of 
the peasants and productivity of land; and in this way increasing the welfare of the 
peasantry and the entire nation. The fact that approximately 10.5 million people in 
Turkey subsist on agriculture reveals the importance of agricultural sector both for the 
Turkish economy and society. The author states that at the moment it is not possible 
to build a school in every village because the state neither has the financial resources 
nor sufficient number of teachers. Thus, the ministry of education plans to build 
boarding schools in the middle of juxtaposed villages; but the majority of the villages 
in Turkey are widely dispersed. Malik believes that if well-to-do peasants share the 
construction expenses of schools, peasants may become more interested in schools. He 
also points out that the three-year schools are inefficient, and do not produce the 
desired results because most peasant children attend to school only for two years, after 
which their parents force them to work in fields. Thus, Malik argues that the 
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government should increase the period of study to four years, and peasant children 
should start school at an earlier age, six or maybe even five.336 
 
According to Malik, the first and most important step in this project is training village 
teachers, and preparing a good curriculum for village schools. These schools are 
expected to teach peasants new methods of agriculture, improving livestock, various 
hand crafts, importance of creating a national agriculture, precautions to take against 
animal diseases, planting and taking care of trees, and importance of solidarity and 
cooperation among peasants. Likewise, village schools have a responsibility to protect 
health of peasants, teaching them how to maintain personal and public hygiene, and 
precautions against diseases and epidemics. The author also notes that when put into 
practice this ideal program may be slightly revised to meet the specific needs of a 
region, and characteristics of each village should also be taken into account. In this 
way, Malik concludes, village schools will certainly increase productivity and welfare 
of villages.337 
 
In March 1933 Fazıl Ahmet wrote an article about aesthetic education. The author 
starts with two definitions of the word ‘terbiye’ (education/discipline). First, it refers 
to those activities that aim to make people the most beneficial both for themselves and 
the society. Second, it can also be defined as an activity to develop physical, 
intellectual, and moral capabilities of people to the fullest extent possible. 338 
According to the author, terbiye works through two mechanisms: First automation of 
behavior of individuals; and second replacing instinctive reactions of people with 
acquired behavior. Ahmet argues that aesthetic education is a necessity in the modern 
world, and it may play a great role in ‘terbiye’. Aesthetic education may have two 
different effects, one positive and one negative. First, engagement in fine arts can lead 
one to temporarily forget his daily struggles, difficulties, and miseries; and hence 
people can dedicate themselves to a greater cause. Aesthetic education also fosters 
humility, generosity, and altruism. On the other hand, an excessive engagement in fine 
arts may result in alienation and loss of touch with reality and real life. Therefore, 
Ahmet argues, aesthetic education should go hand in hand with science and moral 
                                                                 
336 Hilmi A. Malik, “Köyde Mektep, in Ülkü July 1933, pp.481-482. 
337 Ibid., pp.483-484. 
338 Fazıl Ahmet, “Bedii Terbiye”, in Ülkü March 1933, p.128. 
164 
education. An unsupervised aesthetic education may improve aesthetic skills at the 
expense of other vital skills. In his conclusion, Ahmet notes that family, schools, 
buildings, streets, towns, and cities we inhabit; cinema, theater, fine art museums, and 
even nature itself can be great instruments for aesthetic education. We should teach 
children that simplicity, rather than pretension, has more aesthetic value.339 
 
In the same issue of the Ülkü Hamit Zübeyr penned an article to discuss instruments 
of folk education. In the beginning he states that Anatolian villages, which now appear 
so quiet, have witnessed so many calamities and storms such as long and recurring 
wars, epidemics, drought, anarchy, and neglect. Thus, village graveyards are larger 
than the actual village in many parts of Anatolia. However, Turkey needs tens of 
thousands flourishing villages with millions of happy citizens living in prosperity. 
Zübeyr believes that the only way to achieve this goal lies in folk education, which he 
defines as the activity of fusing various groups of people living in Turkey with 
different dialects and religions into one social body and nation, and educating their 
spirits by shaping ideas, senses, and desires of individuals according to the national 
ideal. Schools alone cannot achieve these goals. Folk education does not only consist 
of educating people about certain academic subjects; rather its primary goal is to incite 
in people a permanent desire for progress, self-development, and improvement. 
According to Zübeyr, instruments of such a folk education include: books, speech, 
visual images, music, movies, and radio.340 
 
First, books are a great source of knowledge that one can study at any time or place 
without relying on an instructor or mentor. However, ordinary people in Turkey may 
still need guidance to find appropriate and useful books to read. Second, Zübeyr points 
out that speech may be more effective than writing for it is more passionate and vivid. 
Since the majority of people in Turkey still remain illiterate, speeches and conferences 
will continue to be one of the primary instruments of propagating ideas. Third, visual 
images are more realistic and solid compared to speeches. Drawings, lines, colors, and 
perspectives give viewers a sense of reality, and they make abstract ideas more 
concrete. Thanks to visual images, ordinary people can understand the essence of an 
issue more easily than learning it from a book. Therefore, Zübeyr argues that instead 
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of waiting for millions of people to learn how to read, we should take advantage of 
visual images for education. Let us say, we wish to launch a campaign against 
tuberculosis or alcoholism; or teach people how to build a house, or how to increase 
economic production. By printing large posters and pictures, and distributing them 
around the country the government can educate people about these issues.341 
 
Music, on the other hand, leads to emotional development, and gives pleasure to 
listeners; thus it can help incite nationalist feelings among people. In Turkey, 
according to the author, the government needs to improve ordinary people’s music 
taste slowly, beginning with musical pieces that they can understand and enjoy. 
Singing in chorus is highly important because it does not only improve music culture 
of people, but it also promotes collectivism by making people follow commands of a 
leader, and uniting people around a common cause.342 As for cinema, Zübeyr suggests 
that it makes it possible to educate a large group of people. Movies enable governments 
to teach people various subjects (how-to-dos), and show them various parts of the 
world. Thus, the state should sponsor building of movie libraries in classrooms in the 
future.343  
 
Lastly, Zübeyr argues that the radio may have a huge effect in the cultural sphere, 
similar to that of the printing press. In fact, radio can function as a university for 
ordinary people. With the radio it becomes possible to learn about world news sooner 
than reading them in newspapers. It also enables statesmen, professors, and artists to 
reach to large numbers of people all at once. Isolated and inward-oriented villages and 
towns can take huge advantage of the radio to learn about the world; it can broaden 
their horizon. For example, farmers can increase their productivity and protect their 
products from bad weather by listening to weather forecasts on radio. Zübeyr argues 
that the government needs to take two crucial measures to take full advantage of the 
radio in folk education. First, it needs to make radios available and affordable for 
peasants. Second, the government should also create a special radio station for peasants 
because they neither enjoy nor listen to those programs and music created for city 
dwellers and upper classes. Such a special radio station for peasants should entirely 
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focus on their needs, tastes, and life styles. The author admits that at this point it is not 
possible for everyone to own their own radios; but the People’s Houses and other 
institutions should make their radios available to ordinary people. Zübeyr concludes 
his article by stating that it requires a great deal of effort and hard work to shape souls 
of peasants, improve their bodies, increase their income, incite patriotic feelings in 
them, and to convince them that the government works for their benefit. (Emphasis 
added) Thus the government should employ the above mentioned instruments of adult 
education to facilitate this process.344 
 
In August 1933 Nusret Kemal wrote an article about folk/adult education. Referring 
to the Great Depression, he argues that the world has been going through another huge 
crisis and turmoil. However, Kemal believes that periods of crisis can also present 
opportunities for social reorganization and renewal. Kemal maintains that education, 
and especially adult education, is the best remedy for the current troubles of the 
humanity. Education, in general, has as its main goal to induce minds to think 
systematically. Adult education, on the other hand, refers to all educational activit ies 
that aim to teach people, who are physiologically and psychologically mature, how to 
think systematically on their own, and how to deal with various situations they may 
face in life. Adult education should always take into consideration the specific 
characteristics and culture of a country. According to Kemal, adult education in Turkey 
should have two main objectives: First, teaching people ordinary people the princip les 
of the republican regime so that they will deeply realize the importance of the Turkish 
revolution, and support it wholeheartedly. Kemal notes that survival of a regime relies 
on the popular support it receives. Second, adult education should increase the income 
and living standards of the people. In his conclusion, Kemal reiterates that the holiest 
mission of adult education in Turkey is to teach Turkish people their national identity 
and culture so that they will cooperate with each other, and work harmoniously for the 
development of Turkey.345 
 
Osman Halit wrote an article about folk education in November 1933. In the article he 
makes a distinction between a people and a nation. The former simply refers to all 
people living in a country. Halit argues that once these people unite with each other 
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and reach to a cultural harmony, we call them a nation. The primary goal of folk 
education is to transform such masses into a nation. In general, folk education refers 
to improvement of every Turkish citizen in terms of culture, knowledge, economy, 
morality, and politics. More specifically, it refers to the activity of equipping all male 
and female citizens above school age with reading ability and other necessary skills 
and know-how they need to learn to be successful in business and life. According to 
the author, during the Ottoman period people were reduced to a position of subjects 
who paid taxes and served in the military under the control of the palace and 
madrassas. Transforming these people into conscious republican citizens is one of the 
primary goals of the Turkish revolution and democracy. Instead of people who pray 
for rain in times of drought; Halit argues, we wish to see people, believing in science 
and nature with a willingness to control it, who would bring water into their village 
through irrigation channels from distant locations. Currently, only 8 % of the whole 
population can read, the rest remains illiterate. The alphabet reform of 1928 was a 
great step forward; but there remains a lot of work to do. In his conclusion, Halit argues 
that the state should mobilize all its resources and institutions to resolve this issue.346 
 
In the same issue Ülkü published the inaugural speech of Kazım Pasha, the governor 
of Izmir, at the opening ceremony of the agricultural course for village teachers. Kazım 
Pasha states that such courses will beneficial for Turkish economy. Having learned 
modern methods of agriculture and animal husbandry, village teachers will educate 
children in villages and their fathers as well. In this way, peasants will learn how to 
increase their agricultural production, to protect their crops against pest insects, and to 
improve seeds and animals. Currently, the majority of the peasants in Turkey do not 
know modern agricultural techniques; they remain unaware of animal diseases and 
pest insects to the extent that when their animals die from simple diseases they believe 
that it was the will of God. Kazım Pasha notes that teachers will also teach peasants 
methods of beekeeping, poultry husbandry, fruit growing, and rabbit raising. The 
government also establishes centers for improving animals (horses, donkeys, cows 
etc.) which will serve peasants. In his conclusion, Kazım Pasha congratulates village 
teachers, underlines the important role they will play in Turkey’s development, and 
encourages them to work harder.347 
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In January 1934 painter Ali Sami wrote an article about painting lessons in village 
schools. He states that in the past teachers used wrong teaching methods that alienated 
children from school. Today, they apply more constructive methods so that children 
will start to like school. Sami argues that painting lessons are one of the primary 
instruments that will lead first graders to like school. Unfortunately, due to bigotry and 
neglect, peasants in Turkey do not know much about, and thus not appreciate paintings. 
Villagers could hardly see any paintings or photographs in the past. Now, the author 
contends, the best way to incite an interest among peasants for painting is to place 
importance to painting lessons in village schools, and to open painting museums in 
cities and towns. Ali Sami believes that, despite their lack of knowledge of, and interest 
in painting; there may be many potentially talented painters among peasants waiting 
to be discovered. Therefore, in village schools teachers should first present various 
pictures and paintings to children so that children will start to like and enjoy painting. 
These classes should not bore students; they should be fun and organized as a game. 
Then, students may start to draw simple figures that they can understand and draw 
easily. Teachers should not expect too much from such novice drawings. Yet, they 
should still look for exceptional talents. In case they find talented students, teachers 
should encourage them to continue drawing and painting. Teacher can also teach 
students to make simple sculptures with clay.348 
 
In May 1934 Halil Bedi penned article about the relationship between folk education 
and opera. He argues that opera is the most expensive; but also the most influentia l 
instrument of folk education as it combines several forms of art such as drama, 
literature, music, and dance. Therefore, opera can be useful for familiarizing ordinary 
people with all these art forms; it can play a great role especially in introduc ing 
Western music to the Turkish people. Opera will change people’s taste and 
understanding of music. However, the author also argues that opera in Turkey has to 
have a national character, at least initially. Translations or adaptations of Western 
operas at this point may be counterproductive because ordinary people cannot yet 
appreciate them. Turkish people are still accustomed to traditional Turkish music, and 
they will not like Western music. Therefore, Turkey should produce its own national 
operas with national rhythms and music to slowly familiarize people with opera. 
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People at this point cannot appreciate works of Wagner or Beethoven. Turkish operas 
should derive their stories and scenarios from Turkish history, mythology, and life. 
The state should order composers to write such operas. Soon, a theater academy will 
open in Turkey, and it will have its first graduates in 3 years. Until then Turkey should 
create a national opera repertoire that can be immediately performed when we have 
graduates from the academy.349  
 
In September 1935 Münir Hayri wrote a short article about puppet shows and their 
value for folk education. He notes that in the 20th century propaganda has gained even 
more importance, and nations all around the world have established ministries of 
propaganda. As an instrument of propaganda puppet shows have three advantages. 
First, organizing puppet shows does not require much money or many personnel; but 
shows can reach to a great number of people. Second, puppet shows enables one to 
introduce various topics, from the simplest to the most complex ones, in such a way 
that anyone can easily understand them. Third, puppet shows are beneficial for the 
artistic development of children. Countries like Germany and France have already 
deployed puppet shows an instrument of child education. Münir Hayri believes that, 
with some effort and reorganization, the puppet show tradition in Turkey can be 
revived and used for folk education. He suggests to begin with repairing an old and 
deteriorating puppet theater building in Istanbul so that the nearby People’s Houses 
can start to organize puppet shows there.350 
 
Finally, in March 1939 M.R. Kösemihal wrote an article about the music activities in 
the People’s Houses, and some measures that the Houses should take to promote music 
successfully in their localities. The author argues that, in order to be successful in this 
area, the Houses require financial resources, expertise, a good program, and 
centralized administration and supervision. First of all, the central administration of 
the Houses should agree, in principle, to allocate 60 % of their fine arts budgets solely 
for music because it is an expensive activity. Second, if the Houses only rely on local 
and amateur musicians in their music activities, there will probably arise a great 
difference in quality between, let us say, a musical piece produced by the Izmir House, 
and that of the Diyarbakır House. Therefore, Kösemihal maintains that at least the 
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Houses located in big cities should hire expert musicians to be able to maintain a 
certain musical standard. These musicians should also be able to teach when necessary. 
Third, Kösemihal believes that so far musical pieces produced by the People’s Houses, 
with the exceptions of Istanbul and Ankara Houses, have rarely, if any, surpassed the 
level of an amateur show in quality. Yet, the author contends that the primary goal of 
the Houses is not to organize amateur music shows, but to serve as a preliminary 
conservatory to teach children classical music at a basic level, and give them a proper 
ear training. In other words, the Houses should incite a love of classical music in 
children. Fourth, the Houses should also collect folk songs in their locality, and create 
compilations. In the conclusion, Kösemihal restates the responsibility of the Houses to 
spread high quality music (classical music) around the country.351 
 
In concluding this section, I would like to restate my argument that republican policy 
makers and intellectuals aimed to transform the Anatolian peasants into modern 
Turkish citizens through conduct of conduct; by educating their desires and 
configuring their habits, aspirations, and beliefs. Through their folk education project 
policy makers sought to reconfigure habits, beliefs, and tastes of ordinary people. Here, 
it bears repeating that the folk education project to transform the countryside extended 
beyond mere ideological indoctrination. Rather, republican policy makers and 
intellectuals wished to make ordinary people, the majority of whom were peasants, 
adopt new behaviors, habits, and tastes through aesthetic education.  
 
In order to substantiate this claim I have examined ideas of the policy makers about 
folk education. For instance, Hamit Zübeyr’s definition of folk education provide some 
evidence to support this argument. Zübeyr defines folk education as the activity of 
fusing different groups of people into one social body and nation by shaping ideas, 
senses, and desires of individuals according to the national ideals. He also states that 
the primary goal of folk education is to incite in people a permanent desire for progress, 
self-development, and improvement. For this purpose, he suggests that the government 
should use several instruments of folk education such as books, speeches, visual 
images, music, movies, and radio. Similarly, Fazıl Ahmet’s definition of ‘terbiye’ is 
worthy of note. He defines ‘terbiye’ as an activity to develop physical, intellectual, and 
                                                                 
351 M.R. Kösemihal, “Halkevleri’nde Musiki”, in Ülkü March 1939, pp.67-70. 
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moral capabilities of people to the fullest extent possible. In my opinion, few other 
sentences could summarize the objectives of modern governmental rationality so well. 
Ahmet also argues that aesthetic education should be deployed as an instrument of 
‘terbiye’.  
 
In my opinion, these articles indicate that the republican policy makers and 
intellectuals wished to deploy folk education as an instrument to transform the 
lifestyles, beliefs, habits, and tastes of ordinary people in Turkey. Therefore, it can be 
argued that whereas the authors in the first section of this chapter aimed to discipline 
bodies of individuals through physical education, the authors in this section were 
concerned with disciplining their souls and shaping their tastes through conduct of 
conduct. In other words, as a whole, the republican elite, as the founders of a modern 
nation state who adopted modern governmental rationality, wished to shape bodies, 
souls, and minds of ordinary people through ‘disciplinary power’, ‘biopower’, and 
‘governmentality’. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
In this study I have analyzed writings and speeches of leading republican intellectua ls 
and policy makers in the Ülkü magazine through a Foucauldian perspective. My main 
argument is that as rulers of a newly established modern nation state who adopted 
modern governmental rationality, the republican elite intended to transform and shape 
the Turkish population by utilizing the three technologies of modern power 
(disciplinary power, biopower, and governmentality). The People’s Houses, along 
with other education institutions such as the ministry of education and the Village 
Institutes, were designed by the republican elite as a socio-cultural venue where these 
technologies of modern power would jointly operate upon the local population. In 
order to support my argument I zeroed in on their writings in the Ülkü magazine, and 
examined their ideas, intentions, and policy designs about physical education, the issue 
of population, political economy, and folk education.  
 
The articles about physical education demonstrate that the republican policy makers 
and intellectuals were quite preoccupied with physical education of the Turkish 
population. They aimed to create a national sports culture in which ordinary people 
would voluntarily engage in sports like gymnastics and adopt physical exercise as a 
part of their daily routine. In their writings policy makers and intellectuals held the 
People’s Houses responsible for spreading this culture among ordinary people. The 
sports branches of the Houses were responsible for promoting sports like gymnast ics, 
swimming, wrestling, javeling throwing etc. Moreover, some Ülkü authors advised the 
People’s Houses to cooperate with institutions like the General Directorate of Pyhsical 
Education and the Ministry of Education for promoting sports in Turkey. This task of 
the Houses to promote a sports culture in their region indicates that the People’s 
Houses were designed by the republican elite as the local implementer of disciplinary 
power. 
 
The articles about the issue of population indicate that the republican policy makers 
and intellectuals took the issue of population quite seriously and they strived for 
growing the Turkish population and making it stronger. In their writings the Ülkü 
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authors identified the factors that hindered population growth in Turkey, such as 
epidemics, high infant mortality rates, lack of sanitation and proper healthcare etc. The 
authors also made various suggestions to make the Turkish population healthier. They 
urged the government to launch campaigns against epidemics and bad habits, to build 
hospitals around the country, to take special care of mothers and their babies after 
birth, to vaccinate school children etc. The People’s Houses were tasked with 
educating ordinary people about the hygiene and healthcare, to have the sick people in 
villages examined during village excursions and provide them with medicine, to 
provide social assistance to the poor etc. In addition, the Houses were expected to 
cooperate with the Ministry of Health and assist the ministry in its operations. All these 
activities and responsibilities indicate that the People’s Houses were designed as a 
local implementer of the bio-political policies of the government. 
 
The articles about political economy form the third category. In these articles the Ülkü 
authors focused on issues such as industrialization vs. agricultural economy, 
urbanization vs. countryside, how to increase economic production in Turkey, how to 
integrate peasants into the newly emerging national economy, how to make them more 
productive and efficient, how to alter their consumption habits etc. The authors 
presented various ideas and plans to make the Turkish economy and labor force more 
productive. The role of the People’s Houses was to offer courses to ordinary people on 
various subjects such as how to read and write, modern farming methods, animal 
husbandry, gardening, how to install, use, and repair machines; handcrafts, accounting, 
foreign languages etc. The goal of these courses was to integrate ordinary people into 
modern economy and to equip them with the necessary skills and know-how that the 
modern economy requires. In this way, the productivity and efficiency of the Turkish 
labor force would increase. All these policies indicate that the republican elite adopted 
governmentality, which takes a population into account in terms of its economic 
productivity and use of natural resources. 
 
The last category consists of articles about folk education. In those articles the authors 
aimed to transform the traditional Anatolian peasantry into modern Turkish citizens 
through ‘conduct of conduct’. They deployed folk education as an instrument to 
educate the desires of ordinary people, to reconfigure their habits, aspirations and 
beliefs. The folk education project included both political education and aesthetic 
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education. The political education would teach ordinary people the principles of the 
new regime and make them adopt republican values. On the other hand, aesthetic 
education would inspire among ordinary people a love and appreciation for the  
Western music, theater, painting, and fine arts. In this way, the folk education project 
aimed to transform the lifestyles and worldviews of ordinary people through ‘conduct 
of conduct’. The People’s Houses had responsibility of organizing courses on fine arts, 
Western music and theater so that ordinary people could, as free subjects without 
facing any coercion, would choose any subject that interested them, and discover their 
latent skills and realize their true potential. 
 
In conclusion, I hold the opinion that the goals of the People’s Houses project extended 
beyond mere ‘ideological indoctrination’ or ‘control over minds’. On the contrary, I 
argue that this project was designed by the republican elite to increase their control 
over the Turkish population. I hope that my analysis of the articles in the Ülkü 
magazine provides some evidence to support my research hypothesis. Also I hope that 
this study can make a humble contribution to the critical literature on the People’s 
Houses, and help us deepen our understanding of these institutions which played a 
crucial role in the early republican period. 
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